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 Employment has been cited as a factor that can aid one’s desistance from criminal 
activity. However, research has consistently demonstrated that those with criminal history 
face significant barriers to securing employment. In recognition of this problem, most 
states have implemented various rights restoration mechanisms aimed to increase 
employment opportunities for ex-offenders. One of these mechanisms, the certificate of 
relief, aims to aid ex-offenders in their job search by ensuring employers that certificate 
holders are not a safety risk, providing employers with negligent hiring immunity, and 
removing occupational licensing bans. A handful of studies have examined whether this 
mechanism improved hiring outcomes for ex-offenders, but these studies produced mixed 
results and suffered from important methodological limitations. The goal of the current 
study was to address the limitations of previous research to provide a more 
comprehensive test of one state’s (Ohio) certificate. This goal was achieved with the use 
of two field experiments. Both experiments utilized a correspondence approach where 
hypothetical applicants submitted resumes to entry-level job postings. The first portion of 
the study utilized a mixed experimental design that included a within-subject criminal 
record variable and a between-subject race variable. The second portion of the study 
utilized a between-subjects experimental design that included a between-subjects 
criminal record variable and a between-subjects race variable. Results showed that 
certificate holders received significantly fewer callbacks for interviews than those with 
no criminal record. Results also showed that certificate holders fared no better in terms of 
iv 
callbacks than those with a criminal record and no certificate. Further, African American 
applicants received significantly fewer callbacks than White Applicants in all criminal 
record categories. These results were supported in several robustness checks. Policy 
implications of these findings are discussed in detail along with study limitations, 
directions for future research, and technical notes on correspondence studies.
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The number of those with some sort of criminal record now stands at 
approximately 85 million (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). Such numbers are of 
crucial importance when considering the issue of collateral consequences. A collateral 
consequence can be defined as any “legal penalty, disability or disadvantage, however 
denominated, that is imposed on a person automatically upon that person’s conviction for 
a felony, misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not included in the sentence” 
(American Bar Association, 2004, p. 15). It is also important to note that collateral 
consequences can emanate from early processes such as arrest (see Uggen, Vuolo, 
Lageson, Ruhland, & Whitham, 2014).  
There is now a growing body of literature examining various collateral 
consequences and their impacts on ex-offenders (see Gunnision & Helfgott, 2013; Love, 
Roberts, & Klingele, 2013; Petersilia 2003; Travis, 2005 for reviews). For example, those 
with criminal records face difficulties in securing housing, finding employment, 
participating in civic opportunities such as voting and jury service, securing occupational 
licenses, and dealing with stigma itself (Gunnision & Helfgott, 2013; Love et al., 2013; 
Petersilia 2003; Travis, 2005). Though each of these collateral consequences are 
important, ex-offenders and other related parties such as probation and parole officers 
consistently cite that one of the most punitive collateral consequences is the barrier to 
employment arising from criminal record stigma (Bahr, Harris, Fisher, & Armstrong, 
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2010; Garland, Wodahl, & Mayfield, 2010; O’Brien, 2011; Ray, Grommon, & Rydberg, 
2016; Western, Braga, Davis, & Sirois, 2015). These studies demonstrate that ex-
offenders face significant barriers seeking employment (e.g., lack of ability to travel), 
being hired, and being promoted to better paying jobs (Bahr et al., 2010; Garland et al., 
2010; O’Brien, 2011; Pager, 2003; Ray et al., 2016; Western et al., 2015).  
Such findings are of crucial importance here because employment is a key factor 
for desistance from criminal behavior (Baron, 2008; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Tripodi, 
Kim, & Bender, 2010; Verbruggen, Blokland, & Van der Geest, 2012; Wang, Mears, & 
Bales, 2010; Wright & Cullen, 2004; and see Lageson & Uggen, 2013; Uggen & 
Wakefield, 2008 for thorough reviews). Authors of such research argue that employment 
provides a pro-social bond and also economic resources needed to secure fundamental 
necessities and maintain positive relationships (Berg & Huebner, 2011; Petersilia, 2003; 
Travis, 2005).  
Recognizing the barriers created from collateral consequences, all jurisdictions 
have created collateral consequence relief mechanisms meant to provide some sort of 
collateral sanction relief (Collateral Consequence Resource Center, 2017). One of the 
newest mechanisms, specifically created to combat collateral consequences related to 
employment, is the certificate of relief (sometimes called certificate of recovery or 
certificate of qualification for employment) (Love, 2011; Love & Frazier, 2006; O.R.C. 
2953.25). Certificates of relief are intended to aid ex-offenders in their job search by 
providing a stamp of good character/employability from a court, lifting occupational 
licensing restrictions, and sometimes providing tort immunities to employers (Love, 
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2006; Love & Frazier, 2006; O.R.C. 2953.25). Only two studies have attempted to 
examine the effectiveness of these certificates, with one finding that they were effective 
in improving hiring outcomes (Leasure & Andersen, 2016) and the other finding that they 
were not (Leasure & Andersen, 2019).  
The purpose of this study was to provide a further test of the effectiveness of 
certificates of relief with the use of two field experiments. This study built upon previous 
research in several ways. First, previous research in this area largely focused on 
perceptions of effectiveness and the process for securing a certificate of relief. Like 
Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019), this study provides an actual test of the statute’s 
effectiveness. Second, this study built upon Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) by 
testing an amended version of Ohio’s certificate of relief which is theoretically more 
beneficial to ex-offenders (see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.25(D)(2)).  
Third, previous research only examined the effectiveness of certificates of relief 
for those possessing a drug conviction. This study used a criminal record condition that 
contained convictions of varying crime types (drug and theft). Relatedly, previous 
research only examined the impact of a single conviction. This study used a criminal 
history that included previous convictions. Including multiple and previous convictions 
was important, as previous research showed that most offenders have previous criminal 
convictions (Beck, 1993; Cuyahoga Intake, 2014) and that many of these offenders do 
not specialize in one particular crime-type (Cuyahoga Intake, 2014; Piquero, Farrington, 
& Blumstein, 2007).  
Fourth, Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) included few variables in their 
robustness checks (only job type in the 2016, 2019 study). This study tested the 
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robustness of its results primary results by including several control variables in later 
sensitivity analyses (see Uggen et al., 2014 for a similar approach).  
Fifth, the hypothetical applicants in Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) did not 
have official certificates of relief and were absent from an online list of current Ohio 
certificate holders. This study was conducted in collaboration with the State of Ohio, and 
hypothetical applicants possessed official certificates. Further, hypothetical applicant 
names were also added to the online list of current certificate holders.    
Finally, this study tested the geographic generalizability of certificates of relief by 
using Cleveland, Ohio for data collection. Ohio was chosen because of its recent 
implementation of the CQE legislation and because this state consistently has one the 
highest number of individuals under correctional supervision (Kaeble & Glaze, 2016). 
Cleveland was elected as this jurisdiction consistently produced more individuals coming 
under correctional supervision than any other in Ohio (Bennie, 2017).  
Such a study is important for several reasons. First, certificates of relief are 
becoming a popular legislative collateral consequence relief instrument (Garretson, 
2016). This is so largely because these mechanisms provide legislators an intermediate 
collateral consequence relief mechanism (i.e., one that does not permanently seal the 
offender’s criminal history such as expungement) (Garretson, 2016). Because of their 
growing popularity, it is crucial to test the effectiveness of these mechanisms to justify 
their current forms. Second, as noted above, the only two tests of these certificates 
produced mixed results (Leasure & Andersen, 2016, 2019). We should remember the 
cautionary lessons from early experimental studies on domestic violence mandatory 
arrests and scared straight programs which had a large influence on policy, but were 
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unsuccessfully replicated (e.g., Berk, Campbell, Klap, & Western, 1992; Petrosino, 
Turpin-Petrosino, & Buehler, 2003). Therefore, as employment is a critical factor which 
can aid desistance from criminal behavior (Bahr et al. 2010; Bushway & Apel, 2012; 
Garland et al. 2010; O’Brien 2011; Ray et al. 2016; Uggen 2000; Western et al. 2015), 
further study is necessary to account for the disparate findings in Leasure and Andersen 
(2019) and to determine which, if any, of the previous findings are supported.  
The implications of this study can inform policymakers on several accounts. First, 
as the early tests of this mechanism produced mixed results, the findings of this study can 
be used to determine whether certificates should be supplemented or modified. Relatedly, 
should this study find that certificates are effective in improving employment outcomes, 
such results could influence other jurisdictions to create similar mechanisms. Finally, 
should this study find that certificates are not effective in improving early employment 
outcomes, such results could be used to justify discarding these mechanisms in favor of 
tools such as pardon and expungement, which can completely seal one’s criminal history, 
or other tools that are meant to increase employer incentive for hiring ex-offenders such 
as the Work Opportunity Tax Credit.  
This study continues with Chapter 2 which provides a detailed review of literature 
and the research questions for the current study. Specifically, Chapter 2 explores the 
relationship among employment, offending, and desistance; the proliferation of criminal 
records; the barriers to employment created by criminal records; collateral consequence 
relief mechanisms; the theoretical framework for the current study; and proposed 
research hypotheses. Next, Chapter 3 details the specific methodology of the study 
including the type of design, context, design specifics, and analytic approach. Chapter 4 
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presents the results of the two field experiments. Chapter 5 discusses the results in 
relation to previous certificate research and also policy and theoretical implications. 




 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCHING EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR 
THOSE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS  
 
 Exploring employment outcomes for those with criminal records is an important 
area of research for several reasons. First, employment provides ex-offenders, a group 
who has generally not accumulated substantial assets, with the economic resources 
needed to secure fundamental necessities such as housing and food (Austin & Irwin, 
1990; Petersilia, 2003; Travis, 2005). Second, research has generally found that 
employment is related to lower rates of recidivism (Baron, 2008; Tripodi et al., 2010; 
Verbruggen et al, 2012; Wang et al, 2010; Wright & Cullen, 2004; and see Uggen & 
Wakefield, 2008 for a thorough review). For example, using longitudinal data that 
tracked 1,000 boys, Laub and Sampson (2003) found that adult employment (particularly 
stable jobs) was associated with a lower likelihood of re-offending.  
 However, studies have found differing impacts of employment on recidivism by 
gender and job quality. For example, Denver, Siwach, and Bushway (2017a) examined 
hazard rates for ex-offenders seeking to work in healthcare for both men and women. The 
authors found that those who had secured employment in this industry had an overall 
2.2% decrease likelihood of re-offending after one year, and a 4.2% decrease after three 
years. They also found that men were 8.4% less likely to be arrested over the three year 
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period, while women were 2.4% less likely to be arrested during this period. Further, 
Uggen (1999) found that those who held a higher quality job (quality was measured by 
type of occupation, skill level, and industry) were less likely to offend than those with a 
lower quality job (see also Allan & Steffensmeier, 1989; but see Bunting, Staton, 
Winston, & Pangburn, 2019 finding no significant difference in recidivism rates between 
those in full-time and part-time employment).  
 Finally, employment is often cited by ex-offenders, scholars, and practitioners 
such as probation/parole officers as one of the most important components to a successful 
reentry (Bahr et al., 2010; Francis, 2018; O’Brien, 2001; Petersilia, 2005; Ray et al., 
2016; Western et al., 2015). For example, Bahr and colleagues (2010) interviewed 51 
parolees over three years following their release from prison. Many of the ex-offenders in 
that study noted that securing a level of employment that would enable them to support 
themselves or their families was a major concern during their reentry.   
2.2 THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS POSSESSING CRIMINAL RECORDS  
 The number of those possessing a criminal record in the U.S. is staggering. In 
fact, some estimate that approximately 85 million individuals have some form of a 
criminal record (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). Focusing on arrests, Brame, 
Bushway, Paternoster, and Turner (2014) found that approximately 49% of African 
American males were arrested at least once by age 23. The authors found that 
approximately 38% of White males had experienced an arrest by that age. Examining 
convictions, Shannon and colleagues (2017) showed that people with felony convictions 
account for 8% of all adults and 23% of the African American adult population (see also 
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Uggen, Manza, & Thompson, 2006 finding that those with felonies account for 33.4% of 
the African American male adult population).  
State level data show a similar pattern. For example, previous research showed 
that one in six Ohioans, over 1.9 million people, had a felony or misdemeanor record 
(Ohio Poverty Law Center, 2017). Interestingly, recent research which disentangled 
felony and misdemeanor convictions found that a large number of those criminal records 
come from misdemeanors, rather than felonies (Hepburn, Kohler-Hausmann, & Medina, 
2019). In fact, those authors found that, depending on the cohort, between 34 % and 83 % 
of individuals located in New York City were convicted of a misdemeanor and never 
convicted of a felony (Hepburn, Kohler-Hausmann, & Medina, 2019).  
2.3 BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT 
A. Access and Use of Criminal Records by Employers  
 Coupled with the vast increase in the number of those possessing criminal records 
is the fact that such records now play a large role in the hiring process (see Levashina & 
Campion, 2009 for a review). While there are absolute prohibitions against considering 
race and gender as factors in hiring decisions (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), 
employers are granted a great deal more latitude to consider one’s criminal history (see El 
v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, No. 05-3857 (2007). However, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequent federal case 
law has set some limitations (42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(a)).  
For example, the Federal Eighth Circuit Court stated that an employer violates 
Title VII when the potential employee with a criminal record demonstrates that the 
employer’s neutral policy or practice has the effect (disparate impact) of 
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disproportionately screening out a protected group, and the employer fails to demonstrate 
that the policy or practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity (Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977; 
see also Levashina & Campion, 2009 arguing that the scope of background checks should 
be tailored for each position). In Green, the court used three factors to determine whether 
an exclusion based upon a criminal record is job-related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity. First, the nature and gravity of the offense must be 
considered. Second, the amount of time that has passed since the offense (and sanction 
completion) must be considered. And third, the type of employment position must be 
considered in light of the previous two factors.  
The EEOC has also specified two circumstances in which employers will 
consistently meet the “job related and consistent with business necessity” requirement. 
The first circumstance arises when the criminal conduct screen is conducted pursuant to 
the 2010 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. The second 
circumstance arises when the employer has developed a targeted criminal conduct screen 
that takes into consideration the Green factors and also provides an opportunity for an 
individualized assessment to determine whether the policy as applied is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity (EEOC Enforcement Guide, 2012).  
Further, because numerous private companies now exist to provide quick online 
viewing of criminal records (Jacobs, 2005; Roberts, 2015), the government saw fit to 
regulate such background checks via the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (15 U.S.C. § 
1681 et seq). This act governs criminal records checks that are conducted by a credit 
reporting agency (CRA). The act states that a CRA may not report arrests which are more 
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than seven years old, unless the underlying position has an annual salary of $75,000 or 
more (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c(a)(5), 1681c(b)(3)). Further, CRAs must use “reasonable 
procedures” to insure “maximum possible accuracy” (15 U.S.C. §1681e(b)). A CRA 
cannot report information which “is likely to have an adverse effect on the consumer’s 
ability to obtain employment” to an employer before it either notifies the applicant of its 
findings (so that they can be contested if erroneous) or unless strict procedures are 
already in place to ensure that the information it reports is accurate (15 U.S.C. §1681k). 
Finally, if a CRA fails to follow any of the FCRA provisions, a cause of action may be 
created for the applicant.1  
There are also some limitations at the state level. In Ohio, employers cannot 
question an applicant about an expunged juvenile arrest record (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2151.358(I)). Additionally, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission’s Pre-Employment 
Inquiry Guide cautions that employers should avoid any inquiry that would reveal an 
arrest without a conviction, unless a bona fide occupational qualification is certified in 
advance by the Commission (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02). Employers also cannot 
question applicants about sealed convictions unless the question bears a direct and 
substantial relationship to the position for which the person is being considered (Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2953.32, 2953.33, 2953.55). 
Some research also examines the interpretation and application of rules that 
govern employer responsibilities regarding applicant criminal history in the hiring 
process. Such research helps to ensure that fair hiring laws are being applied uniformly 
                                                 
1 See Philin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F. 3d 957, 963 (3rd Cir. 1996) for required 
elements for a cause of action under this provision.  
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and fairly. For example, one study found that some organizations set explicit standards to 
guide hiring decisions relating to criminal records, while others use a more informal 
approach and turn to a micro-rational decision process (Lageson, Vuolo, & Uggen, 2015). 
In another study, an author found that 33% of surveyed employers ignored requirements 
regarding criminal record questions in the hiring process (Day, 2019). 
Given the inconsistencies in how employers consider criminal record issues, some 
authors are now providing employers with practical frameworks which help employers 
make better informed decisions about candidates with criminal history. For example, 
some researchers used an actuarial method which attempted to predict a candidates’ risk 
of future offending. The first of these studies compared the risk of re-offense over time of 
a group of ex-offenders to a group of individuals in the general population (Blumstein & 
Nakamura, 2009; Kurlycheck, Brame, & Bushway, 2006, 2007). However, a later study 
by DeWitt and Colleagues (2017) argued that ex-offenders should be compared with non-
offenders who were applying to the same types of jobs. DeWitt and Colleagues (2017) 
argued that using the general population as a comparison group would result in many of 
those with no records having an inflated arrest risk. Proponents of the actuarial approach 
argue that such methods would allow ex-offender hiring frameworks to be evaluated and 
critiqued (Gottfredson, 2017). However, Nakamura (2017) cautioned that actuarial 
systems are problematic because they assign risk to even those with no records, meaning 
some life-time non-offenders would be denied employment due to an actuarial prediction.    
Regardless of the company’s approach to dealing with criminal history, 
subsequent case law shows that employers are granted a wide amount of discretion when 
deciding to exclude an employee because of their criminal record. For example, in one 
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case, a man who had been hired and who was satisfactorily performing his duties was 
dismissed from a job solely because of a company’s discovery of a 40 year old conviction 
(see El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, No. 05-3857 (2007)).   
Despite limitations on the use of criminal records in employment decisions, 
research shows that a majority of employers ask about criminal history in the hiring 
process (Bushway 2004; Duane, La Vigne, Lynch, & Reimal, 2017; Freeman, 2008; 
Holzer & Stoll, 2001; Martin, Huffman, Koons-Witt, & Brame, 2019; Mukamal & 
Samuels 2002; Vuolo, Lageson, & Uggen, 2017). For example, one study found that 
nearly 90% of organizations under study conducted criminal background checks on at 
least some job candidates, and nearly 70% reported conducting criminal background 
checks on all job candidates (Society for Human Resource Management, 2012). Further, 
Denver, Pickett, and Bushway (2018) used a national probability sample and found that 
over 31 million U.S. adults were asked about a criminal record during the application 
process in 2016. According to their survey, virtually all of the criminal record inquiries 
occurred at the application stage.  
These results could be explained by survey research which explored employer 
reasoning related to ex-offender hiring and background check practices. For example, 
research shows that employers were concerned about negligent hiring laws which could 
hold employers liable for employees’ actions in the workplace (Pager, 2007a; Levashina 
& Campion, 2009). Further, employers are concerned about the safety, security, and 
comfort of other employees (Giguere & Dundes, 2002; Harris & Keller, 2005; Pager, 
2007a). Finally, employers fear that if any incident were to occur, such negative publicity 
could affect the reputation of the company (Giguere & Dundes, 2002).  
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B. The Impact of a Criminal Record on Employment 
Criminal records can automatically disqualify a person for many state, municipal, 
federal, and private jobs as well as certain occupational and professional licenses (Love 
et. al., 2013; Zhang, 2018).2 Even if not absolutely disqualifying, the above literature 
shows that both federal and state law permits the consideration of a criminal record for 
purposes of hiring decisions in many occupations (Love et. al., 2013). Given that such 
information can be considered, research has consistently found that contact with the 
criminal justice system leads to worse employment opportunities (Ahmed & Lang, 2017; 
Griffith, Rade, & Anazodo, 2019; Holzer, 2007; Pager, 2008). Such findings help explain 
one state’s ex-offender unemployment rate which was nearly eight times that of the 
general population (Nally, Lockwood, & Ho, 2011). The specific outcomes under study 
have been one’s earning potential and early employment outcomes such as being hired or 
being invited to continue in the hiring process.  
As to the first outcome, various studies show that an ex-offender’s employment 
earnings are significantly lower than those without a criminal record or even other 
traditionally socially-disadvantaged groups (Freeman, 1991; Grogger, 1995; Harding, 
Siegal, & Morenoff, 2017; Lyons & Pettit, 2011; Nagin & Waldfogel, 1998; Waldfogel, 
1994). For example, Western (2002) used the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) and found that overall wage levels were about 16% lower for offenders 
compared to non-offenders (see also Raphael, 2007 with similar results). Nagin and 
Waldfogel (1998) used federal offender data and found that even a first-time conviction 
                                                 
2 See Love et al (2013) and the National Inventory of Collateral Consequences for a 
comprehensive list of disqualifications and hindrances.  
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had a large negative and significant impact on wage amounts for offenders over age 30 
(see also Grogger, 1995 finding similar results with state administrative data and 
unemployment insurance earnings data). Western and Sirois (2018) survey data from a 
Boston, Massachusetts reentry program and found that average ex-offender earnings were 
below the poverty level. Interestingly, some studies find a slight increase in earnings 
immediately after incarceration (Harding, Siegal, and Morenoff, 2017; Kling, 2006; 
Sabol, 2007). However, this increase dissipates over time. Further, one recent study 
suggests that wage differences are not as pronounced with offenders who have been 
arrested and not convicted (Apel & Powell, 2019).  
As to early employment outcomes such as being hired or being invited to continue 
in the hiring process, numerous studies of various designs have found that ex-offenders 
are less likely to be hired or called back for an interview. The first set of studies discussed 
here used survey or administrative data. For example, Western and Sirois (2018) found 
that approximately half of their sample of reentering offenders was unemployed during 
the period of study. Using data from the NLSY and comparing offenders with non-
offenders, Freeman (1991) found that incarceration reduced employment by 
approximately 20 to 40% (see also Carter, 2019; Curcio & Pattavina, 2018; Grogger, 
1992). Grogger (1995), as noted above, used state administrative data and unemployment 
insurance data and found that criminal justice contact (arrest, jail/prison, conviction) 
reduced an offender’s employment rate by about 8%. As with earnings, some studies 
show a slight increase in employment immediately after incarceration (Sabol, 2007). 
However, like the increase in earnings, the upturn in employment immediately after 
incarceration dissipated over time. One recent study by Harding and colleagues (2018) 
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utilized a natural experiment (randomization of judges to criminal cases) to examine the 
impact of incarceration and probation on employment. The authors found that both 
sanctions significantly reduced employment. Interestingly, the authors also found that 
those sentenced to incarceration had higher levels of employment than those sentenced to 
probation.  
Qualitative research has examined the experiences of ex-offenders and those 
associated with ex-offenders (parole/probation officers and social workers) during 
reentry. This line of research has largely found that employment is a highly important 
factor to a successful reentry and also that a criminal record is a major hindrance to 
securing employment (Bahr, Harris, Fisher, Armstrong, 2010; Gunnison & Helfgott, 
2011; Garland, Wodahl, & Mayfield, 2010; Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, 2016; O’Brien, 2011; 
Palmer & Christian, 2019; Ray, Grommon, & Rydberg, 2016; Sviridoff & Thompson, 
1983; Walter, Caudy, & Ray, 2016).  
Survey research has also found that employers are much less likely to hire those 
possessing a criminal history (Holzer, 2007; Kuhn, 2019; Pager & Quillian 2005). The 
majority of these surveys were collected by Holzer and colleagues in 1996 and 2007. The 
1996 survey was distributed to about 3,000 employers in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and 
Los Angeles from 1992 to 1994, with a follow-up survey being distributed to 600 Los 
Angeles employers in 2001 (Holzer, 2007). The surveys asked employers about their 
willingness to hire ex-offenders compared to other disadvantaged groups (welfare 
recipients, poor workers) and also about their perceptions of ex-offender workers 
(Holzer, 2007). Approximately 40% of employers stated that they would “definitely” or 
“probably” hire applicants with criminal records (Holzer, 2007). However, approximately 
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80-90% of the same employers stated that they would hire welfare recipients or workers 
with spotty work experience (Holzer, 2007; see also Holzer and Stoll (2001) with similar 
results in Cleveland, Ohio). Other research suggests that employers are less willing to 
hire ex-offenders who have more recent, severe, and job-related criminal history 
(Albright & Denq, 1996; Kuhn, 2019).  
However, a sizable limitation with survey research is that it only gauges an 
employer’s opinion on their likelihood of hiring ex-offenders rather than actual hiring 
practices. In fact, Pager and Quillian (2005) found that employers were just as likely to 
hire African American ex-offenders as White ex-offenders when using a survey design. 
However, Pager’s (2003) experimental audit study (discussed below) comprised these 
same employers, and employers were significantly less likely to hire African American 
applicants with criminal records. 
Because of the methodological issues with survey studies seeking to predict hiring 
practices, several sought to employ experimental designs to examine the impact of a 
criminal record on hiring. In one of the first of these experimental studies, Schwartz and 
Skolnick (1962) utilized an experimental correspondence approach (presenting employers 
with fictitious resumes and gauging positive responses such as callbacks for interviews) 
with the following treatment conditions: assault conviction, assault acquittal, assault 
acquittal and letter from a judge, and one with no criminal record. The results of this 
study were as follows: no record (56%); acquitted with letter (32%); acquitted without 
letter (14%); conviction (4%).   
Pager’s (2003) study was perhaps the most noteworthy in this area as it showed 
the negative effects of criminal record stigma combined with racial stigma and she was 
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the first to do so using an in-person audit approach (sending pairs of actual testers to a 
location to apply for jobs in person, while randomly varying a treatment condition). Pager 
(2003) and its progeny included race variables given the plethora of research showing 
that African Americans were consistently less likely to advance in the hiring process than 
equally situated Whites (see Bendick, Jackson, & Reinoso, 1994; Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2004). For example, Zschirnt and Ruedin (2016) utilized meta-analysis of 
42 separate correspondence studies from 1990 to 2015 to examine discrimination in 
hiring practices and found that discrimination against minorities was present across time, 
jurisdiction, gender, and economic contexts (see also the meta-analysis by Quillian, 
Pager, Hexel, & Midtboen, 2017, finding no change in the levels of discrimination 
against African Americans since 1989, but some evidence of declining discrimination 
against Latinos).  
Pager (2003) sent actual White and African American male testers to apply for 
entry-level positions in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The testers conveyed an incarceration 
criminal history by indicating prison work on a resume, by noting a parole officer 
reference on a resume, or most commonly by noting a cocaine conviction with an 18-
month sentence on an application. Pager’s (2003) results showed that blacks without 
criminal records received callbacks at only 14% while whites in the same group received 
callbacks at 34%. Further, blacks with a criminal record received callbacks at 5% while 
whites of the same group received callbacks at 17%. This means that whites with a 
criminal record received more callbacks than equally situated blacks with no criminal 
record (this result was not statistically significant).  
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Pager’s (2003) original findings have largely been replicated in later studies 
conducted in different jurisdictions. For example, conducted in Arizona using a 
correspondence and in-person audit study, Decker, Ortiz, Spohn, & Hedberg (2015) 
found the following callback percentages for White, Hispanic, and African American 
testers with a high school diploma: White no record (8.4% correspondence, 30.8% in-
person); White with record (8.5% correspondence, 14.3% in-person); Hispanic no record 
(8.4% correspondence, 0.0% in-person); Hispanic with record (8.2% correspondence, 
0.0% in-person); African American no record (6.5% correspondence, 21.1% in-person); 
(African American with record (6.2% correspondence, 12% in-person).  
Conducted in New York City, Pager, Bonikowski, and Western (2009a) employed 
an in-person audit study which used White testers with a criminal record and African 
American and Hispanic testers with no criminal record. The authors found the following 
positive callback rates: White felon (17.2%); Latino no record (15.4%); African 
American no record (13%). During the same data collection project, Pager, Western, and 
Sugie (2009b) employed an in-person audit study that examined differences between 
Whites with and without criminal records and African Americans with and without 
criminal records. The authors found the following positive callback rates: White no 
record (31%); White record (22%); African American no record (25%); African 
American record (10%). Interestingly, the authors also found that applicants who interact 
with the hiring authority at the job location were 4-6 times more likely to receive a 
callback or job offer. 
In Minnesota, Uggen and colleagues (2014) conducted an in-person audit study to 
examine the effect of a low-level arrest (disorderly conduct misdemeanor) on hiring 
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outcomes. White and African American testers were sent to 300 employers. The callback 
rate for the arrest treatment (34.7% for White applicants and 23.5% for African American 
applicants) was about 4 percentage points lower (non-significant) than the no record 
group (38.8% for White applicants and 27.5% for African American applicants). The 
differences in callbacks by race were statistically significant. Finally, as found by Pager 
and colleagues (2009b), applicants who came into contact with the hiring authority at the 
job location were 6-10 times more likely to receive a callback.  
Agan and Starr (2017a) used a correspondence approach that focused on entry-
level positions in the chain restaurant and retail sectors in New York and New Jersey. 
The authors found that those with a criminal record (non-violent drug and property 
offenses) were 60% less likely (statistically significant) to receive callbacks than those 
without criminal records (13.6% versus 8.5%). While the authors tested for racial 
differences in callback rates, no statistically significant or substantive differences were 
found.   
Leasure and Andersen (2017) used an experimental correspondence study which 
was conducted in Ohio’s entry-level employment market in 2015. Their results showed 
that 28.97% of those with no criminal record received a callback for an interview, 
19.15% of those with ten-year-old drug convictions were called back, and that 9.8% of 
those with one-year-old drug convictions were called back. The difference between the 
no record group and the one-year-old conviction was statistically significant. The 
difference between the one and ten-year-old felony groups was marginally significant. A 
limitation of this study was that it used only White applicants.  
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Expectedly, employer reasoning for disfavoring ex-offenders is similar to 
reasoning for instituting background checks. Again. those reasons included fears of 
negligent hiring liability, employee and customer safety, and company reputation 
(Bushway et al., 2007; Giguere & Dundes, 2002; Harris & Keller, 2005; Levashina & 
Campion, 2009; Pager, 2007a). However, some research showed that employers 
questioned whether ex-offenders have the skills to perform adequately in the position or 
if they have the commitment to remain in the position (Bushway, 2004; Graffam, 
Shinkfield, & Hardcastle, 2008). 
2.4 MECHANISMS THAT REDUCE THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF A CRIMINAL 
RECORD ON EMPLOYMENT  
 
As noted above, offenders and other involved parties consistently identify 
employment as both difficult to acquire and a major factor for successful reentry (Bahr et 
al. 2010; Garland et al. 2010; Gunnison & Helfgott 2011; Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, 2016; 
O'Brien, 2001; Western et al. 2015). In recognition of such findings, researchers have 
sought to identify mechanisms that could reduce the negative impact of a criminal record 
on employment opportunities. In addition to this research, a majority of jurisdictions have 
created mechanisms aimed at relieving the barriers to employment created by criminal 
record stigma (Love, 2011; Subramanian, Moreno, & Gebresellassie, 2014).3 The 
following two sections provide a detailed discussion of both formal and informal 
mechanisms that were created or shown to improve employment opportunities for ex-
offenders. A formal mechanism is one that is legislatively created to address collateral 
                                                 
3 Though rights restoration mechanisms are available in all jurisdictions, one recent study 
which surveyed South Carolina employers found little awareness of programs like Work 
Opportunity Tax Credit and Federal Bonding (Martin et al., 2019; see also Visher et al., 
2008, 2011).  
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consequences such as employment. Examples include pardon, expungement, and 
certificates of relief. An informal mechanism is any non-legislative tool that could be 
used to improve employment outcomes for ex-offenders. Examples include education, 
work history, and reentry programming.  
A. Informal Mechanisms  
Some research has shown that education improves employment outcomes for ex-
offenders. Cundiff (2016) utilized a correspondence study that employed testers with and 
without criminal records (drug convictions) who possessed either a high school diploma, 
an associate’s degree, or a bachelor’s degree. The study focused on entry-level employers 
and sought to determine whether callbacks for interviews would increase for ex-offender 
job seekers as their level of education increased. The study did not examine racial 
differences. The results were as follows: high school with record (4%); high school 
without record (16%); associate’s with record (8%); associate’s without record (22%); 
bachelor’s with record (22%); bachelor’s without record (24%). Regarding the first two 
comparisons (ex-offender and no criminal record in the high school and associate’s 
degree groups), the differences were statistically significant. These results show that the 
impact of a criminal record could be diminished once a bachelor’s degree is achieved (see 
also Albright & Denq, 1996 conducting a survey of employers and finding an increased 
willingness to hire ex-offenders who earned a college degree while incarcerated). 
Reich (2017) used an experimental factorial vignette design which was sent to 
employers to determine their willingness to hire various candidates. Some of the 
vignettes listed criminal records but also soft and hard skills. Examples of soft skills were 
being well dressed and having a positive attitude, while examples of hard skills were 
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previous work experience, job training, and a certificate from a court stating that the 
individual was rehabilitated. The results showed that the possession of soft and hard skills 
were significantly and positively associated with willingness to hire offenders. Similarly, 
research shows that incarceration and post-incarceration employment stints increase an 
employer’s willingness to hire ex-offenders (Holzer, 2007) and increase an ex-offender’s 
likelihood of being employed (Flatt & Jacobs, 2018; Visher et al., 2008, 2011). Other 
qualitative and survey research has found that volunteer work and third parties/previous 
employers who “vouch” for the ex-offender can be factors that increase an employer’s 
willingness to hire one with a criminal record (DeWitt & Denver, 2019; Cherney & 
Fitzgerald, 2016; see also Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2002). 
While many studies have failed to find that job training programs increase 
employment for ex-offenders (see Bushway & Apel, 2012; Davis et al., 2013 for 
reviews), some studies have found a higher likelihood of employment for ex-offenders 
who have completed job training (Albright & Denq, 1996; Baloch & Jennings, 2018; 
Saylor & Gaes, 1997). For example, one study using a focus group of employers found 
that employers were 90% more likely to hire an individual with a criminal record if they 
had successfully completed a reentry work program (Fahey, Roberts, & Engel, 2006). 
Similarly, Visher and colleagues (2008, 2011) found that those who were incarcerated 
and participated in trade or employment readiness training were more likely to be 
employed eight months post-release. Finally, Formon and Colleagues (2018) found that 
ex-offender graduates of community-based job training programs obtained employment 
at equal rates of non ex-offenders.   
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In a comprehensive effort to identify mechanisms that improve employment 
outcomes for ex-offenders, Denver (2019) used state-mandated criminal background 
checks in the New York health care industry. Applicants in the sample received an initial 
denial and petitioned for reconsideration to submit evidence of rehabilitation. Denver 
(2019) sought to examine the various methods that applicants demonstrated rehabilitation 
to determine if any particular method was more likely to predict approval. Denver (2019) 
found that prior employer recommendations, program completions (reentry program, 
drug/alcohol rehabilitation program, or anger rehabilitation program), and “other”4 
evidence were positively correlated with clearance to work. This result was similar to the 
findings of Denver and Ewald (2018) which showed the importance of prior employer 
recommendations after examining judicial licensing decisions for ex-offender applicants 
seeking to become unarmed security guards in New York State.   
B. Formal Mechanisms  
A pardon or clemency is an executive device which can certify one’s character, 
clear a criminal record, and or remove automatic restrictions (Love, 2011). Jurisdictions 
differ in what types of collateral consequence relief that pardons can provide. For 
example, in Ohio, a pardon provides a stamp of good character and can remove many 
automatic restrictions that are imposed upon conviction (State v. Boykin, 2013). 
However, the granting of an Ohio pardon does not automatically qualify an ex-offender 
for expungement (Restoration of Rights Project, 2018). In states such as Arkansas, a 
pardon does automatically qualify an ex-offender for expungement (Restoration of Rights 
Project, 2018).  
                                                 
4 The “other” category was not defined in the study.  
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  In many jurisdictions, a pardon is the only available collateral consequence relief 
mechanism (Love, 2011). Unfortunately, it is argued that our current political landscape 
has rendered pardon a “phantom” remedy because politicians avoid granting such relief 
for political expediency (Love 2011). Further, some also note that the pardon process can 
be difficult to navigate for the average reentering offender (Love, 2011).  
Expungement, which is available in about half of U.S. states, seals an offender’s 
criminal record and is usually for low level and first time offenders (Murray, 2016). 
Unfortunately, technology has relegated expungement to a near ineffective status (Jacobs, 
2005). Roberts (2015) notes that the overall effects of expungement will be quite limited 
in terms of actually clearing one’s record because of the proliferation of online record 
depositories who do not conform to sealing requirements. Several public internet 
companies that offer access to criminal records are not covered by expungement laws as 
such laws usually only require government agencies to seal the offender’s criminal record 
(Love, 2011). Further, sealed records can remain available to the public for ex-offenders 
aiming to work with children, the elderly, and other vulnerable populations (Love, 2011). 
To demonstrate the potential importance of expungement, Adams et al. (2016) used semi-
structured interviews with 40 past offenders to examine the expectations of individuals 
who seek record clearance and the extent to which completion of the process facilitates 
efforts to reintegrate into society and desist from crime. The authors found that record 
clearance benefits ex-offenders through external effects, such as the reduction of barriers 
to employment, and internal processes, such as the facilitation of cognitive 
transformation and the affirmation of a new identity. These benefits accrue from both the 
outcomes of the record clearance process and from the process itself. Further, Selbin, 
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McCrary, and Epstein (2016) found that record clearing (or reduction) boosted 
employment rates and average real earnings. In the most recent study in this area, 
Prescott and Starr (2019) found that offenders received an approximate 25% increase in 
wages (compared to offenders without expungement) within two years of expungement. 
The authors also found that re-offense rates for ex-offenders granted expungement were 
comparable offense rates of the general population. However, the authors noted that only 
6.5% of Michigan ex-offenders sought expungement within five years of eligibility. 
 Ban the box laws, which prohibit employers from asking about criminal history 
on applications and dictate when background checks can be completed, have become 
popular policy in recent years in both the public and private employment sectors (Henry 
& Jacobs 2007; Rodriguez & Avery 2017). Ban the box laws applying to public and or 
private companies have been implemented in 31 states and approximately 150 more 
localized jurisdictions (see Avery & Hernandez, 2018). For example, Ohio passed a 
statewide law in 2015 that banned criminal record questions on applications in the public 
sector and over 10 local jurisdictions have similar policies (Avery & Hernandez, 2018). 
Interestingly, empirical tests have generally shown that such laws do aid those with 
criminal records in securing better employment outcomes (Agan, 2017b; Atkinson & 
Lockwood 2014). One study sent out 15,000 fictitious resumes in two states that recently 
passed ban the box legislation (New York and New Jersey) and found that such laws 
made it more likely that individuals with criminal records would receive call-backs from 
prospective employers (Agan & Starr, 2017b). Further, one analysis examining the 
impact of the Massachusetts Criminal Offender Record Information reforms (enacting 
BTB policies) found small reductions in recidivism (Jackson & Zhao, 2017).  
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 Other research, however, found that minorities with no criminal record are 
negatively impacted by BTB laws likely due to statistical discrimination (Agan & Starr 
2017b; see also Sugie, 2017). Aigner and Cain’s (1977) statistical discrimination theory 
states that employers will make assumptions about potential employees based on their 
race. Pager and Karafin (2009) extended statistical discrimination to also explain poor ex-
offender outcomes (see Ortiz, 2014 for a full discussion on statistical discrimination, 
employment, and criminal records). Specifically, it is argued that employers will assume 
that ex-offenders and minorities, on average, will not be as productive or employable as 
whites or non-offenders (Moss & Tilly, 2001; Pager & Karafin, 2009; Zamudio & 
Lichter, 2008). This results in employers not hiring an individual minority or ex-offender 
because said employers impute their assumptions about ex-offenders or minorities as a 
whole to specific individuals applying for a position. For example, Eberhardt et al (2004) 
found that respondents associated African Americans with the term “criminal.” 
Numerous studies have linked negative views of African Americans and offenders to 
employers’ unwillingness to hire such individuals (Anderson, 2012; Neckerman & 
Kirschenman, 1991; Pager & Karafin, 2009). Further, others have found that BTB 
affected companies raise other requirements such as experience levels (Shoag & Veuger, 
2016), an attribute which ex-offenders (especially formerly incarcerated ones) generally 
lack (Austin & Irwin, 1990). Finally, one study found that 33% of surveyed employers 
ignored BTB requirements and included criminal record questions on applications (Day, 
2019).  
 The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), enacted by the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996, was created to help disadvantaged groups secure employment 
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(U.S. Dept. of Labor, 2017). This mechanism does so by offering employers a tax credit 
for hiring members of these disadvantaged groups. One of the disadvantaged groups are 
ex–felons who have a conviction or release from prison that is no more than one year old. 
The amount of the tax credit is determined by the amount of hours worked by the 
disadvantaged employee during the first year of employment; however, the maximum 
credit is $2,400 per employee. Further, to receive the credit, either the employee must be 
pre-certified before applying to the job (uncommon), or the employer must certify the 
employee post-employment (most common) (Hamersma, 2003).  
 Another mechanism called the Federal Bonding Program, created in 1996 by the 
Department of Labor, sought to ease employer concerns that ex-offender job applicants 
would be untrustworthy workers (Ohio Department of Correction, 2017). The program is 
essentially an insurance policy (fidelity bond) that protects an employer from losses 
associated with employee dishonesty. The bond is given to the employer, free-of-charge, 
and serves as an incentive to the employer to hire the job applicant who has a “risk” 
factor in his or her personal background such as an ex-offender with a felony record. 
Recent survey research of South Carolina employers suggests that employers may be 
more willing to hire an ex-offender who is eligible for a WOTC or bonding (Martin et al., 
2019).  
 While it is a federal program, individual states manage this mechanism. For 
example, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction has managed the Federal 
Bonding Program since 1998 (Ohio Department of Correction, 2017). For the bond to be 
processed and issued, four factors must be satisfied: (1) the ex-offender’s criminal history 
must be verifiable; (2) the ex-offender cannot be self-employed or on a personal service 
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contract; (3) the employment must be full-time or part-time; and (4) the applicant must 
receive a job offer and the employer must schedule a start or hire date. Once issued, the 
bond is effective for six months with a coverage amount of $5,000.  After the six months, 
continued coverage will be made available if the worker has exhibited job honesty under 
the program’s bond (Ohio Department of Correction, 2017). One study has found that 
employer willingness to hire ex-offenders was 51% for those with bonding, compared to 
12% for those who lacked this incentive (Albright & Denq, 1996).  
One of the newest mechanisms for relieving collateral consequences, meant to 
avoid the shortcomings of pardons and expungement, is the certificate of recovery/relief.5 
Certificates of recovery/relief are meant to demonstrate former offenders have been 
rehabilitated, remove automatic licensing bars for those with criminal records, protect 
employers who hire ex-offenders from negligent hiring claims, and help decision-makers 
make better-informed decisions about hiring individuals with criminal records (Green, 
2014; Love & Frazier 2006; McCann, Kowalski, Hemmens & Stohr, 2018). The earliest 
certificate of relief was created in New York (Radice, 2012). Several other jurisdictions 
have since created varying versions of certificates (see Garretson, 2016; McCann et al., 
2018 for reviews).6  
The theoretical underpinning for such certificates can most directly be traced to 
labeling and other related theories. Labeling theorists argue that early experimentation in 
criminal activity (primary deviance) could be exacerbated in individuals who were given 
                                                 
5 This section largely follows Leasure and Andersen (2019).  
6 For other examples of certificates of relief, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-904 to -908 
(2016); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 480(b) (West 2016); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5 / 5-5.5-
25 (West 2016); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:168A-7 (West 2011); and N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 
700-706 (McKinney 2016). 
30 
 
a criminal label because they would begin to identify and act out in accordance with this 
label (secondary deviance or the self-fulfilling prophecy) (see Lemert 1951). The main 
purpose of a certificate of relief is therefore to help an individual shed this label. Such 
reasoning is also consistent with Braithwaite’s (1989) reintegrative shaming where 
reintegration involves the use of some formal or social mechanism to show the deviant 
that they are still a member of society (see also Maruna, 2001; Maruna & Immarigeon, 
2013 for the similar concept of “delabeling”). 
While certificates are a relatively new collateral consequence relief mechanism, 
some research has examined issues regarding their accessibility, awareness, and 
effectiveness. Early research on New York certificates of relief utilized interviews with 
court actors, offenders, and other related parties and examined whether the mechanism 
was accessible to ex-offenders, relevant for employment purposes, or uniformly awarded 
(Ewald 2016; Garretson 2016). Ewald (2016) interviewed judges and probation officers 
to explore how these actors understood and awarded certificates. Ewald (2016) found 
considerable differences in responses on the purpose or utility of certificates as well as 
the procedure for awarding certificates (i.e., granting the certificate during sentencing or 
post-supervision). The varying opinions and practices regarding New York’s Certificate 
were said to result from informal local agreements and individualized discretionary 
judgments resulting from the statute’s ambiguity. 
In another study examining New York’s certificate, Garretson (2016) interviewed 
judges, people with certificates or those eligible but without one, attorneys, current and 
former probation officials, service providers, and advocates. The author’s goal was to 
examine the certificate’s accessibility and perceived utility. Garretson found that the 
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process of educating offenders about the existence of certificates varied widely between 
all these groups and individuals within these groups. She also found that interviewees had 
differing opinions on whether certificates were even relevant for employment purposes. 
One respondent stated “[c]ertificates are irrelevant for a lot of employers.” (Garretson, 
2016: 34). Another respondent stated “[e]mployers don’t even know that certificates 
exist” (Garretson, 2016: 34). Therefore, the results of this research show that there is a 
wide range of perceptions about the awareness of employers about certificates and on a 
certificate’s perceived effectiveness.  
Here, the focus is on Ohio’s certificate of relief, the certificate of qualification for 
employment (CQE) which became effective in 2012 (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.25). 
Ohio’s CQE was primarily created to remove occupational licensing barriers for those 
possessing criminal history. However, a CQE can also be used for “general employment 
opportunities” (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 2017). General 
employment opportunities refer to any position that does not require an occupational 
license. Interestingly, most CQEs are used for general employment purposes (Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 2016).  
A CQE is meant to increase the employability of an ex-offender by providing 
employers who hire CQE holders with negligent hiring immunity and an assurance that 
the individual has cleared a rigorous background check process. The background check 
process requires an applicant to provide a document listing identifying information 
(name, address, date of birth, social security number), prior convictions, prior 
employment, professional and personal references, reasons why the CQE is needed and 
should be granted, and one or more employment collateral consequences (Ohio Rev. 
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Code Ann. § 2953.25). Staff at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 
prosecutors, and judges all review and provide input on applications (Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2953.25). However, the ultimate decision belongs to judges on whether or not to 
grant a CQE (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.25).  
 As of January 2017, 588 CQE applications were granted, 140 were denied, and 
1,559 were in progress (Certificate of Qualification for Employment Annual Review, 
2017). Important here, in September 2017, Ohio amended their certificate statute to 
include a rebuttable presumption in favor of applying offenders. The amendment states 
that “[t]he certificate constitutes a rebuttable presumption that the person's criminal 
convictions are insufficient evidence that the person is unfit for the license, employment 
opportunity, or certification in question” (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.25(D)(2)). Such 
language certainly would seem to strengthen the ability of the certificate to combat 
employment-related collateral consequences. 
 Ohio’s certificate has threshold elements that must be met before it is officially 
granted to the ex-offender. The specific code section states as follows: 
[A] court that receives an individual’s petition for a certificate of qualification for 
employment … may issue a certificate of qualification for employment, at the 
court’s discretion, if the court finds that the individual has established all of the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: (a) Granting the petition will 
materially assist the individual in obtaining employment or occupational 
licensing. (b) The individual has a substantial need for the relief requested in 
order to live a law-abiding life. (c) Granting the petition would not pose an 
unreasonable risk to the safety of the public or any individual (Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2953.25(C)(3)).  
 
Further, to receive the certificate, ex-offenders must complete all sanctions and 
then wait one year for felony convictions and six months for misdemeanor convictions 
(Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.25(B)(4)(a)-(b)). As to the negligent hiring immunity, it is 
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important to note that Ohio requires that employers know the employee possesses a 
certificate before they can claim immunity (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.25(G)(2)). 
Further, if the employee demonstrates dangerousness or is subsequently convicted of a 
felony and is not terminated, the immunity does not apply (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2953.25(G)(3)). To aid employers in determining whether a CQE is valid, the Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction manages and publishes a list of all current 
CQE holders on their website. The list is updated every 2-6 weeks.   
Two studies have specifically explored the effectiveness of Ohio’s certificate. 
One study, conducted in 2015, surveyed Ohio certificate holders about whether the 
certificate was effective in improving their employment opportunities (Sahl, 2016). The 
survey of certificate holders received a response rate of 22% (about 90 individuals). 
Results showed an overall employment rate of 47%. Further, 48% of respondents noted 
that a certificate made no difference in their employment search. However, 25% noted 
that they did not even present the certificate to the employer. Forty-two percent said that 
a certificate did indeed help them secure or keep a job. These results indicate that ex-
offenders have mixed perceptions regarding the effectiveness of certificates of relief as a 
collateral consequence relief mechanism.  
 Another study assessed the effectiveness of Ohio’s certificate of relief with an 
experimental correspondence study. Leasure and Andersen (2019) utilized an 
experimental correspondence approach and sent fictitious resumes with identical 
educational backgrounds, employment experiences, and key skills to entry-level 
employers in Columbus, Ohio. Resumes differed only with a racially distinct name 
(Matthew O’Brien for White and Tyrone Williams for African American) and with an 
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affirmative statement self-disclosing a criminal record. On one resume, no criminal 
record was discussed. On the second resume, the applicant noted a single one-year-old 
felony drug conviction. On the third resume, the applicant noted a single one-year-old 
felony drug conviction and a certificate of relief.  
For White applicants, results showed the following predicted probabilities of a 
callback: no record, 29%; one-year-old felony, 9.8%; one-year-old felony plus CQE, 
25.6%. The difference between the CQE group and the recent felony group was 
statistically significant. The difference between the CQE group and the no record group 
was not statistically significant. These findings suggested that certificates of relief offer a 
substantial benefit to White individuals with criminal records seeking employment. The 
predicted probabilities of a callback for African American applicants were as follows: no 
record, 25.2%; one-year-old felony, 8.4%; one-year-old felony plus CQE, 11%. The 
difference between the CQE group and the recent felony group was not statistically 
significant. However, when compared to African Americans with a recent felony and no 
CQE, African American certificate holders had over a seven-percentage point increase in 
callbacks when applying for office positions (those with more customer contact and less 
labor) versus labor positions (those with less customer contact and more labor).7 This was 
a substantively significant finding. The difference between the CQE group and the no 
record group was statistically significant. Finally, the difference between Whites and 
African Americans who possessed a CQE was statistically and substantively significant. 
                                                 
7 Office and labor positions were the only two job categories used in Leasure and 
Andersen (2019).  
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These results indicated that certificates of relief may be more effective for White 
applicants.  
There were several noteworthy limitations from Leasure and Andersen (2016, 
2019). For example, the study was not conducted in collaboration with the Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, meaning the hypothetical applicant names 
were not on Ohio’s official CQE list. The authors argued that because the CQE list was 
updated periodically, it would not be uncommon for an applicant to possess a CQE and 
be absent from the published list. However, a stronger approach would be to add 
hypothetical applicants to the official CQE list. Further, the hypothetical applicants did 
not possess the actual PDF certificate that is awarded upon completion of the CQE 
application process. Instead, Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) included a simple 
statement on the resume noting that the certificate was recently awarded. Here again, a 
stronger approach would have been to attach the official PDF certificate to the resume.  
2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 There are several theories which are useful to understand why certain mechanisms 
are more effective at increasing employment outcomes for ex-offenders. Two of those 
theories, prospect and signaling theory, are intended to provide a framework to 
understand how certificates of relief, the focus of the current study, could be used to 
reduce employment barriers. In prospect theory, an ex-offender would use a certificate to 
reduce the risk associated with their hiring. In signaling theory, an ex-offender would use 
a certificate to signal the unobservable trait of productivity to an employer. The third 
theory, attribution theory, is intended to provide a framework to understand how 
explanatory statements accompanying a criminal record can reduce employment 
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barriers.8 In attribution theory, an ex-offender would provide an explanatory statement 
meant to lower the culpability for their actions and thus increase their employability.  
A. Prospect Theory  
 Prospect theory is a theory about how individuals make decisions and was 
introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect theory was developed to deal 
with unsupported components of utility/rational choice theory such as an assumption that 
individuals make decisions that that are in their best interest after a rational weighing of 
costs and benefits (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, if given the option of a 
50% chance of winning $1,000 over a 100% chance of winning $400, utility/rational 
choice theory would argue that individuals should choose the second sure option. 
However, research shows that this is often not the case and prospect theory is an attempt 
to remedy this issue (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). While this theory is descriptive and 
meant only to identify preferences (not to explain them), several components are useful in 
guiding the current study.  
Prospect theory has two primary phases with multiple components in each for the 
actual decision-making process. The editing or framing phase involves analysis and 
refinement or simplification of the available prospects. A large portion of this phase is 
influenced by heuristics. Heuristics are essentially methods/mechanisms that one uses to 
answer a particular question (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). For example, in the current 
context, an employer may ask “What is the probability that applicant A will be more 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that the current study does not test attribution theory. Attribution 




productive than employee B?” Kahneman and Tversky (1973) would argue that 
individuals would typically rely on a representative heuristic.  
Representativeness is when one tries to determine if object A is a representation 
of object B (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, an employer may see that an 
applicant possesses a recent criminal record and assume that this person is unstable or 
risky because of the behavioral characteristics commonly associated to those who have 
criminal history. In this example, the employer determined that the applicant was 
representative of a negative population (unstable or risky individuals) because the 
applicant possessed a criminal record. This is very similar to the procedures in statistical 
discrimination theory noted above in the discussion of ban-the-box (see Aigner & Cain, 
1977). The strength of this heuristic largely depends on the level of representation (the 
quality of the match between object A and B) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Another common heuristic is called availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Availability means that larger populations are more often 
used as a frame of reference than smaller populations, that likely events are more often 
used than unlikely events, and that one associates often co-occurring events (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Interestingly, both of the above heuristics are subject to multiple 
cognitive biases as people often begin the decision-making process with incomplete or 
inaccurate information and fail to properly adjust for new information (anchoring) 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, many individuals will make decisions based 
on limited personal or media observations and fail to recognize that such events could be 
rare and not typical (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the current context, an employer 
may have had a single negative experience with a previous employee possessing a 
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criminal record. This lone experience, which may or may not have been typical behavior 
from an ex-offender, could now influence their future practices about all other candidates 
with criminal records and result in a strong preference not to hire ex-offenders. 
 There are also several formal components of the editing or framing phase that are 
useful in the current study (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 for a full discussion of other 
components). One of these relevant components is called coding, which involves an 
individual identifying an outcome as either a loss or a gain. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) argued that an individual’s perception of loss or gain could be affected by the 
formulation of particular contexts, particular prospects, the expectations of a particular 
decision-maker, and by the reference point used by the decision-maker. For example, an 
employer may have a strong need for an employee (particular context) and a preference 
not to hire candidates with criminal records (expectation of decision-maker). However, if 
all candidates possess criminal history (formulation of particular prospects), the employer 
may be likely to relax their criminal history preference and select a candidate according 
to other factors (particular reference point).  
Another relevant component was meant to deal with situations of two or more 
prospects and was called cancellation. Cancellation involves the discarding of the similar 
traits of prospects in the decision-making process. For example, an employer may have a 
requirement of a high school diploma for employment. Because this factor is required and 
will be present in all candidates, the employer is likely to discard this factor in the 
decision-making process.  
Finally, detection of dominance is when an individual rejects a prospect due to a 
dominating alternative without further evaluation. For example, consider the following 
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two choices: (1) a 10% chance to win $20 and (2) a 10% chance to win $30. In this 
scenario, the dominated prospect (the lower dollar amount) is unanimously rejected (see 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In the current study, the dominated prospect is very likely 
the applicant with a criminal record. This is evidenced by the plethora of research noting 
significantly lower hiring outcomes for those with criminal history compared to those 
without (see Ahmed and Lang, 2017 for a review). The key to improving hiring outcomes 
for ex-offenders, therefore, is to identify a mechanism that can remove the label of 
dominated prospect. Interestingly, some research on prospect theory shows that framing a 
choice in positive terms can cause an individual to select a dominated alternative 
(Schelling, 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).    
In the second phase called evaluation, the prospect with the perceived highest 
value is selected (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) argue that decision-makers in this phase are prone to loss aversion, 
meaning that individuals fear equal losses more than gains.  Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979, p.278) provide an example of this process:  
the difference in value between a gain of 100 and a gain of 200 appears to be 
greater than the difference between a gain of 1,100 and a gain of 1,200. Similarly, 
the difference between a loss of 100 and a loss of 200 appears greater than the 
difference between a loss of 1,100 and a loss of 1,200.  
 
Several studies have supported this portion of the theory (Fishburn & Kochenberger 
1979; Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Hershey & Schoemaker1980; Payne, Laughhunn, & 
Crum 1980; Tversky 1977; Eraker & Sox 1981; Tversky & Kahneman 1981; Fischhoff 
1983). In the current context, this means that if an employer were given the option to 
choose between an applicant without a criminal record and another applicant without 
such a record, the employer would be more likely to hire the applicant without a criminal 
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record, even with similar work histories and education. Again, the key to improve hiring 
outcomes for ex-offenders would be to find a mechanism that reduces their perceived 
riskiness.   
B. Signaling Theory  
Signaling theory largely came from labor economics (DeWitt, 2018; Spence, 
1973). As noted by Maruna (2012, p.73), “signaling theory is very well suited as a 
framework for understanding how ex-offenders navigate and fare in the hiring process.” 
Signaling theory first originated from a work by Spence in 1973. In essence, signaling 
theory involves an employer (receiver) trying to identify traits which signal a productive 
or non-productive employee and a job seeker (signaler) who is attempting to signal 
productivity and hence employability to an employer (Spence, 1973). Bushway and Apel 
(2012, p.30) provide a scenario which shows the potential benefit of signaling in the 
reentry and employment context: 
The person reentering the community from prison may know that he or she has 
desisted from crime or that he or she is a good employee—but no one else does. 
Moreover, she now belongs to an observable group (ex-prisoners) that is known 
to have poor employment outcomes and high recidivism rates. Are there ways that 
the desister can signal to the employer her true identity? 
 
Spence (1973) defined signals as traits that could be altered by the job seeker. 
While recognizing the potential impact of non-alterable traits (generally race or sex), the 
focus of the theory is on alterable traits as these are ones that the job seeker controls (and 
could therefore demonstrate higher levels of productivity). The employer uses these 
signals of productivity because productivity itself is not an observable trait. There are 
many factors that influence the ability of a signal to be effective. First, it must be seen as 
rare or at least uncommon. For example, some argue that education is a very good signal, 
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as it takes a good deal of work to achieve a degree, and these qualities are expected to be 
translated into work productivity (Bushway & Apel, 2012). However, if all applicants to 
a particular position note a particular level of education, the employer will seek other 
signals to determine productivity (Spence, 1973). Further, if all applicants to a particular 
position noted a criminal record, then the employer would turn to other signals to make 
their hiring decision. This is a crucial point for signaling theory as it means that what 
counts as a signal of productivity or non-productivity can shift over time and in different 
market conditions (DeWitt, 2018; Spence, 1973).   
 Second, the signal must fit the unobservable quality (productivity or reliability in 
the employment context) (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; DeWitt, 2018). Fit 
is the amount of correlation between the signal and the unobservable quality (Connelly et 
al., 2011). As stated by DeWitt (2018, p.24) in the criminological context, “a signal of 
productivity or a signal of desistance should also be correlated with attitudes or behaviors 
we believe to be related to productivity or desistance.” Third, if a job seeker sends 
multiple signals, those signals must be consistent (Connelly et al., 2011). Consistency is 
the amount of agreement between signals from a single individual (Connelly et al., 2011). 
Research in economics examining the consistency of signals has found support for this 
proposition. For example, Chung and Kalnins (2001) found that hotels which send 
consistent marketing signals receive higher profits than those that do not. Interestingly, 
DeWitt (2018) argues that consistency creates a difficult situation for job seekers with 
criminal records because such candidates would be obligated to send multiple positive 
signals to overcome the single negative signal of the criminal record.  
42 
 
 Fourth, an effective signal must be viewed as honest.9 An honest signal is one that 
is in agreement with the quality that the signaler is trying to convey (Connelly et al., 
2011). For example, if an employee who is trying to convey education and thus 
productivity makes several grammar errors on their application, the employer may not 
view the signal as on honest one. In the current context, if an employee with a criminal 
record states that they have been crime-free for only a few months, the employer may not 
view that signal as honest.  
 Another component of signaling theory is noise. Noise can occur through varying 
interpretation of signals and also through preconceived perceptions of signals or signal 
categories (DeWitt, 2018). DeWitt (2018, p.22) stated as follows in regards to noise for 
those with criminal records seeking employment: 
[P]opular media is flush with references to dangerous criminals, collectively 
contributing to a disparaging view of ex-offenders by the general public and, 
thereby, a noisy, uncertain signaling environment. Probabilistically speaking, the 
criminological world knows that these depictions are caricatures of reality and it 
might even be said that employers are (un)consciously aware of this as well. 
However, the proverbial “bell” cannot be un-rung, and the damage to the 
signaling environment (i.e., labor markets) is unlikely to be undone without 
greater effort than it took to damage it in the first place. 
 
 Interestingly, some authors have argued that some signals may be more effective 
at reducing the negative signal of a criminal record. For example, Bushway and Apel 
(2012, p.33) note that signals which could overcome criminal record stigma “must be 
voluntary, . . . must be attainable by a comparatively small proportion of the population 
of interest, and . . . must have opportunity costs for the individual that vary inversely with 
desistance probabilities or work productivity” (see also Maruna, 2012).   
                                                 
9 Another component of signaling theory is reliability or credibility. This is essentially the 
combination of fit and honesty (see Connelly et al., 2011). 
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C. Reducing Risk or Signaling Productivity with Certificates of Relief   
Bushway and Apel (2012) stated that certificates of relief may be an effective 
mechanism for signaling the productivity/employability of an ex-offender (see also 
DeWitt, 2018; Maruna, 2012). Further, prospect theory would also predict that 
certificates of relief should be an effective mechanism at reducing the risk of hiring one 
with a criminal record. First, the wait times required by CQEs demonstrate that an 
individual refrained from criminal behavior for a substantial period of time. Ex-offenders 
satisfying this component demonstrate a reduced risk of further offense (see Blumstein & 
Nakamura, 2009; Kurlychek et al., 2006, 2007) and thus a higher level of 
productivity/employability. Second, all individuals seeking a certificate must voluntarily 
undergo a rigorous background check process (CQE Information Flyer, 2016). This 
satisfies the voluntary component of signaling theory noted by Bushway and Apel 
(2012). Third, the certificate application process requires offenders to show that the 
mechanism is needed and deserved (meaning there is no danger to the community) by a 
standard of proof used in civil law (preponderance of the evidence). This court 
determination or stamp of good character should be an effective component which 
reduces the risk associated with hiring one with a criminal record. Further, satisfying that 
burden of proof could be viewed as difficult to achieve as required by signaling theory, 
especially because some courts have denied CQE applications submitted by otherwise 
eligible applicants (see In re Bailey 28 N.E.3d 578, 2015). Finally, the negligent hiring 
immunity was specifically created as a risk reduction component for employers. Given 
many employers point to liability fears for not hiring ex-offenders (see Levashina & 
Campion, 2009), this component may be a particularly effective risk reduction 
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mechanism for employers. However, it is important to note that these requirements would 
need to be known or communicated to the employer in order for a CQE to be an effective 
signal or risk reduction mechanism. 
As noted above, Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) and Sahl (2016) found that 
Ohio’s certificate of relief improved hiring outcomes for ex-offenders (not statistically 
significant for African American applicants in Leasure and Andersen). Such results lend 
initial support for the argument that certificates are an effective signal of productivity 
(signaling theory) or an effective risk reduction factor (prospect theory).  
D. Attribution Theory  
The study design used here relied on the submission of resumes noting various 
criminal record conditions. The criminal record conditions were supplemented with a 
brief ex-offender explanation for the underlying criminal behavior. Such a practice is 
consistent with previous experimental studies examining employment and criminal 
record stigma as well as ex-offender practices (see Ahmed & Lang, 2017; Harding, 2003; 
Myrick, 2013; Ricciardelli & Mooney, 2019; Winnick & Bodkin, 2008). The substance 
of statement pointed to a drug dependency issue and subsequent job loss as the cause for 
the criminal behavior. These reasons were chosen because of the large prevalence of drug 
use and job instability with offenders (Cuyahoga Intake, 2014). The theoretical support 
for supplying an explanatory statement largely comes from attribution theory.  
The primary argument of attribution theory was that a perceiver would attribute 
higher responsibility to an actor if the actions were viewed as the result of internal factors 
and that a perceiver would relieve the actor of responsibility if the act was viewed as the 
result of external or environmental factors (Heider 1944, 1958; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; 
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Jones et al., 1972; Kelley 1967; Kelley & Michela, 1980; Shaver, 1975). Examples of 
external factors are all factors beyond the individual’s control such as socio-economic 
status and upbringing and examples of internal factors are personality, attitude, or greed 
(Cullen et al., 1985; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Hawkins, 1981; Kelley, 1967). 
The primary argument of the theory has received a good deal of support (Carroll, 
1978; Carroll & Payne, 1977; Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987; Cullen, 
Clark, Cullen, & Mathers, 1985; Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; Grasmick & McGill, 
1994; Hawkins, 1981; Ostrom, Ostrom, & Kleiman, 2004; Shaver, 1975). Research in the 
criminal justice area has found that those who attribute actions to internal factors give 
offenders a higher level of culpability and a harsher sentence recommendation (Grasmick 
and McGill 1994; Woolfolk et al., 2006), while those who attribute actions to external 
factors lower an offender’s level of culpability and their respective punishment (Carroll et 
al., 1987; Cochran, Boots, & Chamlin, 2006; Cullen et al., 1985; Graham, Weiner, & 
Zucker, 1997; Hawkins, 1981; Unnever, Cullen, & Jones, 2008). For example, Carroll 
(1978a, 1978b) and Carroll and Payne (1977) found that the most lenient parole decisions 
were reserved for individuals who were viewed as committing crimes due to external, 
rather than internal factors. Further, Cochran and colleagues (2003) found that 
respondents using internal factors were significantly more likely to recommend a death 
sentence than were those using external factors (see also Boots & Cochran, 2011).  
Interestingly, a few projects have indirectly begun to examine the relationship 
between attributions, criminal history, and employment. Ali and colleagues (2017) 
conducted three studies to examine the impact of apology, justification, and excuse on 
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one’s likelihood to hire one with a criminal record.10 In the first study which used 
vignettes on a student sample, the authors found that providing an employer an apology 
or a justification in relation to a criminal conviction resulted in a higher likelihood of 
hiring. However, providing an excuse resulted in a lower likelihood of hiring an 
individual with a criminal record. These results were consistent across job and crime type 
(Ali et al., 2017).  
The second study used a sample of hiring managers and confirmed the findings 
from the first study. In the third phase, the authors collected qualitative data from hiring 
managers. This data, supporting the other two studies, showed that the provided 
justification was an acceptable mechanism to decrease culpability, that the excuse 
showed lack of responsibility and thus questionable character, and that the apology 
showed acceptance of responsibility and thus employable character.11  
                                                 
10 In the control condition, candidates gave the following response: “I would be happy to 
discuss in the interview.” In the excuse condition, candidates gave the response: “I was 
convicted of [aggravated assault/burglary]. I was not responsible for the incident because 
I was in the wrong place at the wrong time. It was not my fault.” In the justification 
condition, candidates gave the response: “I was convicted of [aggravated 
assault/burglary]. I accept responsibility because I should not have been involved but I 
got involved in the incident because I was trying to help out a family member.” And, in 
the apology condition, the candidates gave the response: “I was convicted of [aggravated 
assault/burglary]. I should not have been involved and I understand what I did caused 
harm. I apologized and promised it would never happen again.” 
11 Another study in this area showed that attributions could differ depending upon the 
geographic location of the employer. Cohen and Nisbett (1997) sent employers in 
different geographic areas varying letters seeking an opinion on employability. A 
treatment condition contained a statement explaining the circumstances surrounding a 
manslaughter conviction (killing a spouse’s lover). A control condition conveyed a theft 
conviction. The results indicated that the treatment letters sent to western and southern 




In the current context, this means that employers who identify internal factors as 
responsible for criminal acts will likely attribute a higher level of culpability (and thus 
unemployability) to the actor. Conversely, if the criminal act was viewed as a result of an 
external factor such as poor education or socio-economic status, then the employer would 
lower the applicant’s level of culpability and determine that they are capable of 
rehabilitation and thus employable.  
Drug dependency has been largely classified as a medical condition in recent 
literature (Leshner, 1997), which may mean this condition could be viewed as an external 
factor. The loss of employment could also be viewed as an external factor (without 
evidence of a with cause termination). Further, the applicant’s simple forthrightness in 
voluntarily disclosing their criminal history may also be seen as a positive 
(EmployeeScreenIQ, 2013). Therefore, voluntarily including these two factors in an 
explanatory statement should increase the attractiveness of an ex-offender candidate. 
However, even if the two factors are not viewed as external, it is important to note again 
that supplying an explanatory statement with these conditions is both a more practical 
and a more generalizable approach for ex-offender jobseekers.  
2.6 THE PRESENT STUDY 
Because of the mixed findings on certificates of relief, the dearth of research on 
the subject, and previous findings that show the importance of employment to desistance 
(Bahr et al. 2010; Bushway & Apel, 2012; Garland et al. 2010; O’Brien 2011; Ray et al. 
2016; Uggen 2000; Western et al. 2015), further study was necessary to test the utility of 
certificates of relief in combatting barriers to employment. The purpose of this study was 
to provide a more comprehensive test of certificates of relief. This objective was achieved 
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with two field experiments. Specifically, this study built upon previous research in 
several ways. First, previous research in this area largely focused on perceptions of 
effectiveness and the process for securing a certificate of relief. Like Leasure and 
Andersen (2016, 2019), this study provides an actual test of the statute’s effectiveness. 
Second, this study built upon Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) by testing the amended 
version of Ohio’s certificate of relief (containing the presumption that one’s criminal 
record is insufficient evidence to deny them an employment opportunity) which is 
theoretically more beneficial to ex-offenders (see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2953.25(D)(2)).  
Third, previous research only examined the effectiveness of certificates of relief 
for those possessing a drug conviction. This study used a criminal record condition that 
contained convictions of varying crime types (drug and theft). Relatedly, previous 
research only examined the impact of a single conviction. This study used a criminal 
history that included previous convictions. Including multiple and previous convictions 
was important, as previous research showed that most offenders have previous criminal 
convictions (Beck, 1993; Cuyahoga Intake, 2014) and that many of these offenders do 
not specialize in one particular crime-type (Cuyahoga Intake, 2014; Piquero et al., 2007).  
Fourth, Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) included few variables in their 
robustness checks (only job type in the 2016 study). This study tested the robustness of 
its results primary results by including several control variables in later sensitivity 
analyses (see Uggen et al., 2014 for a similar approach).  
Fifth, the hypothetical applicants in Leasure and Andersen (2016, 2019) did not 
have official certificates of relief and were absent from an online list of current Ohio 
49 
 
certificate holders. This study was conducted in collaboration with the State of Ohio, and 
hypothetical applicants possessed official certificates. Further, hypothetical applicant 
names were also added to the online list of current certificate holders.    
Finally, this study tested the geographic generalizability of certificates of relief by 
using Cleveland, Ohio for data collection. Ohio was chosen because of its recent 
implementation of the CQE legislation and because this state consistently has one the 
highest number of individuals under correctional supervision (Kaeble & Glaze, 2016). 
Cleveland was elected as this jurisdiction consistently produced more individuals coming 
under correctional supervision than any other in Ohio (Bennie, 2017). As certificates of 
relief have become a popular legislative collateral consequence relief instrument 
(Garretson, 2016), such research is crucial to justify the continued use of current versions 
of this mechanism.  
The specific hypotheses were developed after careful consideration of previous 
research and theory in the employment area, new amendments to the certificate statute, 
and by the specific formulation of the base criminal record used in this study. Further, 
because of the design of the second experiment in the current study, it was possible to 
analyze the impact of a multiple conviction record on employment outcomes compared to 
one with no record. While the current study is primarily focused on the effectiveness of 
certificates of relief, this secondary analysis also contributes to the above literature given 
the dearth of research on the impact of multiple conviction records on employment 
outcomes. The hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: The probability of a callback for applicants with a CQE will be less than 




H2: The probability of a callback for applicants with a CQE will be greater than 
those with a record and no CQE. 
 
H3: The probability of a callback for applicants with no record will be greater 
than those with a record. 
 
H4: The probability of a callback for African American applicants will be less 



































3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 To answer the above research questions, two field experiments were used. The 
first field experiment used a between-subjects correspondence approach (see Lahey & 
Beasley, 2018; Vuolo, Uggen, & Lageson, 2018). This design called for sending an 
employer a single resume that is randomly assigned12 a criminal record condition and a 
racially distinct name. There were several benefits to using a between-subjects design. 
One of the advantages was that an additional criminal record treatment condition could 
be used for further comparison. In the instant case, this meant that outcomes of a 
hypothetical applicant with a criminal record and CQE can be compared to one with no 
criminal record and one with an identical criminal record and no CQE. Sending two 
nearly identical resumes to a single employer would have likely raised suspicion and 
biased any results (see Vuolo et al., 2018). Further, using only one base resume 
guarantees equivalence of base resume information (education, work history, and skills) 
(Heckman, 1998; Heckman and Siegelman, 1993). Limitations of this design include the 
inability to examine within employer differences (Vuolo, Uggen, & Lageson, 2016) and a 
                                                 
12 Randomization in the current study was accomplished using randomizer.org and 
random.org. Both platforms have been widely used for randomization in previous 
experimental studies (see Haahr, 2019; Urbaniak & Plous, 2013).  
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greater potential for error variance, where unobserved individual employer differences 
could affect the dependent variable.  
To account for these limitations, a mixed (both within-subjects and between-
subjects treatment variables used) correspondence design was also used (see Lahey & 
Beasley, 2018; Vuolo, Uggen, & Lageson, 2018). This portion of the design involved 
sending a single employer a treatment resume noting a criminal record and CQE and a 
control resume that noted no criminal history. Both resumes were matched on education, 
work history, and skill. Sending one employer both a treatment and control resume 
allowed one to examine within employer differences (Pager, 2003; Vuolo et al., 2016) 
and reduced the amount of error variance. Limitations of this approach include the lack of 
pre-treatment equivalence, carryover/spillover effects where one treatment’s impact can 
affect a subsequent treatment’s impact (a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption)13, and the inability to send additional comparison treatments to a single 
employer (Berk, 2005; Lahey & Beasley, 2018; Phillips, 2016). Fortunately, one can 
control for the lack of pre-treatment equivalence in resumes of within-subjects designs 
with random assignment of base resume information (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; 
Neumark, 2012).  
                                                 
13 For example, an employer, who despises those with criminal history, may receive one 
treatment resume with a criminal record statement and one treatment resume without 
such a statement. Receiving the criminal record resume may result in concern about the 
candidate history of other candidates, causing the employer to cancel the job posting (see 
Phillips, 2016). This would negatively bias callback rates for other conditions. 
Carryover/spillover effects could also positively bias callback rates where the beneficial 
attribute of one resume is imputed to others. Interestingly, one study has provided 
evidence of carryover/spillover effects in correspondence studies (Phillips, 2016).  
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Alluded to above, the correspondence approach sends resumes or other mailings 
to employers. The racial and criminal record conditions are then communicated via a 
racially distinct name and by an indicative statement on the resume. The correspondence 
approach has several advantages over other designs. For example, contrary to the audit 
approach, which sends actual testers to interviews, the correspondence approach requires 
no actual job applicants, is cost-effective, and offers greater control over experimental 
treatment and control conditions (Lahey & Beasley, 2009; Pager, 2007). For example, in 
Uggen and colleagues (2014) audit study, the authors assessed their testers’ conveyance 
of information and discovered some inconsistencies between tester reports and the quality 
check reports. Further, many employers now require online applications, and most U.S. 
adult job seekers utilize online resources when searching for employment (Nakamura et 
al., 2009; Smith, 2005; Stevenson, 2009). Other limitations of audit research such as 
problems in effective matching, the use of “overqualified” testers (testers who may seem 
more educated or well-spoken than the population under study), experimenter effects 
(individual traits, mannerisms, and or communications that would bias an experiment as 
they would vary from tester to tester), and issues of sample size and adequate statistical 
power (Fix & Struyk, 1993; Heckman & Siegelman, 1993; Vuolo et al., 2016).   
The experimental correspondence approach is also superior to non-experimental 
designs for several reasons. First, random assignment, which is the hallmark of 
experimental design, creates groups that are probabilistically similar to each other with 
any differences being left to chance (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Because of this 
fact, we can infer that any differences in groups is due to the treatment, not differences 
between groups that were present before the implementation of treatment (Shadish et al., 
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2002). This means that properly implemented experiments can yield unbiased estimates 
of the average treatment effect (Shadish et al., 2002). Second, when properly 
implemented, this design best deals with internal validity by satisfying all three of the 
requirements for unpacking a causal relationship (the cause proceeds the effect, the cause 
is associated with the effect, and there is no plausible alternative explanation for the 
effect other than the cause) (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Shadish et al., 2002). In fact, 
properly implemented randomized experiments are the only design to definitionally 
prevent selection bias (Berk & Ray, 1982).  
 Third, while one could survey employers or ex-offenders on their employment 
practices or experiences, such designs make it difficult to isolate causal mechanisms 
(Pager, 2003; Shadish et al, 2002), and it is also difficult to rule out selection bias and 
many other validity threats (Winship & Morgan, 1999; Rubin, 1990; Heckman et al., 
1998). Further, Pager and Karafin (2009) have already shown that many employers in 
their survey design stated that they would consider minorities with a criminal record and 
the same employers were later found not to do so in an experimental audit study. 
Similarly, though qualitative research provides a wealth of information useful for framing 
various concepts and providing in depth understandings of individual experiences, it 
lacks in its ability to determine causal relationships (Shadish et al, 2002).  
Finally, some studies have used secondary data such as the NLSY and techniques 
such as propensity score matching and fixed effects models to examine various questions 
surrounding criminal records and employment (see Ortiz, 2014 for examples). However, 
secondary data can be limited in terms of explanatory variables regarding employment 
outcomes and can suffer from low power (see Ortiz, 2014). Some have also shown that 
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techniques such as propensity score matching can introduce bias by creating imbalance in 
groups (King & Nielsen, 2018). Further, and most important in the current context, no 
secondary data exists that could be used to adequately gauge the effectiveness of 
certificates of relief.   
3.2 STUDY CONTEXT  
The study was conducted in Cleveland, Ohio. In 2019, Cleveland had an 
estimated population of 383,793 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). Of that population, 52.1% 
were female. Further, 33.8% identified as White, 50.4% identified as Black or African 
American, and 11.2% identified as Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). 
According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data (2019a), Cleveland had an unemployment 
rate of 5.2% in January 2019, 4.8% in February 2019, 4.4% in March 2019, 3.8% in April 
2019, 3.9% in May 2019, and 4.7% in June 2019. National averages during that time 
were 4% in January, 3.8% in February, 3.8% in March, 3.6% in April, 3.6% in May, and 
3.7% in June (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019b).   
One in six Ohioans—over 1.9 million people—has a felony or misdemeanor 
record (Ohio Poverty Law Center, 2017). Further, in 2015, more than 70,000 persons 
were incarcerated in Ohio jails and prisons, and 262,000 persons were under some form 
of community supervision (Kaeble & Glaze, 2016). These numbers result in a 
correctional supervision rate of nearly 3,000 per 100,000 adults (Kaeble & Glaze, 2016). 
In fact, only California, Florida, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Texas had more individuals 
under some form of correctional supervision (Kaeble & Glaze, 2016). Further, 251,500 of 
these individuals were male and 80,000 were female (Kaeble & Glaze, 2016). Cuyahoga 
County, which comprises Cleveland area, consistently sends the most individuals to Ohio 
56 
 
prisons. For example, in 2016, Cuyahoga County sent about 2,500 individuals to Ohio 
prisons, about 5 percentage points higher than any other county (Bennie, 2017).  
Of these incarcerated individuals, 60.5% were White, 36.6% were black or 
African American, and about 2% were Hispanic (Bennie, 2017). Approximately 76% of 
Ohio inmates are 39 years old or younger (Bennie, 2017). Further, drug offenses 
(possession the most common) make up the largest single group of Ohio commitments at 
approximately 28%14, while other common categories are crimes against persons 
(robbery most common) at 24%, property offenses (theft most common) at 22%, and 
fraud offenses (forgery most common) at 2%. However, some individual offenses worthy 
of note are weapons under disability which makes up 4% of Ohio commitments and 
resisting arrest at 2%. These statistics mirror data for Ohioans under some form of 
community supervision as well (Galli, 2016). Important in the current study, intake data 
also shows that at least 70% of Cuyahoga County offenders had one or more prior felony 
or misdemeanor convictions and with varied crime types (Cuyahoga Intake, 2014).  
Cuyahoga county’s correctional demographic trends track those at the state level 
(Cuyahoga County Snapshot, 2014). Further, approximately 3,250 offenders were 
released back into Cuyahoga County in 2014, with about 60% of those offenders on 
parole (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 2015). The most recent 
numbers show a three-year recidivism rate of 26.5% for the Cleveland area for offenders 
who entered the Department of Correction (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction, 2011). This rate is similar to other counties in Ohio.   
                                                 
14 Crimes against a person would be the most common if sex offenses (rape most 
common) were counted in this category. However, Ohio separates these two crime types.  
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3.3 EMPLOYER SAMPLE 
 The data used in the current study was derived from a census of Cleveland, Ohio 
lower-level employment listings posted on the websites craigslist.org and 
careerbuilder.com and a random sample of indeed.com.15 Only postings that required the 
submission of a resume were included.16 17Employers that requested applicants to apply 
in person or those in industries which generally prohibit hiring those with criminal 
records were eliminated from the sampling frame (healthcare, childcare, eldercare, and 
security) (see Pager, 2003 for a similar approach). Lower-level employment was defined 
as a position requiring no previous work experience, training, or skills that were specific 
to a particular position. Further, postings were included if they contained minimal 
                                                 
15 The number of postings and layout of careerbuilder.com and craigslist.org allowed for 
a census approach, while the amount of positions and layout of indeed.com was much 
greater and required a random draw. However, it was very difficult to create a full 
population list on indeed.com as the site repopulates postings after each page change or 
refreshing. Therefore, only postings listed within the last two weeks were included to try 
and approximate a census approach. Further, using more recent postings should help to 
increase the likelihood of callbacks. Focusing on more recent applications is a common 
practice in actual ex-offender job searches and in previous correspondence studies (see 
Decker et al., 2015). 
16 Submitting only a resume is a common practice. For example, a search of 
careerbuilder.com just before data collection showed that 159 out of 288 lower-level jobs 
only required submission of a resume.  
17 Some postings on indeed.com and careerbuilder.com required an applicant to fill in 
required fields when attaching their resume. These fields were largely completed using 
the information supplied on the resume (e.g., name, email, work experience in a 
particular industry). However, some fields (primarily on indeed.com) sought information 
that was not supplied on the resume. Examples included availability, expected start dates, 
and willingness to submit to a background check. To help ensure the absence of bias from 
this approach, each hypothetical applicant answered these questions in the same manner 
(see Agan & Starr, 2017a, 2017b for a similar approach to dealing with formal 
application differences). Further, models were estimated with and without job website as 
an additional control variable and there were no statistically or substantively significant 
differences in the treatment results. Job website was ultimately not included as a control 
variable in the robustness checks below because several individual job listings were 
posted on multiple websites.   
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requirements that were satisfied by the work histories in the fictitious resumes. This type 
of employment was the focus here given previous research showing that ex-offenders 
were more likely to seek and find work in these sectors (Griffith et al., 2019; Nally et al., 
2014; Visher et al., 2008, 2011).  
Sample size calculations for in-person audit and correspondence studies are 
largely dependent on the number of callbacks received for a particular treatment (Decker 
et al., 2015; Vuolo, Uggen, & Lageson, 2016, 2018). For matched-pairs designs utilizing 
binary outcomes, sample size is determined from the proportions of the discordant pairs 
(Vuolo, Uggen, & Lageson, 2016). For between-subjects designs utilizing binary 
outcomes, sample size is determined from the proportions of positive responses for each 
experimental condition or from expected effect sizes (Cohen, 1988; Rosner, 2011).  
In line with the recommendations of Vuolo, Uggen, and Lageson (2016), several 
estimates of callback rates were used for sample size calculations. The estimates were 
guided by callback/willingness to hire estimates from previous research, new 
amendments to the certificate statute, and by the formulation of the criminal record and 
base resume information used in this study. Sample size for the mixed design was largely 
determined by Vuolo, Uggen, and Lageson (2016) as these authors presented sample size 
suggestions for various discordant pair proportions. Sample size for the between-subjects 
design was determined from various sample size calculators (ClinCalc, 2019; Champely 
et. al., 2018). After several different estimates of callbacks, a conservative mixed design 
sample size was determined to be 400 employers and thus 800 resumes (two resumes to 
each employer). A conservative sample size for the between-subjects design was 
determined to be 1200 employers and 1200 resumes (one resume to each employer). In 
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each design, there will be 200 resumes for each condition (e.g., White with no record, 
African American with no record, etc.). These calculations were based on a power of .8 
to .9 to detect statistically significant effects (p ≤ .05).   
 To reach this sample size, data was collected from January 2019 to June 2019. 
Further, if an employer listed multiple postings, only one posting was selected for each 
employer. If the study were to include multiple postings from one employer, it would be 
possible that the employer would be randomly assigned resumes with identical base 
resume information and different names or criminal record treatment conditions. Each 
week, all lower-level job listings on the above websites were selected and then randomly 
assigned to a racial and criminal record condition. 
3.4 BASE RESUME CONSTRUCTION   
A correspondence approach necessitates the creation of base resume information 
such as education, work history, address, phone number, and skills. Traditionally, two 
approaches have been used to assign this base information to resumes. In the first 
approach, researchers create sets of resumes with base information that is equally 
matched on each component (see Decker et al., 2015). For example, one resume would 
note a 2-year employment with Home Depot, while another would note a 2-year 
employment with Lowe’s. Each base resume component would be matched in this 
fashion. Previous authors using this method argue that random assignment of treatment to 
resumes cures any pre-application differences (Decker et al., 2015). However, others note 
that failure to create effective matches could bias any results due to unobserved resume 
characteristics (Heckman, 1998; see Lahey & Beasley, 2018 for the similar problem of 
template bias). In an attempt to cure this potential bias from unobserved resume 
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characteristics, some randomly assign base resume characteristics and treatment 
conditions so that they can analyze the impact of these factors (see Agan & Starr, 2017a, 
2017b; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark, 2012). In the current study, base 
resumes were matched and coded so that their potential impact could be assessed and 
controlled.  
Regardless of the chosen approach, it is most important to ensure that the base 
resume information is generalizable to the population under study (Carlsson, Fumarco & 
Rooth, 2014; Lahey & Beasley, 2018). To ensure generalizability here, resumes of ex-
offenders who participated in an Ohio work-readiness program were used to create the 
bulk of the fictitious base resume information. This information was also coupled with 
Ohio correctional data.  
In line with this approach, resumes were designated with only a GED to satisfy 
the education requirement of the resume. Because of the commonality of an applicant 
with a GED, both resumes can be assigned this characteristic without raising suspicion. 
This education level was chosen because of its prevalence at the Ohio work-readiness 
facility and because approximately 64% of those under supervision in Ohio had at least a 
GED or high school diploma (Intake, 2016). A GED was chosen over a high school 
diploma because the majority of offenders under Ohio supervision had a GED rather than 
diploma (Intake, 2016). Assigning resumes with a GED rather than no GED or no high 
school diploma should increase employer response and thus increase the statistical power 
of the study (see Pager, 2003 for a similar approach). However, because approximately 
40% of offenders lack a GED or high school diploma, it will be important to note as a 
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descriptive statistic how many employers in the sample make this level of education a 
requirement. 
As to the work history requirement on the resume, research has found that 31% of 
state inmates and 27% of federal inmates were unemployed in the month before their 
incarceration (Government Accounting Office, 2000). In Cuyahoga County Ohio, 49.7% 
of correctional commitments reported some type of employment before incarceration 
(Cuyahoga Intake, 2014). The most recent work in this area suggests that post-
incarceration employment is indeed very irregular for ex-offenders (Sugie, 2018). 
Therefore, in the current study, resumes were assigned an inconsistent work history to 
increase external validity. Specifically, resumes indicated lower-level employment 
experience in general labor, customer service, and restaurant work. The key skills were 
derived from this work history.  
Each resume will include equivalent gaps in work history to account for a period 
of incarceration. However, many ex-offenders with felony convictions do not face 
incarceration (Reaves 2013). Regardless, the approach here was designed to fit any 
sanction.  
The addresses presented on the resumes were randomly chosen from a list of 
rental properties in the Central and Glenville neighborhoods of Cleveland (two addresses 
for the mixed design and one address for the between-subjects design). Residents of these 
neighborhoods were predominately African American populations (approximately 42% 
larger of an African American population compared to all of Cleveland) (Statistical Atlas, 
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2019a, 2019b).18 Further, when compared to Cleveland averages, these neighborhoods 
had lower household incomes, higher unemployment rates, higher use of public benefits 
such as food stamps, higher proportions of individuals with no high school diploma, and 
lower proportions of individuals with advanced degrees (Statistical Atlas, 2019a, 2019b). 
While it may be interesting to explore whether there would be differences between 
disadvantaged and advantaged addresses, the addresses used here have been shown to 
receive the largest amount of reentering ex-offenders (La Vigne et al., 2003) and were 
used here to increase generalizability.   
The resumes also noted a Cleveland, Ohio phone number which used a standard 
voicemail account. Email addresses were also presented on resumes. The email addresses 
were comprised of the applicants’ name (i.e., sethwalsh135@gmail.com).  
3.5 KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
A. Criminal Record Conditions 
The first key independent variable contained the criminal record categories. In the 
between-subjects portion of the study, employers were randomly assigned one of three 
criminal record categories. The specific crimes were formulated from commitment and 
release data from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction noted above. The 
criminal record categories for the between-subjects design were as follows: (1) a 
condition noting a felony drug and theft conviction and a misdemeanor drug conviction 
(2) a condition noting a felony drug and theft conviction and a misdemeanor drug 
conviction with CQE; and (3) a condition noting no criminal record. The no criminal 
                                                 
18  This entity combines and cross-references information from the 2010 U.S. Census 
Bureau and from the 2012-2016 American Community Survey.  
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record group is useful as it provides a baseline measure for the applicants with 
certificates. The specific criminal record categories for the mixed design were as follows: 
(1) a condition noting a felony drug and theft conviction and a misdemeanor drug 
conviction with CQE and (2) a condition noting no criminal record. Using a criminal 
history with multiple convictions provides a more comprehensive test of Ohio’s 
certificate because this type of criminal history is more generalizable to Ohio’s offender 
population. 
The misdemeanor drug conviction was listed as approximately six years-old and 
the felony theft and drug convictions were listed as approximately three years-old. The 
three-year-old convictions noted a term of incarceration that ended a little over one year 
before the submission of the resume. This post-incarceration term allows for the one-year 
time clean requirement imposed by the CQE statute. Further, as noted above, this study 
was conducted in collaboration with the State of Ohio, and hypothetical applicants 
possessed official certificates and hypothetical applicant names were also added to the 
online list of current certificate holders.    
Criminal histories in previous audit and correspondence studies were signaled by 
noting work experience in prison (see Decker et al., 2015, i.e., Arizona State Prison 
Complex, Laundry Crew), parole officer references (Pager, 2003), application questions 
(Agan & Starr, 2017a; Pager, 2003; Uggen et al., 2014), and through unsolicited 
statements in interviews (Uggen et al., 2014). Many of these studies confirmed these 
practices as common with local employment specialists, parole officers, and offenders 
(Pager, 2003; Uggen et al., 2014). The practice of self-disclosure on resumes and other 
early application materials, such as cover letters, is consistent with procedures 
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recommended by a Columbus, Ohio work-readiness facility (where the author assisted in 
teaching for three years), professional resume writing firms, and previous correspondence 
studies (Ahmed & Lang, 2017; Grammar Chic, 2014). The criminal record conditions 
used here were conveyed via cover letter.  
Self-disclosure of a criminal record is recommended practice for several reasons. 
First, research shows that an ex-offender’s forthrightness helps combat the negative 
effects of criminal record stigma (Ross et al, 2011; Ali et al., 2017). In fact, one study 
found that 52% of the 992 employers surveyed would be inclined to hire someone who 
self-disclosed criminal history, while only 8% stated that they would not hire one who 
self-disclosed (EmployeeScreenIQ, 2013). Relatedly, Adler (1993) found that many 
offenders fear attempts to conceal their criminal history will likely harm their 
employment opportunities. Second, research has demonstrated that disclosure of one’s 
criminal history can serve as a form of stigma management, as the offender controls 
when and how the information is discussed (Harding, 2003; Myrick, 2013; Ricciardelli & 
Mooney, 2019; Winnick & Bodkin, 2008).  
B. Racial Conditions 
The second key independent variable was the randomly assigned racially distinct 
name. This variable was coded 0 for African Americans and 1 for Whites. First names 
were randomly selected from Gaddis (2017) who surveyed users of Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (an online crowdsourcing platform) to examine perceptions of which 
first names best conveyed race in correspondence studies (see Berinsky et al., 2012; 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci 2014 for a 
discussion of representativeness/external validity issues with this platform). Gaddis 
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(2017) also paired first names with various last names to ensure that the racial 
perceptions of the first names were robust once paired with various last names. First 
names that best conveyed a White individual were Katelyn, Hunter, Claire, Jake, and 
Seth. More than 97% of respondents in that study perceived these names as White. First 
names that best conveyed an African American individual were DaShawn, Tanisha, 
Tremayne, Jamal, and Daquan. More than 95% of respondents perceived these first 
names as African American. Many of these first names were also used in the rigorous 
correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) who confirmed racial 
distinctiveness from birth certificate data and an independent field survey.  
Last name selection was guided by Crabtree and Chykina (2018) and frequency 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Crabtree and Chykina 
(2018) adapted a method from political research to identify geographically robust racially 
distinct last names and found that last names such as Andersen, Walsh, Nielsen, and 
McGrath were consistently perceived as White. Further, frequency data from the Census 
showed that many last names are predominately used by one race. For example, the 
surname Washington was used by 89.9% of African Americans and only 5.2% of Whites. 
The surname Jefferson was used by 75.2% of African Americans and only 18.7% of 
Whites. The surname Booker was used by 65.6% of African Americans and only 30% of 
Whites. Census data also showed that the White names mentioned above from Crabtree 
and Chykina (2018) were used by approximately 95% Whites and only about 1% of 
African Americans.  
Using these sources of racially distinct names, a list was created so that individual 
first and last names could be randomly drawn and applied to resumes. The randomly 
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selected names for the African American applicants were as follows: (1) DaQuan 
Jefferson and (2) Tremayne Washington. The randomly selected names for the White 
applicants were as follows: (1) Jake Walsh and (2) Seth McGrath. 
3.6 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable in both portions of the study was whether a hypothetical 
applicant was invited to advance in the hiring process (dichotomous yes or no). Generally 
referred to as a callback, this has been the outcome of interest in the majority of 
experimental studies examining racial and criminal record discrimination within the 
hiring process (see Decker et al., 2015; Lahey & Beasley, 2018; Leasure & Andersen, 
2016, 2019; Pager, 2003, Pager et al., 2009; Uggen et al., 2014). Discussed further below, 
the mixed design includes an additional robustness check analysis for occasions when 
both resumes receive a callback. This analysis uses a dependent variable that noted which 
resume was called first (see Rodríguez Menés & Rovira, 2019 for a similar approach). 
Focusing upon this stage of employment is ideal as research has found and argued 
that these early employment outcomes, such as hiring and interview decisions, account 
for a large amount of discrimination in the job market (Bendick et al. 1999; Pager 2003; 
Pager et al. 2009). Callbacks were measured by monitoring anonymous email accounts 
(which were made up of the hypothetical applicants’ names, e.g., 
jakewalsh.1@gmail.com) and anonymous voicemail boxes for 30 days after submission 
of the resume. While voicemails and emails were monitored for 30 days after resume 
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submission, virtually all callbacks occurred within one week of submission (see Baert et 
al., 2016 for a similar practice and result).19   
3.7 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS   
A. Control Variables  
The first robustness check procedure involved including control variables into 
each regression model. There were several control variables included in both studies. The 
first variable noted the employment status of the position (full-time, part-time, and none 
listed). This variable was coded 0 for part-time, 1 for full-time, and 2 if neither could be 
determined from the posting.20 Some postings did not directly specify an employment 
                                                 
19 Sixteen voicemails or emails could not be traced to a specific job posting/company 
name (see Agan & Starr, 2017a, 2017b experiencing similar difficulties). However, it is 
important to note that some of these unidentified voicemails or emails may have been 
related to entries that were already recorded or were recorded later. Further, it is also 
possible that two or more of the unidentified voicemails and emails were related to the 
same entry. Failure to identify a voicemail or email occurred for two reasons. First, some 
voice messages were inaudible or left little detail and the job posting could not be 
identified through a Google search of the phone number. This first reason accounted for 
the majority of voicemails and emails that could not be traced. Second, some emails and 
voicemails noted company names that did not match any of those in the submitted list. It 
is possible that some unidentified companies had additional titles/affiliations such as 
parent companies. Such an explanation is plausible as Google searches sometimes 
uncovered these affiliations. However, some unidentified company names could not be 
traced to a parent company or separate affiliation. Some of the unidentified voicemails 
and emails could be narrowed to specific designs and conditions. Six can be traced to the 
mixed design (meaning one was CQE and one was no criminal record) as both phones 
received calls. Of those six, two pairs were White and African American (DaQuan and 
Jake and Seth and Tremayne). Five other calls were for Jake (two which must have been 
a CQE), two for Tremayne, one for Seth, and two that did not note a name (one for 
delivery driver and one for landscaping). 
20 During initial data collection, this variable was coded as 1 for part-time positions and 0 
for all other positions. In the analysis phase, this variable was recoded in several different 
ways. The first recode was used in the results below. This recode had the following 
categories: 0 for part-time, 1 for full-time, and 2 for postings did not provide enough 
information to clearly determine whether the employment status was full-time or part-
time. The second recode dealt with occasions when an employer gave the employee the 
option of both full-time and part-time employment. These occasions were initially coded 
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status. In many cases, additional language in the posting could be used to determine 
employment status. For example, if the posting noted a work week of 40 hours, such a 
posting would be labeled full-time. If a posting noted a 10-hour work week, it would be 
labeled part-time. This variable was important to include as employers may be more 
likely to offer ex-offenders less desired part-time positions with lower hours and less 
benefits (see Nally et al., 2011; Pager et al., 2009).  
The second variable noted whether the employment was temporary or seasonal. 
This variable was coded 1 if the position listing noted temporary or seasonal work and 0 
otherwise. Here again, it is possible that ex-offenders again will be offered less desired 
positions (see Nally et al., 2011).  
The third variable noted whether the position was offered by a staffing company. 
This variable was coded 1 if the listing was produced by a staffing company and 0 
otherwise. Many job postings included language that directly identified the listing 
company as a staffing firm. For postings without identifying language, internet searches 
of company names were used to determine if the business was a staffing firm. This 
variable was important to include, as a staffing company may be more inclined to hire 
                                                 
as full-time. In the analysis phase, an attempt was made to recode these postings as a 
separate category. However, both recodes were largely only successful for the 
indeed.com postings as posting links for the other sites either no longer functioned or 
were removed. Nonetheless, the reliability of the recoded variable used below is 
supported by the fact that very few postings on craigslist.org and careerbuilder.com failed 
to identify an employment status. In fact, craigslist.org and careerbuilder.com require that 
employers enter an employment status. Most importantly, no coding formulation of this 
variable significantly or substantively altered the results of the treatment variables. 
Results with and without the employment status variable were also compared and no 
statistically or substantively significant differences were found.  
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riskier individuals such as ex-offenders as such firms are contracted to provide a steady 
workforce into jobs that are traditionally difficult to keep adequately staffed.  
The fourth variable noted the hourly pay offered by the position. This variable 
was important to include as some have suggested that ex-offenders will be forced to 
accept lower paying positions (Griffith et al., 2019; Nally et al., 2011; Nally et al., 2014; 
Visher et al., 2008, 2011). After all data was collected, the hourly pay for the sample was 
coded as 0 for pay at or below the 50th percentile, 1 for pay above the 50th percentile, and 
2 if hourly pay was not provided in the listing.21  
The fourth variable noted the job type for which the resume was submitted. This 
variable was important to include, as many authors have shown that employment 
outcomes can also depend upon the type of job being sought (Bendick et al., 1991; 
Bendick et al., 1994; Decker et al., 2015; Galgano, 2009; Holzer et al., 2004; Pager, 
2007; Pager et al., 2009; Purser, 2012). The categories were as follows: clerical, customer 
service in store, customer service call center, restaurant labor, restaurant customer 
service, sales in store, sales call center, driving, warehouse/shipping, manufacturing, 
general labor, and multiple positions.  These categories were largely derived from 
Leasure and Andersen (2016). However, customer service, sales, and restaurant have two 
subcategories here because Pager and colleagues (2009) argued that minority and ex-
offender applicants would be steered toward two types of positions, (a) positions with 
greater physical demands and or (b) positions with less contact with customers (see also 
Holzer et al., 2004).    
                                                 
21 Additional codings of this variable were explored (additional percentiles). These 
additional codings did not statistically or substantively alter any results discussed below.   
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The fifth variable noted the distance between the employer address and the 
hypothetical applicant address. This variable was important to include as an employer 
may be more likely to consider hiring an individual that lives closer to the workplace (see 
Phillips, 2018). Employer addresses were recorded and distance from the applicant’s 
address was calculated in miles using the Google Maps Directions feature. This variable 
was coded as 0 for distances that were at and below the 50th percentile and 1 for distances 
above the 50th percentile.22 
The sixth variable noted the county subdivision where the employer was located. 
This variable was important to include as some argue that communities which are more 
often exposed to convicted individuals are less affected by the stigma of a criminal record 
(Hirschfield & Piquero, 2010). The variable was coded 1 for employers located in 
Cleveland City, East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, and Shaker Heights, 0 for those that 
were not, and 2 if no subdivision could be identified. This coding procedure was chosen 
                                                 
22 The distance variable is only included in the descriptive statistics below due to missing 
data (36.75% missing in the mixed design and 41.50% missing in the between-subjects 
design). Analyses that used distance dummies (0 = not missing and 1 = missing) as 
dependent variables and other control variables noted in this section as independent 
variables showed several statistically significant predictors. Given this result, the data 
were likely not missing completely at random (see Social Science Research Cooperative, 
2013). Because there are several plausible reasons for missing data that are not fully 
explained with other variables (i.e., locations with difficult commutes, locations within 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, and positions that require travel to several locations may 
be less likely to list an address), there may also be a question as to whether the data is 
missing at random. Further, some guidance suggests that imputation of around 50% of a 
variable would likely result in bias (Social Science Research Cooperative, 2013). 
Therefore, most imputation methods would not be recommended. Nonetheless, control 
models with and without a distance variable (coded as 0 for distances that were at and 
below the 50th percentile, 1 for distances above the 50th percentile, and 2 for missing) 
were compared and there were no significant or substantive differences in the results for 
the treatment variables. Additional codings of this variable were also explored (additional 
percentiles). These additional codings did not statistically or substantively alter any 
results discussed below.   
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as previous research demonstrated that a vast majority of offenders returning to 
Cuyahoga County returned to the Cleveland City, East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, and 
Shaker Heights county subdivisions (La Vigne, 2003). Cleveland City, East Cleveland, 
Cleveland Heights, and Shaker Heights also possess the higher percentages of minority 
residents in Cuyahoga County (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). This is important as previous 
research has demonstrated that neighborhoods with higher concentrations of White 
residents are more likely to stigmatize in the hiring process (see Agan & Starr, 2017a; 
Agan & Starr, 2017b).   
 The seventh variable noted the time of day that the application was submitted. 
This variable was coded 0 for AM and 1 for PM. The eighth variable noted the day of the 
week that the application was submitted. This variable was coded 0 for Sunday through 
Thursday and 1 for Friday and Saturday. The ninth variable noted the month in which the 
application was submitted. This variable was coded 1 for January, 2 for February, 3 for 
March, 4 for April, and 5 for May. Each of these temporal variables were important to 
include as some have argued that applications submitted during certain months, times, 
and days have a higher likelihood of a positive response (see ZipJob, 2017a, 2017b). For 
example, Chakrabarti (2017) found that applications submitted in the morning were five 
times more likely to receive an interview. Further, Chakrabarti (2018) found a higher 
likelihood of an interview for applications submitted Sunday through Thursday.  
 The tenth variable noted the age of the position listing. This variable was coded 0 
for listings posted within one to 4 days and 1 for listings posted within 5 to fourteen days. 
This variable was important to include as applicants applying to more recent listings are 
more likely to receive a favorable response due to lower numbers of competing 
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applications. In fact, Dalton (2017) noted that applicants were up to eight times more 
likely to get an interview if they applied within four days of the position being listed.  
There were also additional control variables that were used only in the mixed 
design. The first variable in this category noted which base resume accompanied the 
criminal record and racial treatment variables. While the base resumes were closely 
matched on education, work history, and skills, it is still possible that the minor 
differences between resumes could impact results if left unobserved (see Neumark, 
2012). To account for this issue, base resume 1 was coded as 0 and base resume 2 was 
coded as 1 so that any impact of the base resumes could be assessed and controlled.  
The second variable in this category noted the order in which the resumes were 
submitted. This variable was coded 1 if the resume was to be submitted first and 0 if the 
resume was to be submitted second. This variable was important to include as an 
employer may be more inclined to contact a candidate who was earliest to submit an 
application (see Uggen et al., 2014). However, the design of the mixed design portion of 
the study was meant to limit any impact of this variable as the second resume was 
submitted no more than one hour after the first.  
B. Individual Names 
The second robustness check procedure involved an examination of the impact of 
individual names. This procedure was important to include because the two individual 
names used as a measure for each race may differentially impact callback rates. Similar 
analyses have taken place in previous correspondence studies that examine racial 





The third robustness check procedure included tests for an interaction effect 
between race and criminal record. This procedure was important to include as previous 
research discovered a robust interaction between race and criminal record (see Pager, 
2003; but see Agan & Starr, 2017a who did not find a significant race and criminal record 
interaction). Additional interactions between city location, criminal record, and race are 
also explored. While not shown below, all interactions were also examined graphically.  
D. Racial Grouping  
The mixed design includes an exploration of the impact of each racial grouping. A 
racial grouping is defined as the specific pairing of resumes sent to each employer (two 
African American resumes, two White resumes, and one African American and one 
White resume). Such a procedure has been recommended and conducted by previous 
research (see Heckman & Siegalman, 1993; Pager et al., 2009).  
E. First Call Analysis 
As mentioned above, the mixed design includes an additional analysis for 
occasions when both resumes receive a callback. This analysis uses a dependent variable 
that notes which resume was called first (see Rodríguez Menés & Rovira, 2019 for a 
similar approach). This procedure was important to include because it is possible 
employers would be more likely to first call White candidates and those without criminal 
records. Further, such a procedure reduces measurement error for within-subjects audit 





3.8 ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
 All analyses will be conducted with the software Stata 16 (StataCorp., 2019). The 
first stage of data analysis presented descriptive statistics. Specifically, distributions of 
variables across the criminal record and racial treatment levels are presented with 
frequencies and percentages (see Saint-Mont, 2015 noting the need for such statistics as 
randomization is not a guarantee of comparability between variables of interest).   
The second stage utilized bivariate analyses to examine the impact of the criminal 
record variable and the race variables separately. The specific bivariate tests used were 
logistic regressions, Chi square tests, and McNemar’s tests (see Uggen et al., 2014 for a 
similar approach).23 Using both parametric and non-parametric tests help ensure the 
robustness of results.  
The third stage of analysis utilized multiple logistic regression to examine the 
callbacks for criminal record categories across race. This stage examined differences in 
callbacks for the criminal record levels within each racial group individually (i.e., 
examining whether African American certificate holders fare better than African 
Americans who do not possess a certificate) and across race (i.e., does one racial group 
fare better in employment outcomes). The final stage of analysis applied the robustness 
checks noted above (see Uggen et al, 2014 for a similar approach).  
 The mixed design portion of the analysis required an adjustment for clustering as 
multiple resumes were sent to one employer (see Lahey & Beasley, 2018). Stata’s cluster 
analysis commands were used to address this issue. Such adjustments were not necessary 
with the between-subjects portion of the study (Lahey & Beasley, 2018).  
                                                 
23 Logistic regression diagnostics are presented in Appendix A.  
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Results are presented using Stata’s margins commands.24 Reported first in all 
regressions were predicted probabilities (predicted probability of a callback in the current 
study) (Williams, 2012). The prime advantages of using predicted probabilities include 
ease of interpretation (including interaction effects which are often misinterpreted in non-
linear regression models) and practical significance (Ai & Norton, 2003; Kam & 
Franzese, 2007; Long & Freese, 2006; Norton et al., 2004; Williams, 2012).  
Statistically significant differences between these predicted probabilities were 
then reported using Stata’s average marginal effects (discrete change from base level) 
(see Bartus, 2005; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Kam & Franzese, 2007; Williams, 2012 for 
authors preferring average marginal effects largely because all data is used in its 
computation rather than just means).25 While statistical significance (p < .05) was noted 
throughout the results section, marginally (p < .10) and substantively significant findings 
were also discussed as recommended by Bushway, Sweeten, and Wilson (2006), 
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996), and Wasserstein, Schirm, and Lazar (2019).  
                                                 
24 Regression output using odds ratios is presented in Appendix B. Model fit statistics 
(AIC and BIC) are also provided to compare models within the same section using 
different predictors. Favored BIC values were identified using Raftery (1995) and 
favored AIC values were identified using Hilbe (2009). 
25 All p-values presented in the tables and text below are derived from default Stata 
output (p < .05). For directional hypotheses, however, these values should be divided in 
half (if in the expected direction) to determine statistical significance. Further, only the 
key independent variables are examined for one-sided significance. Results are discussed 





4.1 MIXED DESIGN RESULTS  
A. Descriptive Statistics  
 A total of 800 resumes were sent to 400 employers. As shown in Table 4.1, data 
was balanced on the criminal record and racial treatment variables so that each level had 
200 resumes. Overall, 150 out of 800 (18.75%) of the hypothetical applicants received an 
invitation to continue in the hiring process.  
Table 4.1. Distribution of treatment variables   
 No Record CQE Total 
Race    
     White 200 (50.0%) 200 (50.0%) 400 (100%) 
     African American 200 (50.0%) 200 (50.0%) 400 (100%) 
 
Displayed in Table 4.2 are robustness check variables which could vary across 
criminal record categories. As shown in Table 4.2, randomization of these variables was 
successful. The minimum distance for the no record level was .4 miles, the median was 
15.5 miles, and the maximum was 38.1 miles. The minimum distance for the record and 
CQE level was .8 miles, the median was 15.7 miles, and the maximum was 36.6 miles.  
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Table 4.2. Distribution of control variables which could vary across criminal record 
types.   
Variables No Record CQE Total 
Base Resume    
     Base Resume 1 200 (50.0%) 200 (50.0%) 400 (100%) 
     Base Resume 2 200 (50.0%) 200 (50.0%) 400 (100%) 
Distance    
     Below Median 127 (50.2%) 126 (49.8%) 253 (100%) 
     Above Median 126 (49.8%%) 127 (50.2%%) 253 (100%) 
     No Address 147 (50.0%) 147 (50.0%) 294 (100%) 
Submitted First    
     Yes 197 (49.3%) 203 (50.8%) 400 (100%) 
     No 203 (50.8%) 197 (49.3%) 400 (100%) 
    
The remaining variables did not vary by criminal record treatment as both levels 
were sent to a single employer. Four percent of the resumes were submitted to employers 
that were staffing firms. Seven percent of the resumes were submitted to temporary 
employment positions. The minimum hourly pay was $8, the median hourly pay was $11, 
and the maximum hourly pay was $18.58 (24% below the median, 23% above the 
median, and 53% with no hourly pay listed). The distribution for month submitted was as 
follows: January, 8.3%, February, 33.8%, March, 27.3%, April, 13.0%, and May, 17.8%. 
The distribution for day submitted was as follows: Monday, 3.5%, Tuesday, 38.8%, 
Wednesday, 12.8%, Thursday, 32.8%, Friday, 7.5%, Saturday, 2.8%, and Sunday, 2.50% 
(89.8% Sunday through Thursday and 10.3% Friday and Saturday). Approximately 61% 
or resumes were submitted in the AM and approximately 39% in the PM. Approximately 
23% of resumes were submitted to companies located inside of the Cleveland, East 
Cleveland, Shaker Heights, and Cleveland Heights county subdivisions, while about 66% 
were submitted to other subdivisions and about 12% of the company location could not 
be identified. The distribution of job type was as follows: customer service call center, 
5.8%, customer service in store, 15.0%, manufacturing, 5.5%, general labor, 29.3%, 
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restaurant labor, 5.8%, restaurant server/host, 3.50%, driver, 7.0%, clerical, 10.0%, sales 
in store, 4.3%, warehouse/shipping, 9.0%, sales call center, 3.0%, and multiple job types, 
2.0%. Approximately 73% of these positions noted full-time employment, while about 
21% noted part-time employment and 7% did not note either. Finally, eighty three 
percent of the resumes were submitted to postings that were 1-4 days old and 17.00% 
were submitted to postings that were 5-14 days old.  
 Displayed in Table 4.3 are the distribution of control variables which could vary 
across the racial categories. As shown in Table 4.3, randomization of racial categories 
was successful. The minimum distance for the African American names was .4 miles, the 
median was 15.8 miles, and the maximum was 36.6 miles. The minimum distance for the 
White names was 1 mile, the median was 15.3 miles, and the maximum was 38.1 miles. 
The minimum hourly pay for the African American names was $8, the median was $12, 
and the maximum was $18.58. The minimum hourly pay for the White names $8, the 
median was $11, and the maximum was $18.58.  
Table 4.3. Distribution of control variables across race.    
Variables African American White  Total 
Base Resume    
     Base Resume 1 197 (49.3%) 203 (50.8%) 400 (100%) 
     Base Resume 2 203 (50.8%) 197 (49.3%) 400 (100%) 
Month Submitted    
     January 36 (54.6%) 30 (45.5%) 66 (100%) 
     February 137 (50.7%) 133 (49.3%) 270 (100%) 
     March 106 (48.6%) 112 (51.4%) 218 (100%) 
     April 55 (52.9%) 49 (47.1%) 104 (100%) 
     May 66 (46.5%) 76 (53.5%) 142 (100%) 
Day Submitted    
     Sunday – Thursday 351 (48.9% 367 (51.1%) 718 (100%) 
     Friday - Saturday 49 (59.8%) 33 (40.2%) 82 (100%) 
Time Submitted    
     AM 237 (48.8%) 249 (51.2%) 486 (100%) 
     PM 163 (51.9%) 151 (48.1%) 314 (100%) 
Hourly Pay    
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     Below Median 89 (45.9%) 105 (54.1%) 194 (100%) 
     Above Median 94 (50.5%) 92 (49.5%) 186 (100%) 
     No Pay Listed 217 (51.7%) 203 (48.3%) 420 (100%) 
Submitted First    
     Yes 201 (50.3%) 199 (49.8%) 400 (100%) 
     No 199 (49.8%) 201 (50.3%) 400 (100%) 
Distance    
     Below Median 124 (49.0%) 129 (51.0%) 253 (100%) 
     Above Median 129 (51.0%) 124 (49.00%) 253 (100%) 
     No Address 147 (50.0%) 147 (50.0%) 294 (100%) 
Full-Time Employment    
     No 78 (47.6%) 86 (52.4%) 164 (100%) 
     Yes 293 (50.5%) 287 (49.5%) 580 (100%) 
     Not Listed  29 (51.8%) 27 (48.2%) 56 (100%) 
Cleveland City    
     No 262 (50.0%) 262 (50.0%) 524 (100%) 
     Yes 90 (49.5%) 92 (50.56%) 182 (100%) 
     No City Location 48 (51.1%) 46 (48.9%) 94 (100%) 
Job Type    
     Customer Service Call Center 21 (45.7%) 25 (54.4%) 46 (100%) 
     Customer Service In-Store 55 (45.8%) 65 (54.2%) 120 (100%) 
     Manufacturing 21 (47.7%) 23 (52.3%) 44 (100%) 
     General Labor 114 (48.7%) 120 (51.3%) 234 (100%) 
     Restaurant Labor 26 (56.5%) 20 (43.5%) 46 (100%) 
     Restaurant Customer Service 14 (50.0%) 14 (50.0%) 28 (100%) 
     Driving 32 (57.1%) 24 (42.9%) 56 (100%) 
     Clerical 36 (45.0%) 44 (55.0%) 80 (100%) 
     Sales In-Store 18 (52.9%) 16 (47.1%) 34 (100%) 
     Shipping/Warehouse 40 (55.6%) 32 (44.4%) 72 (100%) 
     Sales Call Center 15 (62.5%) 9 (37.5%) 24 (100%) 
     Multiple Job Types 8 (50.0%) 8 (50.0%) 16 (100%)  
Posting Age    
     1-4 days old 334 (50.3%) 330 (49.7%) 664 (100%) 
     5-14 days old 66 (48.5%) 70 (51.5%) 136 (100%) 
Staffing Agency    
     No 383 (49.9%) 385 (50.1%) 768 (100%) 
     Yes 17 (53.1%) 15 (46.9%) 32 (100%) 
Temporary    
     No 375 (50.4%) 369 (49.6%) 744 (100%) 
     Yes 25 (44.6%) 31 (55.4%) 56 (100%) 








B. Bivariate Analyses  
 
Table 4.4 displays the predicted probabilities of a callback for the pooled criminal 
record and racial conditions (see Table B.1 for the full logistic regression output).26 As 
shown, the predicted probabilities were as follows: no record = .223, CQE = .153, 
African American = .163, White = .213. Average marginal effects in Table 4.5 show that 
the difference between the no record and record plus CQE categories was statistically 
significant (p <= .001). This result was confirmed with McNemar’s test which examines 
difference in discordance with matched pairs. Callbacks by pair were as follows: 52 for 
both CQE and no record, 9 for CQE only, 37 for no record only, and 302 for neither 
(Exact McNemar significance probability = .000; McNemar’s Chi square = 17.04; df = 1; 
p <= .001). Given the above directional hypothesis about the impact of race, the 
difference between African Americans and Whites was statistically significant (p = 
.069*). This result was confirmed with a Chi square test, χ2 = 3.28; df = 1; p = .070*.   
Table 4.4. Probability of a callback for pooled criminal record and racial conditions.   
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper  
Record Type     
     No Record 0.223 0.021 0.182 0.263 
     Record and CQE 0.153 0.018 0.117 0.188 
Race     
     African American 0.163 0.021 0.121 0.204 
     White 0.213 0.023 0.167 0.258 
 
Table 4.5. Average marginal effects for pooled criminal record and racial conditions.   
Variable – Base Outcome Difference SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
White – African Am. 0.050 0.028 1.82 0.069 -0.004 0.104 
      
                                                 
26 Pooled results examine the racial and criminal record conditions separately. For 
example, Whites with no record and Whites with a record plus CQE would be combined 
into one group to determine the predicted probability of a callback for Whites.  
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CQE – No Record -0.070 0.017 -4.21 0.000 -0.103 -0.037 
 
C. Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 display the predicted probabilities of a callback for 
criminal record type conditioned on race (see Table B.1 for the full logistic regression 
output). As shown, the predicted probabilities were as follows: African American no 
record = .194, African American CQE = .131, White no record = .251, White CQE = 
.174. Average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.7 showed that the difference between 
African Americans with no criminal record and African Americans with a criminal record 
and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference between Whites with 
no criminal record and Whites with a criminal record and a CQE was statistically 
significant (p <= .001). Average marginal effects also showed that the difference between 
Whites with no criminal record and African Americans with no criminal record was 
statistically significant (p = .069*). The difference between Whites with a criminal record 
and a CQE and African Americans with a criminal record and a CQE was statistically 
significant (p = .071*).   
Table 4.6. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by race.   
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record    
     African American 0.194 0.025 0.145 0.243 
     White 0.251 0.027 0.198 0.304 
Record and CQE    
     African American 0.131 0.020 0.092 0.170 
     White 0.174 0.023 0.129 0.219 
 
 
Table 4.7. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by race.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
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African Am. No Record -0.063 0.016 -4.02 0.000 -0.093 -0.032 
       
White CQE - 
White No Record -0.077 0.019 -4.15 0.000 -0.114 -0.041 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.057 0.031 1.82 0.069 -0.004 0.119 
       
White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.043 0.024 1.81 0.071 -0.004 0.089 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by race with 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
D. Robustness Check Models  
 i. Control Variables  
 
Table 4.8 displays the predicted probabilities of a callback for criminal record 
type conditioned by race with control variables included in the model (see Table B.2 for 
the full logistic regression output). As shown below in Table 4.8, the addition of the 
control variables did not significantly or substantively alter the above results. The 


































American CQE = .133, White no record = .249, White CQE = .172.  Average marginal 
effects which are displayed in Table 4.9 showed that the difference in predicted 
probabilities between African Americans with no criminal record and African Americans 
with a criminal record and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference 
between Whites with no criminal record and Whites with a criminal record and a CQE 
was statistically significant (p <= .001). Average marginal effects also showed that the 
difference between Whites with no criminal record and African Americans with no 
criminal record was statistically significant (p = .069*). The difference between Whites 
with a criminal record and a CQE and African Americans with a criminal record and a 
CQE was statistically significant (p = .070*).    
Table 4.8. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by race with 
controls.   
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record    
     African American 0.196 0.023 0.151 0.240 
     White 0.249 0.025 0.199 0.298 
Record and CQE    
     African American 0.133 0.018 0.097 0.169 
     White 0.172 0.022 0.130 0.215 
 
Table 4.9. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by race with 
controls.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.063 0.016 -4.03 0.000 -0.094 -0.032 
       
White CQE - 
White No Record -0.076 0.018 -4.13 0.000 -0.112 -0.040 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.053 0.029 1.82 0.069 -0.004 0.110 
       
White CQE - 0.040 0.022 1.81 0.070 -0.003 0.083 
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African Am. CQE 
 
 Table C.1 in Appendix section C displays the predicted probabilities of a callback 
for the control variables and Table C.2 in appendix section C displays their average 
marginal effects. While the control variables did not alter the above results, a few points 
are worthy of note regarding overall impacts on callbacks. First, resumes submitted to 
staffing agencies had a probability of a callback of 66.6%, while those that were not 
submitted to a staffing agency had a probability of a callback of 16.7%, p <= .001. 
Second, resumes submitted to temporary positions had a probability of a callback of 
26.8%, while all other positions had a probability of 18.1%, p = 0.236. Third, resumes 
submitted Sunday through Thursday had a probability of 20.1%, while those that were 
submitted Friday and Saturday had a probability of 7.9%, p = 0.006. Fourth, using 
general labor (callback probability = 24.9%) as the reference category, results indicated 
significant differences with clerical positions (7.1%, p = 0.001) and marginally 
significant differences with sales call center positions (52.8%, p = 0.052), customer 
service in store positions (15.3%, p = 0.086), manufacturing positions (12.9%, p = 0.062), 
and listings with multiple positions (10.3%, p = 0.082). Fifth, resumes submitted in 
February (21.2%) had a significantly higher probability of a callback than those 
submitted in April (11.8%), p = 0.065.  
ii. Individual Names  
 
Displayed in Table 4.10 are the predicted probabilities of a callback for criminal 
record type conditioned by individual name (see Table B.3 for the full logistic regression 
output). The predicted probabilities were as follows: DaQuan no record = .164, DaQuan 
CQE = .109, Jake no record = .244, Jake CQE = .168, Seth no record = .259, Seth CQE = 
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.180, Tremayne no record = .225, Tremayne CQE = .154. Average marginal effects 
displayed in Table 4.12 showed that the differences between the no criminal record and 
criminal record and CQE categories were statistically significant for each individual 
name (p <= .001). In Table 4.11, average marginal effects also showed that the difference 
between DaQuan with no record and Jake with no record was statistically significant (p = 
.027). The difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Jake with a record 
and CQE was statistically significant (p = .027). The difference between DaQuan with no 
record and Seth with no record was statistically significant (p = .026). The difference 
between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Seth with a record and CQE was 
statistically significant (p = .030). The difference between DaQuan with no record and 
Tremayne with no record was marginally significant (p = .077). The difference between 
DaQuan with a record and CQE and Tremayne with a record and CQE was marginally 
significant (p = .080). The difference between Jake with no record and Seth with no 
record was not statistically significant (p = .685). The difference between Jake with a 
record and CQE and Seth with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = 
.686). The difference between Jake with no record and Tremayne with no record was not 
statistically significant (p = .692). The difference between Jake with a record and CQE 
and Tremayne with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .692). The 
difference between Seth with no record and Tremayne with no record was not statistically 
significant (p = .371). The difference between Seth with a record and CQE and Tremayne 
with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .373).  
Table 4.10. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name.   
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper  
No Record    
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     DaQuan 0.164 0.028 0.109 0.219 
     Jake 0.244 0.033 0.178 0.309 
     Seth 0.259 0.033 0.195 0.324 
     Tremayne 0.225 0.033 0.161 0.290 
CQE    
     DaQuan 0.109 0.021 0.068 0.151 
     Jake 0.168 0.026 0.117 0.219 
     Seth 0.180 0.028 0.124 0.235 
     Tremayne 0.154 0.026 0.103 0.206 
 
Table 4.11. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name.   
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
Jake No Record v.      
DaQuan No Record 0.080 0.036 2.22 0.027 0.009 0.151 
       
Jake CQE v. 
DaQuan CQE 0.059 0.027 2.21 0.027 0.007 0.111 
      
Seth No Record v.      
DaQuan No Record 0.095 0.043 2.22 0.026 0.011 0.180 
       
Seth CQE v. 
DaQuan CQE 0.071 0.033 2.17 0.030 0.007 0.134 
       
Tremayne No Record v.      
DaQuan No Record 0.062 0.035 1.77 0.077 -0.007 0.130 
       
Tremayne CQE v. 
DaQuan CQE 0.045 0.026 1.75 0.080 -0.005 0.096 
      
Seth No Record v.      
Jake No Record 0.016 0.038 0.41 0.685 -0.06 0.091 
       
Seth CQE v. 
Jake CQE 0.012 0.029 0.40 0.686 -0.046 0.069 
      
Tremayne No Record v.      
Jake No Record -0.018 0.046 -0.40 0.692 -0.108 0.072 
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Tremayne CQE v. 
Jake CQE -0.014 0.034 -0.40 0.692 -0.081 0.054 
      
Tremayne No Record v.      
Seth No Record -0.034 0.038 -0.90 0.371 -0.107 0.040 
       
Tremayne CQE v. 
Seth CQE -0.025 0.029 -0.89 0.373 -0.082 0.031 
 
Table 4.12. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name continued.   
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
DaQuan CQE v.      
DaQuan No Record -0.054 0.015 -3.73 0.000 -0.083 -0.026 
       
Jake CQE v. 
Jake No Record -0.076 0.019 -3.93 0.000 -0.113 -0.038 
      
Seth CQE v.      
Seth No Record -0.079 0.019 -4.16 0.000 -0.117 -0.042 
       
Tremayne CQE v. 
Tremayne No Record -0.071 0.018 -3.92 0.000 -0.107 -0.036 
 
 Displayed in Table 4.13 are the predicted probabilities of a callback for criminal 
record type conditioned by individual name with controls included in the model (see 
Table B.4 for the full logistic regression output). The predicted probabilities were as 
follows: DaQuan no record = .170, DaQuan CQE = .111, Jake no record = .253, Jake 
CQE = .173, Seth no record = .247, Seth CQE = .168, Tremayne no record = .225, 
Tremayne CQE = .152. The inclusion of the control variables did not significantly or 
substantively alter the above results. Average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.15 
again showed that the differences between the no criminal record and criminal record and 
CQE categories were statistically significant for each individual name (p <= .001). In 
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Table 4.14, average marginal effects showed that the difference between DaQuan with no 
record and Jake with no record was statistically significant (p = .015). The difference 
between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Jake with a record and CQE was 
statistically significant (p = .014). The difference between DaQuan with no record and 
Seth with no record was now statistically significant (p = .058*) in this analysis. The 
difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Seth with a record and CQE was 
now statistically significant (p = .059*) in this analysis. The difference between DaQuan 
with no record and Tremayne with no record was marginally significant (p = .103). The 
difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Tremayne with a record and 
CQE was marginally significant (p = .098). The difference between Jake with no record 
and Seth with no record was not statistically significant (p = .866). The difference 
between Jake with a record and CQE and Seth with a record and CQE was not 
statistically significant (p = .866). The difference between Jake with no record and 
Tremayne with no record was not statistically significant (p = .502). The difference 
between Jake with a record and CQE and Tremayne with a record and CQE was not 
statistically significant (p = .503). The difference between Seth with no record and 
Tremayne with no record was not statistically significant (p = .540). The difference 
between Seth with a record and CQE and Tremayne with a record and CQE was not 
statistically significant (p = .542). 
Table 4.13. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name with controls.   
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper  
No Record    
     DaQuan 0.170 0.026 0.120 0.220 
     Jake 0.253 0.032 0.191 0.315 
     Seth 0.247 0.031 0.186 0.308 
     Tremayne 0.225 0.031 0.163 0.286 
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Record and CQE    
     DaQuan 0.111 0.021 0.071 0.152 
     Jake 0.173 0.025 0.123 0.223 
     Seth 0.168 0.027 0.116 0.220 
     Tremayne 0.152 0.023 0.106 0.197 
 
Table 4.14. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name with controls.   
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
Jake No Record v.      
DaQuan No Record 0.083 0.034 2.43 0.015 0.016 0.151 
       
Jake CQE v. 
DaQuan CQE 0.062 0.025 2.46 0.014 0.013 0.111 
      
Seth No Record v.      
DaQuan No Record 0.077 0.041 1.90 0.058 -0.003 0.157 
       
Seth CQE v. 
DaQuan CQE 0.057 0.03 1.88 0.059 -0.002 0.116 
       
Tremayne No Record v.      
DaQuan No Record 0.055 0.034 1.63 0.103 -0.011 0.121 
       
Tremayne CQE v. 
DaQuan CQE 0.040 0.024 1.66 0.098 -0.007 0.088 
      
Seth No Record v.      
Jake No Record -0.006 0.037 -0.17 0.866 -0.079 0.067 
       
Seth CQE v. 
Jake CQE -0.005 0.028 -0.17 0.866 -0.060 0.051 
      
Tremayne No Record v.      
Jake No Record -0.028 0.042 -0.67 0.502 -0.111 0.055 
       
Tremayne CQE v. 
Jake CQE -0.021 0.032 -0.67 0.503 -0.084 0.041 
      
Tremayne No Record v.      
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Seth No Record -0.022 0.036 -0.61 0.540 -0.093 0.049 
       
Tremayne CQE v. 
Seth CQE -0.017 0.027 -0.61 0.542 -0.070 0.037 
 
Table 4.15. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name with controls continued.   
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
DaQuan CQE v.      
DaQuan No Record -0.058 0.014 -4.1 0.000 -0.086 -0.030 
       
Jake CQE v. 
Jake No Record -0.080 0.02 -4.04 0.000 -0.119 -0.041 
      
Seth CQE v.      
Seth No Record -0.079 0.019 -4.19 0.000 -0.115 -0.042 
       
Tremayne CQE v. 
Tremayne No Record -0.073 0.019 -3.88 0.000 -0.110 -0.036 
 
iii. Interactions  
Table 4.16 below shows the predicted probabilities derived from of the logistic 
regression specified with an interaction between the race and criminal record treatment 
variables (see Table B.5 for the full logistic regression output). The predicted 
probabilities were as follows: African American no record = .180, African American 
CQE = .145, White no record = .265, White CQE = .160. These predicted probabilities 
possess only slight differences from the above main effects model. However, the 
interaction model produced several changes in statistical significance. Average marginal 
effects in Table 4.17 showed that the difference between African Americans with no 
criminal record and African Americans with a criminal record and a CQE was no longer 
statistically significant (p = .246). The difference between Whites with no criminal record 
and Whites with a criminal record and a CQE is still statistically significant (p = .002). 
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Average marginal effects also showed that the difference between Whites with no 
criminal record and African Americans with no criminal record was now statistically 
significant (p = .040). The difference between Whites with a criminal record and a CQE 
and African Americans with a criminal record and a CQE was no longer statistically 
significant (p = .677). However, it should be noted that both the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) favored the main effects 
model. Additional interactions were also explored (race x city location; criminal record x 
city location; criminal record x job type; race x job type; race x criminal record x city 
location); however, results again indicated minimal differences and AIC and BIC still 
favored the main effects model.27  
Table 4.16. Probability of a callback for the criminal record and race interaction.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record 
     African American 0.180 0.027 0.127 0.233 
     White 0.265 0.031 0.204 0.326 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.145 0.025 0.096 0.194 
     White  0.160 0.026 0.109 0.211 
 
Table 4.17. Average marginal effects of the criminal record and race interaction. 
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.035 0.030 -1.16 0.246 -0.094 0.024 
       
White CQE - 
White No Record -0.105 0.034 -3.11 0.002 -0.171 -0.039 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.085 0.041 2.05 0.040 0.004 0.166 
       
                                                 
27 Race x Criminal Record x Job Type was also examined. However, this interaction 
caused significant instability in the model.  
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White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.015 0.036 0.42 0.677 -0.056 0.086 
 
Table 4.18 below shows the predicted probabilities derived from of the logistic 
regression specified with an interaction between the race and criminal record treatment 
variables with the inclusion of the control variables (see Table B.6 for the full logistic 
regression output). The results of the control model did not significantly or substantively 
vary from the base interactive model. The predicted probabilities were as follows: 
African American no record = .184, African American CQE = .144, White no record = 
.260, White CQE = .161. These predicted probabilities possess only slight differences 
from the above main effects and interaction models. Average marginal effects in Table 
4.19 showed that the difference between African Americans with no criminal record and 
African Americans with a criminal record and a CQE was now marginally significant (p 
= .166*). The difference between Whites with no criminal record and Whites with a 
criminal record and a CQE is statistically significant (p = .003). Average marginal effects 
also showed that the difference between Whites with no criminal record and African 
Americans with no criminal record was statistically significant (p = .049). The difference 
between Whites with a criminal record and a CQE and African Americans with a 
criminal record and a CQE was not statistically significant (p = .614). 
Table 4.18. Probability of a callback for the criminal record and race interaction with 
controls.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record 
     African American 0.184 0.025 0.135 0.233 
     White 0.260 0.030 0.202 0.318 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.144 0.023 0.099 0.189 




Table 4.19. Average marginal effects of the criminal record and race interaction with 
controls.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.040 0.029 -1.39 0.166 -0.096 0.016 
       
White CQE - 
White No Record -0.099 0.033 -2.98 0.003 -0.165 -0.034 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.077 0.039 1.97 0.049 0.000 0.153 
       
White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.017 0.034 0.50 0.614 -0.049 0.084 
 
iv. Racial Groupings  
 
Displayed in Table 4.20 are the callback probabilities for the African American 
only grouping (see Table B.7 for the full logistic regression output). The predicted 
probabilities were as follows: no record = .184, CQE = .126. Average marginal effects 
displayed in Table 4.21 show that the difference between those with a CQE and no record 
was statistically significant, p = .022. These results were confirmed with a McNemar’s 
test. Callbacks by pair were as follows: 11 for both CQE and no record, 0 for CQE only, 
5 for no record only, and 71 for neither (Exact McNemar significance probability = .063; 
McNemar’s Chi square = 5.00; df = 1; p = .025).    
Table 4.20. Probability of a callback for criminal record type for the African American 
only grouping.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type  
     No Record 0.184 0.042 0.102 0.266 
     CQE 0.126 0.036 0.056 0.197 
 
Table 4.21. Average marginal effects of criminal record type for the African American 
only grouping.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
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African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.057 0.025 -2.29 0.022 -0.107 -0.008 
 
Displayed in Table 4.22 are the callback probabilities for the African American 
only grouping for a model including controls (see Table B.8 for the full logistic 
regression output). This model did not include job type as it caused instability in the 
model and observations to be lost.28 The predicted probabilities were as follows: no 
record = .181, CQE = .130. Average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.23 show that 
the difference between those with a CQE and no record was statistically significant, p = 
.024. Therefore, including control variables resulted in only small differences.  
Table 4.22. Probability of a callback for criminal record type for the African American 
only grouping with controls.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type  
     No Record 0.181 0.036 0.109 0.252 
     CQE 0.130 0.029 0.072 0.188 
 
Table 4.23. Average marginal effects of criminal record type for the African American 
only grouping with controls.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.05 0.022 -2.25 0.024 -0.094 -0.007 
 
Displayed in Table 4.24 are the callback probabilities for the White only grouping 
(see Table B.9 for the full logistic regression output). The predicted probabilities were as 
follows: no record = .287, CQE = .195. Average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.25 
show that the difference between those with a CQE and no record was statistically 
                                                 
28 A model was also estimated that included job type as a predictor. Including this 
variable caused instability in the model and 30 observations were dropped. However, 




significant, p = .018. These results were confirmed with a McNemar’s test. Callbacks by 
pair were as follows: 15 for both CQE and no record, 2 for CQE only, 10 for no record 
only, and 60 for neither (Exact McNemar significance probability = .039; McNemar’s 
Chi square = 5.33; df = 1; p = .021).    
Table 4.24. Probability of a callback for criminal record type for the White only 
grouping.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type  
     No Record 0.287 0.049 0.192 0.383 
     CQE 0.195 0.043 0.112 0.279 
 
Table 4.25. Average marginal effects of criminal record type for the White only 
grouping.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
White CQE -      
White No Record -0.092 0.039 -2.37 0.018 -0.168 -0.016 
 
Displayed in Table 4.26 are the callback probabilities for the White only grouping 
with controls added (see Table B.10 for the full logistic regression output). This model 
did not include job type as it caused instability in the model and observations to be lost.29 
The predicted probabilities were as follows: no record = .289, CQE = .194. Average 
marginal effects displayed in Table 4.27 show that the difference between those with a 
CQE and no record was statistically significant, p = .017. Therefore, including control 
variables resulted in very little differences.  
Table 4.26. Probability of a callback for criminal record type for the White only grouping 
with controls.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type  0.289 0.047 0.197 0.380 
                                                 
29 A model was also estimated that included job type as a predictor. Including this 
variable caused instability in the model and 8 observations were dropped. However, 




     No Record 
     CQE 0.194 0.035 0.126 0.263 
 
Table 4.27. Average marginal effects of criminal record type for the White only grouping 
with controls.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
White CQE -      
White No Record -0.094 0.040 -2.38 0.017 -0.172 -0.017 
 
For the African and White grouping, callbacks by pair were as follows: 26 for 
both CQE and no record, 7 for CQE only, 22 for no record only, and 171 for neither 
(Exact McNemar significance probability = .008; McNemar’s Chi square = 7.76; df = 1; 
p = .005). The callback rate for the no record group was .212, while the callback rate for 
the CQE group was .146.  Displayed in Table 4.28 are the callback probabilities for the 
African American and White grouping by criminal record group and race (see Table B.11 
for the full logistic regression output). The callback probabilities were as follows: no 
record African American = .200, no record White = .225, CQE African American = .137, 
CQE White = .155. Average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.29 show that the 
difference between African Americans with a CQE and no record was statistically 
significant, p = .006.  The difference between Whites with a CQE and no record was 
statistically significant, p = .005.  Average marginal effects also showed that the 
difference between African Americans and Whites with no record was not statistically 
significant, p = .344. The difference between African Americans and Whites with a CQE 
was not statistically significant, p = .348.   
Table 4.28. Probability of a callback for criminal record type for the African American 
and White grouping.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record 
     African American 0.200 0.030 0.141 0.259 
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     White 0.225 0.031 0.165 0.285 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.137 0.025 0.088 0.185 
     White  0.155 0.027 0.103 0.208 
 
Table 4.29. Average marginal effects of criminal record type for the African American 
and White grouping.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.063 0.023 -2.77 0.006 -0.108 -0.018 
       
White CQE - 
White No Record -0.070 0.025 -2.84 0.005 -0.118 -0.022 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.025 0.027 0.95 0.344 -0.027 0.078 
       
White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.019 0.020 0.94 0.348 -0.021 0.058 
 
Displayed in Table 4.30 are the callback probabilities for the African American 
and White grouping by criminal record group and race with controls added (see Table 
B.12 for the full logistic regression output). This model did not include job type as it 
caused instability in the model and observations to be lost.30 The callback probabilities 
were as follows: no record African American = .199, no record White = .224, CQE 
African American = .137, CQE White = .156. Average marginal effects displayed in 
Table 4.31 show that the difference between African Americans with a CQE and no 
record was statistically significant, p = .007.  The difference between Whites with a CQE 
and no record was statistically significant, p = .005.  Average marginal effects also 
                                                 
30 A model was also estimated that included job type as a predictor. Including this 
variable caused instability in the model and 60 observations were dropped. However, 




showed that the difference between African Americans and Whites with no record was 
not statistically significant, p = .350. The difference between African Americans and 
Whites with a CQE was not statistically significant, p = .356. Therefore, including 
control variables resulted in very little differences. 
Table 4.30. Probability of a callback for criminal record type for the African American 
and White grouping with controls.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record 
     African American 0.199 0.028 0.144 0.255 
     White 0.224 0.030 0.166 0.282 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.137 0.024 0.091 0.184 
     White  0.156 0.027 0.103 0.209 
 
Table 4.31. Average marginal effects of criminal record type for the African American 
and White grouping with controls.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.062 0.023 -2.71 0.007 -0.107 -0.017 
       
White CQE - 
White No Record -0.068 0.024 -2.78 0.005 -0.116 -0.020 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.025 0.026 0.93 0.350 -0.027 0.076 
       
White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.019 0.020 0.92 0.356 -0.021 0.058 
 
v. First Call Analysis 
 
Bivariate analysis showed that the difference between criminal record groups 
(60% of those with no record and 40% of those with a CQE were called first) was 
statistically significant, χ2 = 3.60; df = 1; p = .058*. The difference between the racial 
conditions (39.53% of African Americans and 59.57% of Whites were called first) was 
also statistically significant, χ2 = 3.61; df = 1; p = .058*.  Displayed in Table 4.32 are the 
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probabilities of being called first for the criminal record type conditioned by race (see 
Table B.13 for the full logistic regression output). The predicted probabilities were as 
follows: no record African American = .495, no record White = .676, CQE African 
American = .316, CQE White = .496. Average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.33 
show that the difference between African Americans with a CQE and no record was not 
statistically significant, p = .216.  The difference between Whites with a CQE and no 
record was not statistically significant, p = .216.  Average marginal effects also showed 
that the difference between African Americans and Whites with no record was 
statistically significant, p = .087*. The difference between African Americans and Whites 
with a CQE was statistically significant, p = .085*. 
Table 4.32. Probability of being called first for criminal record type conditioned by race.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record 
     African American 0.495 0.098 0.303 0.687 
     White 0.676 0.082 0.516 0.837 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.316 0.084 0.151 0.481 
     White  0.496 0.096 0.308 0.684 
 
Table 4.33. Average marginal effects of being called first for criminal record type 
conditioned by race.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.179 0.145 -1.24 0.216 -0.463 0.105 
       
White CQE - 
White No Record -0.180 0.146 -1.24 0.216 -0.466 0.105 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.181 0.106 1.71 0.087 -0.026 0.388 
       
White CQE - 




Displayed in Table 4.34 are the predicted probabilities of being called first for the 
criminal record type conditioned by race with the controls of submitted first and base 
resume included (see Table B.14 for the full logistic regression output). Only these 
variables were included to reduce instability in the model given the low number of 
observations. The predicted probabilities were as follows: no record African American = 
.507, no record White = .703, CQE African American = .287, CQE White = .481. 
Average marginal effects displayed in Table 4.35 show that the difference between 
African Americans with a CQE and no record was marginally significant, p = .114*. The 
difference between Whites with a CQE and no record was marginally significant, p = 
.116*. Average marginal effects also showed that the difference between African 
Americans and Whites with no record was statistically significant, p = .053*. The 
difference between African Americans and Whites with a CQE was statistically 
significant, p = .051*. Therefore, including control variables resulted in very little 
differences.  
Table 4.34. Probability of being called first for criminal record type conditioned by race 
with controls.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record 
     African American 0.507 0.090 0.331 0.683 
     White 0.703 0.081 0.543 0.862 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.287 0.086 0.118 0.456 
     White  0.481 0.090 0.305 0.657 
 
Table 4.35. Average marginal effects of being called first for criminal record type 
conditioned by race with controls.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. CQE -      
African Am. No Record -0.22 0.139 -1.58 0.114 -0.492 0.053 
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White CQE - 
White No Record -0.222 0.141 -1.57 0.116 -0.498 0.055 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.196 0.101 1.94 0.053 -0.002 0.394 
       
White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.194 0.099 1.95 0.051 -0.001 0.389 
 
4.2 BETWEEN-SUBJECTS DESIGN RESULTS  
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 A total of 1200 resumes were submitted to 1200 employers. Table 4.36 shows the 
distribution of treatment variables. Overall, 176 of the 1200 (14.67%) hypothetical 
applicants received an invitation to continue in the hiring process.  
Table 4.36. Distribution of treatment variables.  
 No Record Record CQE Total 
Race     
     White 200 (33.3%) 200 (33.3%) 200 (33.3%) 400 (100%) 
     African American 200 (33.3%) 200 (33.3%)  200 (33.3%) 400 (100%) 
 
Table 4.37 displays the distribution of control variables across criminal record 
type. As shown in Table 4.37, randomization was successful. The minimum hourly pay 
for the no record group was $8.5, the median was $12, and the maximum was $23. The 
minimum hourly pay for the record group was $8, the median was $11, and the maximum 
was $20. The minimum hourly pay for the record and CQE group was $8.5, the median 
was $12, and the maximum was $18. The minimum distance for the no record group was 
2.2 miles, the median was 17.4 miles, and the maximum was 37.5 miles. The minimum 
distance for the record group was 1.5 miles, the median was 15.6 miles, and the 
maximum was 36.5 miles. The minimum distance for the record and CQE group was 1.8 
miles, the median was 14.3 miles, and the maximum was 38.7 miles.    
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Table 4.37. Distribution of control variables across criminal record type.     
Variable No Record Record CQE Total 
Month Submitted     
     January 28 (26.2%) 41 (38.3%) 38 (35.5%) 107 (100%) 
     February 132 (33.1%) 133 (33.3%) 134 (33.6%) 399 (100%) 
     March 129 (33.6%) 131 (34.1%) 124 (32.3%) 384 (100%) 
     April 36 (34.3%) 37 (35.2%) 32 (30.5%) 105 (100%) 
     May 75 (36.6%) 58 (28.3%) 72 (35.1%) 205 (100%) 
Day Submitted     
     Sunday – Thursday 373 (33.0%) 380 (33.6%) 379 (33.5%) 1132 (100%) 
     Friday - Saturday 27 (39.7%) 20 (29.4%) 21 (30.9%) 68 (100%) 
Time Submitted     
     AM 256 (34.0%) 240 (31.8%) 258 (34.2%) 754 (100%) 
     PM 144 (32.3%) 160 (35.9%) 142 (31.8) 446 (100%) 
Hourly Pay     
     Below Median 114 (32.0%) 120 (33.7%) 122 (34.3%) 356 (100%) 
     Above Median 53 (36.1%) 44 (29.9%) 50 (34.0%) 147 (100%) 
     No Pay Listed 233 (33.4%) 236 (33.9%) 228 (32.7%) 697 (100%) 
Distance     
     Below Median 111 (31.4%) 122 (34.6%) 120 (34.0%) 353 (100%) 
     Above Median 129 (37.0%) 113 (32.4%) 107 (30.7%) 349 (100%) 
     No Address 160 (32.1%) 165 (33.1%) 173 (34.7%) 498 (100%) 
Full-Time Employment     
     No 108 (35.5%) 93 (30.6%) 103 (33.9%) 304 (100%) 
     Yes 262 (32.0%) 286 (35.0%) 270 (33.0%) 818 (100%) 
     Not Listed  30 (38.5%) 21 (26.9%) 27 (34.6%) 78 (100%) 
Cleveland City     
     No 262 (34.4%) 255 (33.4%) 246 (32.2%) 763 (100%) 
     Yes 99 (31.8%) 103 (33.1%) 109 (35.1%) 311 (100%) 
     No City Location 39 (31.0%) 42 (33.3%) 45 (35.7%) 126 (100%) 
Job Type     
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 16 (31.4%) 17 (33.3%) 18 (25.3%) 51 (100%) 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 59 (36.2%) 49 (30.1%) 55 (33.7%) 163 (100%) 
     Manufacturing 23 (39.0%) 21 (35.6%) 15 (25.4%) 59 (100%) 
     General Labor 135 (34.1%) 132 (33.3%) 129 (32.6%) 396 (100%) 
     Restaurant Labor 43 (29.3%) 53 (36.1%) 51 (34.7%) 147 (100%) 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 20 (24.4%) 34 (41.5%) 28 (34.2%) 82 (100%) 
     Driving 18 (43.9%) 9 (22.0%) 14 (34.2%) 41 (100%) 
     Clerical 25 (28.4%) 35 (39.8%) 28 (31.8%) 88 (100%) 
     Sales In-Store 11 (31.4%) 10 (28.6%) 14 (40.0%) 35 (100%) 
     Shipping/Warehouse 29 (37.2%) 23 (29.5%) 26 (33.3%) 78 (100%) 
     Sales Call Center 11 (30.6%) 11 (30.6%) 14 (38.9%) 36 (100%) 
     Multiple Job Types 10 (41.7%) 6 (25.0%) 8 (33.3%) 24 (100%) 
Posting Age     
     1-4 days old 317 (33.8%) 312 (33.3%) 308 (32.9%) 937 (100%) 
     5-14 days old 83 (31.6%) 88 (33.5%) 92 (34.5%) 263 (100%) 
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Staffing Agency     
     No 390 (33.3%) 390 (33.3%) 391 (33.4%) 1171 (100%) 
     Yes 10 (34.5%) 10 (34.5%) 9 (31.0%) 29 (100%) 
Temporary     
     No 378 (33.5%) 378 (33.5%) 371 (32.9%) 1127 (100%) 
     Yes 22 (30.1% 22 (30.1%) 29 (39.7%) 73 (100%) 
     
Displayed in Table 4.38 is the distribution of control variables across race. As 
shown in Table 4.38, randomization was successful. The minimum hourly pay for 
African Americans was $8, the median was $11.5, and the maximum was $18. The 
minimum hourly pay for Whites was $8.55, the median was $12, and the maximum was 
$23.  The minimum distance for African Americans was 1.5 miles, the median was 16.9 
miles, and the maximum was 36.5 miles. The minimum distance for Whites was 1.7 
miles, the median was 14.9 miles, and the maximum was 38.7 miles.   
Table 4.38. Distribution of control variables across race.      
Variable African American White Total 
Month Submitted    
     January 55 (51.4%) 52 (48.6%) 107 (100%) 
     February 193 (48.4%) 206 (51.6%) 399 (100%) 
     March 201 (52.3%) 183 (47.7%) 384 (100%) 
     April 56 (53.3%) 49 (46.7%) 105 (100%) 
     May 95 (46.3%) 110 (53.7%) 205 (100%) 
Day Submitted    
     Sunday – Thursday 565 (49.9%) 567 (50.1%) 1132 (100%) 
     Friday - Saturday 35 (51.5%) 33 (48.5%) 68 (100%) 
Time Submitted    
     AM 375 (49.7%) 379 (50.3%) 754 (100%) 
     PM 225 (50.5%) 221 (49.6) 446 (100%) 
Hourly Pay    
     Below Median 174 (48.9%) 182 (51.1%) 356 (100%) 
     Above Median 64 (43.5%) 83 (56.5%) 147 (100%) 
     No Pay Listed 362 (51.9%) 335 (48.1%) 697 (100%) 
Distance    
     Below Median 164 (46.5%) 189 (53.5%) 353 (100%) 
     Above Median 181 (51.9%) 168 (48.1%) 349 (100%) 
     No Address 255 (51.2%) 243 (48.8%) 498 (100%) 
Full-Time Employment    
     No 167 (54.9%) 137 (45.1%) 304 (100%) 
     Yes 398 (48.7%) 420 (51.3%) 818 (100%) 
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     Not Listed  35 (44.9%) 43 (55.1%) 78 (100%) 
Cleveland City    
     No 376 (49.3%) 387 (50.7%) 763 (100%) 
     Yes 157 (50.5%) 154 (49.5%) 311 (100%) 
     No City Location 67 (53.2%) 59 (46.8%) 126 (100%) 
Job Type    
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 28 (54.9%) 23 (45.1%) 51 (100%) 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 83 (50.9%) 80 (49.1%) 163 (100%) 
     Manufacturing 25 (42.4%) 34 (57.6%) 59 (100%) 
     General Labor 198 (50.0%) 198 (50.0%) 396 (100%) 
     Restaurant Labor 75 (51.0%) 72 (49.0%) 147 (100%) 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 45 (54.9%) 37 (45.1%) 82 (100%) 
     Driving 16 (39.0%) 25 (61.0%) 41 (100%) 
     Clerical 43 (48.9%) 45 (51.1%) 88 (100%) 
     Sales In-Store 19 (51.3%) 16 (45.7%) 35 (100%) 
     Shipping/Warehouse 35 (44.9%) 43 (55.1%) 78 (100%) 
     Sales Call Center 22 (61.1%) 14 (38.9%) 36 (100%) 
     Multiple Job Types 11 (45.9%) 13 (54.2%) 24 (100%) 
Posting Age    
     1-4 days old 477 (50.9%) 460 (49.1%) 937 (100%) 
     5-14 days old 123 (46.8%) 140 (53.2%) 263 (100%) 
Staffing Agency    
     No 585 (50.0%) 586 (50.0%) 1171 (100%) 
     Yes 15 (51.7%) 14 (48.3%) 29 (100%) 
Temporary    
     No 563 (50.0%) 564 (50.0%) 1127 (100%) 
     Yes 37 (50.7%) 36 (49.3%) 73 (100%) 
    
B. Bivariate Analyses   
Table 4.39 displays the predicted probability of a callback for the treatment 
variables (see Table B.15 for the full logistic regression output). As shown, the predicted 
probabilities were as follows: no record = .220, record = .123, CQE = .098, African 
American = .108, White = .185. Displayed in Table 4.40, average marginal effects 
showed that the difference between the no record and record and CQE categories was 
statistically significant (p <= .001). This result was confirmed with a Chi square test, χ2 = 
22.47; df = 1; p <= .001. The difference between the no record and record categories was 
statistically significant (p <= .001). This result was confirmed with a Chi square test, χ2 = 
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13.40; df = 1; p <= .001. The difference between the record and record with CQE 
categories was not statistically significant (p = .256). This result was confirmed with a 
Chi square test, χ2 = 1.28; df = 1; p = .258. The difference between African Americans 
and Whites was statistically significant (p <= .001). This result was confirmed with a Chi 
square test, χ2 = 14.09; df = 1; p <= .001.   
Table 4.39. Probability of a callback for the pooled criminal record and racial conditions.  
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type     
     No Record 0.220 0.021 0.180 0.260 
     Record 0.123 0.016 0.091 0.154 
     Record and CQE 0.098 0.015 0.069 0.126 
Race     
     African American 0.108 0.013 0.084 0.133 
     White 0.185 0.016 0.154 0.216 
 
Table 4.40. Average marginal effects of a callback for the pooled criminal record and 
racial conditions.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
White – African American 0.077 0.020 3.82 0.000 0.037 0.116 
       
No Record - CQE 0.122 0.025 4.84 0.000 0.073 0.172 
       
Record - CQE 0.025 0.022 1.14 0.256 -0.018 0.068 
       
No Record - Record 0.098 0.026 3.72 0.000 0.046 0.149 
 
C. Multiple Regression Analysis  
Table 4.41 and Figure 4.2 display the predicted probability of a callback for each 
criminal record separated by race (see Table B.15 for the full logistic regression output). 
As shown, the predicted probabilities were as follows: African American no record = 
.166, African American record = .089, African American CQE = .070, White no record = 
.274, White record = .156, White CQE = .125. In Table 4.42, average marginal effects 
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showed that the difference between African Americans with no criminal record and 
African Americans with a criminal record and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= 
.001). The difference between African Americans with no record and African Americans 
with a record was statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference between African 
Americans with a record and African Americans with a record and a CQE was not 
statistically significant (p = .258). 
The difference between Whites with no criminal record and Whites with a 
criminal record and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference 
between Whites with no criminal record and Whites with a criminal record was 
statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference between Whites with a criminal record 
and Whites with a criminal record and a CQE was not statistically significant (p = .256).  
Average marginal effects also showed that the difference between Whites with no 
criminal record and African Americans with no criminal record was statistically 
significant (p <= .001). The difference between Whites with a criminal record and 
African Americans with a criminal record was statistically significant (p <= .001). The 
difference between Whites with a criminal record and a CQE and African Americans 
with a criminal record and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= .001).   
Table 4.41. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by race.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record    
     African American 0.166 0.022 0.123 0.209 
     White  0.274 0.028 0.219 0.329 
Record     
     African American 0.089 0.015 0.059 0.118 
     White  0.156 0.022 0.113 0.199 
Record and CQE    
     African American 0.070 0.013 0.045 0.096 
     White  0.125 0.020 0.086 0.164 
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Table 4.42. Average marginal effects of a callback for criminal record type conditioned 
by race.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am No Record -      
African Am. CQE 0.096 0.021 4.50 0.000 0.054 0.138 
       
African Am. Record -      
African Am. CQE 0.019 0.017 1.13 0.258 -0.014 0.052 
       
African Am. No Record -      
African Am. Record 0.077 0.022 3.57 0.000 0.035 0.119 
       
White No Record - 
White CQE 0.149 0.031 4.77 0.000 0.088 0.210 
      
White Record -      
White CQE 0.031 0.027 1.14 0.256 -0.023 0.085 
       
White No Record -      
White Record 0.118 0.032 3.69 0.000 0.055 0.181 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.108 0.029 3.75 0.000 0.052 0.164 
       
White Record - 
African Am. Record 0.067 0.019 3.58 0.000 0.030 0.104 
       
White CQE - 





Figure 4.2. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by race with 
95% confidence intervals.  
 
D. Robustness Checks  
i. Control Variables  
Table 4.43 displays the predicted probability of a callback for each criminal 
record separated by race (see Table B.16 for the full logistic regression output). As 
shown, the predicted probabilities were as follows: African American no record = .165, 
African American record = .091, African American CQE = .069, White no record = .268, 
White record = .159, White CQE = .124. In Table 4.44, average marginal effects showed 
that the difference between African Americans with no criminal record and African 
Americans with a criminal record and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= .001). 
The difference between African Americans with no record and African Americans with a 
record was statistically significant (p = .001). The difference between African Americans 
with a record and African Americans with a record and a CQE was not statistically 




































The difference between Whites with no criminal record and Whites with a 
criminal record and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference 
between Whites with no criminal record and Whites with a criminal record was 
statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference between Whites with a criminal record 
and Whites with a criminal record and a CQE was not statistically significant (p = .186).  
Average marginal effects also showed that the difference between Whites with no 
criminal record and African Americans with no criminal record was statistically 
significant (p <= .001). The difference between Whites with a criminal record and 
African Americans with a criminal record was statistically significant (p <= .001). The 
difference between Whites with a criminal record and a CQE and African Americans 
with a criminal record and a CQE was statistically significant (p <= .001).  Therefore, 
inclusion of the control variables did not substantively or significantly alter the above 
results.  
Table 4.43. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by race with 
controls.  
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record    
     African American 0.165 0.021 0.123 0.206 
     White  0.268 0.027 0.216 0.321 
Record     
     African American 0.091 0.015 0.061 0.121 
     White  0.159 0.022 0.117 0.201 
Record and CQE    
     African American 0.069 0.013 0.044 0.094 
     White  0.124 0.019 0.086 0.161 
 
Table 4.44. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by race with 
controls. 
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. No Record -      
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African Am. CQE 0.095 0.021 4.58 0.000 0.055 0.136 
       
African Am. Record -      
African Am. CQE 0.022 0.017 1.31 0.190 -0.011 0.055 
       
African Am. No Record -      
African Am. Record 0.073 0.021 3.45 0.001 0.032 0.115 
       
White No Record - 
White CQE 0.145 0.030 4.83 0.000 0.086 0.204 
      
White Record -      
White CQE 0.036 0.027 1.32 0.186 -0.017 0.088 
       
White No Record -      
White Record 0.109 0.031 3.52 0.000 0.048 0.170 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.104 0.028 3.76 0.000 0.050 0.158 
       
White Record - 
African Am. Record 0.068 0.019 3.62 0.000 0.031 0.105 
       
White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.054 0.016 3.49 0.000 0.024 0.085 
 
Table C.5 in Appendix section C displays the predicted probabilities of a callback 
for the control variables and Table C.6 in Appendix section C displays their average 
marginal effects. While the control variables did not alter the above results, a few points 
are worthy of note regarding overall impacts on callbacks. First, resumes submitted to 
staffing agencies had a probability of a callback of 33.2%, while those that were not had a 
probability of a callback of 14.2%, p = 0.029. Second, resumes submitted to temporary 
positions had a probability of a callback of 20.2%, while all other positions had a 
probability of 14.3%, p = 0.200. Third, resumes submitted Sunday through Thursday had 
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a probability of 15.1%, while those that were submitted Friday and Saturday had a 
probability of 8.3%, p = 0.047. Fourth, using general labor as the reference category 
(callback probability = 17.4%), results indicated significant differences with clerical 
positions (5%, p = 0.000) and restaurant customer service positions (9.2%, p = 0.041) and 
marginally significant differences with sales call center positions (31.5%, p = 0.079), 
customer service call center positions (9.4%, p = 0.063), manufacturing positions (10.3%, 
p = 0.078), and listings with multiple positions (10.3%, p = 0.082). Further, while there 
was not a statistically significant difference with general labor, driving positions had a 
callback probability of 27.1%, p = 0.158. Fifth, postings that did not list full-time or part-
time employment (22.6%) had a significantly higher probability of a callback than those 
that listed part-time employment (11.5%), p = 0.030.   
ii. Individual Names 
 Displayed below in Table 4.45, the predicted probabilities for individual names 
were as follows: DaQuan no record = .172, DaQuan record = .090, DaQuan CQE = .071, 
Jake no record = .307, Jake record = .175, Jake CQE = .141, Seth no record = .247, Seth 
record = .136, Seth CQE = .108, Tremayne no record = .164, Tremayne record = .086, 
Tremayne CQE = .068 (see Table B.17 for the full logistic regression output). In Table 
4.47, average marginal effects showed that the differences between the no criminal record 
and criminal record and CQE categories were statistically significant for each individual 
name (p <= .001). The differences between the no criminal record and record categories 
were also statistically significant for each individual name (p = .001 for DaQuan and p 
<= .001 for all other names). The difference between the criminal record and criminal 
record with CQE categories was not statistically significant for DaQuan (p = .264). The 
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difference between the criminal record and criminal record with CQE categories was not 
statistically significant for Jake (p = .260). The difference between the criminal record 
and criminal record with CQE categories was not statistically significant for Seth (p = 
.262). The difference between the criminal record and criminal record with CQE 
categories was not statistically significant for Tremayne (p = .266).  
In Table 4.46, average marginal effects also showed that the difference between 
DaQuan with no record and Jake with no record was statistically significant (p = .001). 
The difference between DaQuan with a record and Jake with a record was statistically 
significant (p = .002). The difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Jake 
with a record and CQE was statistically significant (p = .002). The difference between 
DaQuan with no record and Seth with no record was statistically significant (p = .057*). 
The difference between DaQuan with a record and Seth with a record was statistically 
significant (p = .065*). The difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Seth 
with a record and CQE was statistically significant (p = .067*). The difference between 
DaQuan with no record and Tremayne with no record was not statistically significant (p = 
.825). The difference between DaQuan with a record and Tremayne with a record was not 
statistically significant (p = .825) The difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE 
and Tremayne with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .825). The 
difference between Jake with no record and Seth with no record was not statistically 
significant (p = .167). The difference between Jake with a record and Seth with a record 
was not statistically significant (p = .166). The difference between Jake with a record and 
CQE and Seth with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .168).  The 
difference between Jake with no record and Tremayne with no record was statistically 
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significant (p = .001). The difference between Jake with a record and Tremayne with a 
record was statistically significant (p = .001). The difference between Jake with a record 
and CQE and Tremayne with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = 
.001). The difference between Seth with no record and Tremayne with no record was 
statistically significant (p = .032). The difference between Seth with a record and 
Tremayne with a record was statistically significant (p = .036). The difference between 
Seth with a record and CQE and Tremayne with a record and CQE was statistically 
significant (p = .039). 
Table 4.45. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name. 
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record    
     DaQuan 0.172 0.030 0.113 0.231 
     Jake 0.307 0.038 0.232 0.381 
     Seth 0.247 0.033 0.183 0.311 
     Tremayne 0.164 0.028 0.110 0.218 
Record     
     DaQuan 0.090 0.019 0.054 0.127 
     Jake 0.175 0.028 0.121 0.229 
     Seth 0.136 0.024 0.088 0.183 
     Tremayne 0.086 0.018 0.050 0.121 
Record and CQE    
     DaQuan 0.071 0.016 0.040 0.103 
     Jake 0.141 0.025 0.092 0.189 
     Seth 0.108 0.021 0.067 0.150 
     Tremayne 0.068 0.015 0.038 0.097 
 
Table 4.46. Average marginal effect of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name. 
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
Jake No Record -      
DaQuan No Record 0.135 0.042 3.21 0.001 0.052 0.217 
       
Jake Record - 
DaQuan Record 0.084 0.027 3.09 0.002 0.031 0.138 
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Jake CQE -       
DaQuan CQE 0.069 0.023 3.03 0.002 0.024 0.114 
       
Seth No Record -      
DaQuan No Record 0.075 0.04 1.90 0.057 -0.002 0.153 
       
Seth Record -       
DaQuan Record 0.045 0.025 1.84 0.065 -0.003 0.094 
       
Seth CQE - 
DaQuan CQE 0.037 0.020 1.83 0.067 -0.003 0.077 
       
Tremayne No Record -      
DaQuan No Record -0.008 0.037 -0.22 0.825 -0.081 0.065 
       
Tremayne Record -       
DaQuan Record -0.005 0.021 -0.22 0.825 -0.047 0.037 
       
Tremayne CQE - 
DaQuan CQE -0.004 0.017 -0.22 0.825 -0.037 0.030 
      
Seth No Record -      
Jake No Record -0.060 0.043 -1.38 0.167 -0.144 0.025 
       
Seth Record -       
Jake Record -0.039 0.028 -1.39 0.166 -0.094 0.016 
       
Seth CQE - 
Jake CQE -0.032 0.023 -1.38 0.168 -0.078 0.014 
      
Tremayne No Record -      
Jake No Record -0.143 0.042 -3.43 0.001 -0.225 -0.061 
       
Tremayne Record -       
Jake Record -0.089 0.027 -3.34 0.001 -0.141 -0.037 
       
Tremayne CQE - 
Jake CQE -0.073 0.023 -3.24 0.001 -0.117 -0.029 
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Tremayne No Record -      
Seth No Record -0.083 0.039 -2.15 0.032 -0.160 -0.007 
       
Tremayne Record -       
Seth Record -0.050 0.024 -2.1 0.036 -0.097 -0.003 
       
Tremayne CQE - 
Seth CQE -0.041 0.020 -2.07 0.039 -0.079 -0.002 
 
Table 4.47. Average marginal effect of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name continued. 
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
DaQuan No record -      
DaQuan CQE 0.101 0.025 4.08 0.000 0.052 0.149 
       
Jake No Record - 
Jake CQE 0.166 0.036 4.62 0.000 0.096 0.236 
      
Seth No Record -      
Seth CQE 0.139 0.030 4.64 0.000 0.080 0.197 
       
Tremayne No Record - 
Tremayne CQE 0.096 0.023 4.22 0.000 0.051 0.141 
      
DaQuan Record -      
DaQuan CQE 0.019 0.017 1.12 0.264 -0.014 0.053 
       
Jake Record - 
Jake CQE 0.034 0.030 1.13 0.260 -0.025 0.094 
      
Seth Record -      
Seth CQE 0.028 0.025 1.12 0.262 -0.021 0.076 
       
Tremayne Record - 
Tremayne CQE 0.018 0.016 1.11 0.266 -0.014 0.050 
      
DaQuan No Record -      
DaQuan Record 0.081 0.024 3.38 0.001 0.034 0.129 
       
Jake No Record - 
Jake Record 0.132 0.036 3.67 0.000 0.061 0.202 
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Seth No Record -      
Seth Record 0.111 0.030 3.71 0.000 0.052 0.170 
       
Tremayne No Record - 
Tremayne Record 0.078 0.022 3.50 0.000 0.034 0.122 
 
Displayed below in Table 4.48 are the predicted probabilities for the criminal 
record conditions separated by individual names with control variables added to the 
model (see Table B.18 for the full logistic regression output). The predicted probabilities 
were as follows: DaQuan no record = .167, DaQuan record = .092, DaQuan CQE = .070, 
Jake no record = .284, Jake record = .168, Jake CQE = .131, Seth no record = .254, Seth 
record = .148, Seth CQE = .115, Tremayne no record = .164, Tremayne record = .090, 
Tremayne CQE = .068. In Table 4.50, average marginal effects showed that the 
differences between the no criminal record and criminal record and CQE categories were 
statistically significant for each individual name (p <= .001). The differences between the 
no criminal record and record categories were also statistically significant for each 
individual name (p <= .001 for Seth and .001 for all other names). The difference 
between the criminal record and criminal record with CQE categories was not statistically 
significant for DaQuan (p = .198). The difference between the criminal record and 
criminal record with CQE categories was not statistically significant for Jake (p = .191). 
The difference between the criminal record and criminal record with CQE categories was 
not statistically significant for Seth (p = .193). The difference between the criminal 
record and criminal record with CQE categories was not statistically significant for 
Tremayne (p = .198).  
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In Table 4.49, average marginal effects also showed that the difference between 
DaQuan with no record and Jake with no record was statistically significant (p = .004). 
The difference between DaQuan with a record and Jake with a record was statistically 
significant (p = .005). The difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Jake 
with a record and CQE was statistically significant (p = .007). The difference between 
DaQuan with no record and Seth with no record was statistically significant (p = .023). 
The difference between DaQuan with a record and Seth with a record was statistically 
significant (p = .029). The difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE and Seth 
with a record and CQE was statistically significant (p = .031). The difference between 
DaQuan with no record and Tremayne with no record was not statistically significant (p = 
.930). The difference between DaQuan with a record and Tremayne with a record was not 
statistically significant (p = .930) The difference between DaQuan with a record and CQE 
and Tremayne with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .930). The 
difference between Jake with no record and Seth with no record was not statistically 
significant (p = .498). The difference between Jake with a record and Seth with a record 
was not statistically significant (p = .497). The difference between Jake with a record and 
CQE and Seth with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .498).  The 
difference between Jake with no record and Tremayne with no record was statistically 
significant (p = .002). The difference between Jake with a record and Tremayne with a 
record was statistically significant (p = .003). The difference between Jake with a record 
and CQE and Tremayne with a record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = 
.003). The difference between Seth with no record and Tremayne with no record was 
statistically significant (p = .027). The difference between Seth with a record and 
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Tremayne with a record was statistically significant (p = .030). The difference between 
Seth with a record and CQE and Tremayne with a record and CQE was statistically 
significant (p = .033). Therefore, except for the DaQuan and Seth comparisons becoming 
statistically significant without use of a one-sided test, the inclusion of the control 
variables did not substantively or significantly alter the above results.  
Table 4.48. Probability of a callback for criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name with controls. 
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
No Record    
     DaQuan 0.167 0.029 0.110 0.224 
     Jake 0.284 0.036 0.214 0.354 
     Seth 0.254 0.033 0.189 0.320 
     Tremayne 0.164 0.028 0.110 0.218 
Record     
     DaQuan 0.092 0.019 0.055 0.129 
     Jake 0.168 0.027 0.116 0.221 
     Seth 0.148 0.026 0.097 0.199 
     Tremayne 0.090 0.019 0.052 0.127 
Record and CQE    
     DaQuan 0.070 0.016 0.039 0.100 
     Jake 0.131 0.023 0.085 0.177 
     Seth 0.115 0.022 0.071 0.158 
     Tremayne 0.068 0.016 0.037 0.099 
 
Table 4.49. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name with controls. 
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
Jake No Record -      
DaQuan No Record 0.117 0.041 2.85 0.004 0.036 0.197 
       
Jake Record - 
DaQuan Record 0.077 0.028 2.78 0.005 0.023 0.131 
       
Jake CQE -       
DaQuan CQE 0.062 0.023 2.71 0.007 0.017 0.106 
       
Seth No Record -      
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DaQuan No Record 0.087 0.038 2.27 0.023 0.012 0.162 
       
Seth Record -       
DaQuan Record 0.056 0.026 2.19 0.029 0.006 0.106 
       
Seth CQE - 
DaQuan CQE 0.045 0.021 2.15 0.031 0.004 0.086 
       
Tremayne No Record -      
DaQuan No Record -0.003 0.037 -0.09 0.930 -0.077 0.070 
       
Tremayne Record -       
DaQuan Record -0.002 0.023 -0.09 0.930 -0.047 0.043 
       
Tremayne CQE - 
DaQuan CQE -0.002 0.018 -0.09 0.930 -0.037 0.034 
      
Seth No Record -      
Jake No Record -0.030 0.044 -0.68 0.498 -0.115 0.056 
       
Seth Record -       
Jake Record -0.020 0.030 -0.68 0.497 -0.079 0.038 
       
Seth CQE - 
Jake CQE -0.017 0.025 -0.68 0.498 -0.065 0.032 
      
Tremayne No Record -      
Jake No Record -0.120 0.039 -3.05 0.002 -0.197 -0.043 
       
Tremayne Record -       
Jake Record -0.079 0.026 -3.02 0.003 -0.130 -0.028 
       
Tremayne CQE - 
Jake CQE -0.063 0.021 -2.94 0.003 -0.105 -0.021 
      
Tremayne No Record -      
Seth No Record -0.090 0.041 -2.21 0.027 -0.171 -0.010 
       
Tremayne Record -       
Seth Record -0.058 0.027 -2.17 0.030 -0.111 -0.006 
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Tremayne CQE - 
Seth CQE -0.046 0.022 -2.13 0.033 -0.089 -0.004 
 
Table 4.50. Average marginal effects of criminal record type conditioned by individual 
name with controls continued. 
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
DaQuan No record -      
DaQuan CQE 0.097 0.024 4.07 0.000 0.050 0.144 
       
Jake No Record - 
Jake CQE 0.152 0.033 4.60 0.000 0.088 0.217 
      
Seth No Record -      
Seth CQE 0.140 0.030 4.64 0.000 0.081 0.199 
       
Tremayne No Record - 
Tremayne CQE 0.096 0.022 4.27 0.000 0.052 0.139 
      
DaQuan Record -      
DaQuan CQE 0.022 0.017 1.29 0.198 -0.011 0.056 
       
Jake Record - 
Jake CQE 0.037 0.028 1.31 0.191 -0.018 0.093 
      
Seth Record -      
Seth CQE 0.033 0.026 1.30 0.193 -0.017 0.084 
       
Tremayne Record - 
Tremayne CQE 0.022 0.017 1.29 0.198 -0.011 0.054 
      
DaQuan No Record -      
DaQuan Record 0.075 0.023 3.23 0.001 0.030 0.121 
       
Jake No Record - 
Jake Record 0.115 0.033 3.45 0.001 0.050 0.181 
      
Seth No Record -      
Seth Record 0.106 0.030 3.49 0.000 0.047 0.166 
       





 iii. Interactions  
Displayed below in Table 4.51 are the predicted probabilities derived from the 
interaction between the race and criminal record treatment variables (see Table B.19 for 
the full logistic regression output). The predicted probabilities were as follows: African 
American no record = .170, African American record = .090, African American CQE = 
.065, White no record = .270, White record = .155, White CQE = .120. In Table 4.52, 
average marginal effects showed that the difference between African Americans with no 
criminal record and African Americans with a criminal record and CQE was statistically 
significant (p = .001). The difference between African Americans with a criminal record 
and African Americans with a criminal record and CQE was not statistically significant 
(p = .349). The difference between African Americans with no record and African 
Americans with a criminal record was statistically significant (p = .017). The difference 
between Whites with no criminal record and Whites with a criminal record and CQE was 
statistically significant (p <= .001). The difference between Whites with a criminal record 
and Whites with a criminal record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .474). 
The difference between Whites with a criminal record and Whites with no criminal 
record was statistically significant (p = .005).  
Average marginal effects also showed that the difference between Whites and 
African Americans with no record was statistically significant (p = .015). The difference 
between Whites and African Americans with a criminal record was statistically 
significant (p = .046). The difference between White and African Americans with a 
criminal record and CQE was statistically significant (p = .027). These results indicate 
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minimal differences between the main effects and interaction models, and both AIC and 
BIC favored the main effects model. Additional interactions were also explored (race x 
city location; criminal record x city location; criminal record x job type; race x job type; 
race x criminal record x city location); however, results again indicated minimal 
differences and AIC and BIC still favored the main effects model.31 
Table 4.51. Probability of a callback for the criminal record and race interaction.  
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper  
No Record 
     African American 0.170 0.027 0.118 0.222 
     White 0.270 0.031 0.208 0.332 
Record 
     African American 0.090 0.020 0.050 0.130 
     White 0.155 0.026 0.105 0.205 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.065 0.017 0.031 0.099 
     White 0.130 0.024 0.083 0.177 
 
Table 4.52. Average marginal effects of the criminal record and race interaction.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper  
African Am. No Record -      
African Am. CQE 0.105 0.032 3.30 0.001 0.043 0.167 
       
African Am. Record -      
African Am. CQE 0.025 0.027 0.94 0.349 -0.027 0.077 
       
African Am. No Record -      
African Am. Record 0.080 0.033 2.40 0.017 0.015 0.145 
       
White No Record - 
White CQE 0.140 0.039 3.55 0.000 0.063 0.217 
      
White Record -      
White CQE 0.025 0.035 0.72 0.474 -0.043 0.093 
       
White No Record -      
                                                 
31 Race x Criminal Record x Job Type was also examined. However, this interaction 
caused significant instability in the model.  
123 
 
White Record 0.115 0.041 2.84 0.005 0.036 0.194 
      
White No Record -      
African Am. No Record 0.100 0.041 2.43 0.015 0.019 0.181 
       
White Record - 
African Am. Record 0.065 0.033 1.99 0.046 0.001 0.129 
       
White CQE - 
African Am. CQE 0.065 0.029 2.20 0.027 0.007 0.123 
 
Displayed below in Table 4.53 are the predicted probabilities derived from the 
interaction between the race and criminal record treatment variables with control 
variables included in the model (see Table B.20 for the full logistic regression output). 
The predicted probabilities were as follows: African American no record = .179, African 
American record = .092, African American CQE = .064, White no record = .264, White 
record = .158, White CQE = .129. In Table 4.54, average marginal effects showed that 
the difference between African Americans with no criminal record and African 
Americans with a criminal record and CQE was statistically significant (p = .001). The 
difference between African Americans with a criminal record and African Americans 
with a criminal record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .290). The difference 
between African Americans with no record and African Americans with a criminal record 
was statistically significant (p = .020). The difference between Whites with no criminal 
record and Whites with a criminal record and CQE was statistically significant (p <= 
.001). The difference between Whites with a criminal record and Whites with a criminal 
record and CQE was not statistically significant (p = .398). The difference between 
Whites with a criminal record and Whites with no criminal record was statistically 
significant (p = .008).  
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 Average marginal effects also showed that the difference between Whites and 
African Americans with no record was statistically significant (p = .019). The difference 
between Whites and African Americans with a criminal record was statistically 
significant (p = .043). The difference between White and African Americans with a 
criminal record and CQE was statistically significant (p = .024). Therefore, inclusion of 
the control variables did not substantively or significantly alter the above results.  
Table 4.53. Probability of a callback for the criminal record and race interaction with 
controls.  
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper  
No Record 
     African American 0.169 0.026 0.118 0.220 
     White 0.264 0.030 0.204 0.323 
Record 
     African American 0.092 0.021 0.052 0.132 
     White 0.158 0.025 0.109 0.208 
Record and CQE 
     African American 0.064 0.017 0.031 0.097 
     White 0.129 0.023 0.083 0.175 
 
Table 4.54. Average marginal effects of the criminal record and race interaction with 
controls.  
Variable – Base Outcome  Difference SE Z P>|z|  CI Lower CI Upper   
African Am. No Record -       
African Am. CQE 0.105 0.031 3.41 0.001 0.045 0.166  
        
African Am. Record -       
African Am. CQE 0.028 0.027 1.06 0.290 -0.024 0.080  
        
African Am. No Record -       
African Am. Record 0.077 0.033 2.33 0.020 0.012 0.142  
        
White No Record - 
White CQE 0.135 0.038 3.53 0.000 0.060 0.209 
 
       
White Record -       
White CQE 0.029 0.035 0.85 0.398 -0.038 0.097  
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White No Record -       
White Record 0.105 0.040 2.65 0.008 0.028 0.183  
       
White No Record -       
African Am. No Record 0.094 0.040 2.35 0.019 0.016 0.173  
        
White Record - 
African Am. Record 0.066 0.033 2.02 0.043 0.002 0.130 
 
        
White CQE - 










5.1 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND PREVIOUS CQE RESEARCH   
H1: The probability of a callback for applicants with a CQE will be less than 
those with no record. 
  
 The above results support hypothesis 1. Applicants with a CQE received 
significantly fewer callbacks than those with no record (probabilities were as follows: 
Whites with no record in mixed design = 25.1%; African Americans with no record 
mixed design = 19.4%; Whites with a CQE mixed design = 17.4%; African Americans 
with a CQE mixed design = 13.1%; Whites with no record between-subjects design =  
27.4%; African Americans with no record between-subjects design = 16.6%; Whites with 
CQE between-subjects design = 12.5%; African Americans with CQE between subjects 
design = 7%). This finding was present in African American and White applicants, both 
designs, and in most robustness checks.32 Further, the mixed design also showed that 
                                                 
32 The mixed design interaction model showed that the difference between African 
Americans with a CQE and African Americans with no record was not statistically 
significant. However, removing influential pairs from this model resulted in a marginally 
significant difference using a one-sided test. Further, inclusion of control variables also 
resulted in a marginally significant difference using a one-sided test and removal of 
influential pairs along with controls resulted in a fully significant difference using a one-
sided test.  
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when both applicants received a callback, those with a CQE had a probability of being 
called first that was approximately 22 percentage points lower (marginally significant 
when controls were added to the model) than those with no record. Therefore, the results 
indicate that a CQE does not eliminate the stigma of the particular criminal record used in 
the current study.  
 The above results support Leasure and Andersen (2019) which found that 
callbacks for African Americans with a CQE were significantly lower than those with no 
record (African Americans with no record = 25.2%; African Americans with a CQE = 
11%). Further, the use of multiple control variables, multiple designs, a different research 
location, a formal certificate, multiple names, and a different criminal record in the 
current study adds robustness to the results of Leasure and Andersen (2019).  
 However, the above result does not support the findings of Leasure and Andersen 
(2016) which found that callbacks for White applicants with a CQE were statistically 
indistinguishable from those with no record (Whites with no record = 29%; Whites with a 
CQE = 25.6%). Potential explanations for this difference could be the use of a formal 
certificate, a different research location, or a different criminal record in the current 
study. Further, it is possible that one or more of the control variables used here (i.e., 
staffing agency or day submitted) were driving the higher White CQE callback rates in 
Leasure and Andersen (2016).    
H2: The probability of a callback for applicants with a CQE will be greater than 
those with a record and no CQE. 
 
The above results do not support hypothesis 2. Applicants with a record and CQE 
fared no better in terms of callbacks than applicants with a record and no CQE 
(probabilities were as follows: Whites with a record and no CQE = 15.6%; African 
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Americans with a record and no CQE = 8.9%; Whites with a CQE = 12.5%; African 
Americans with a CQE = 7%). In fact, point estimates for the CQE condition were lower 
than those with a record and no CQE in every comparison. This finding was supported in 
all robustness checks. Therefore, findings were not even in the expected direction stated 
in the above hypothesis.  
This result supports Leasure and Andersen (2019) which found that callbacks for 
African Americans with a record (one-year-old drug felony) and CQE were statistically 
indistinguishable from those with a record and no CQE (African Americans with a CQE 
= 11%; African Americans with a record and no CQE = 8.4%). Further, the use of 
multiple control variables, a different research location, a formal certificate, multiple 
names, and a different criminal record in the current study adds robustness to the results 
of Leasure and Andersen (2019).  
 The above result does not support the findings of Leasure and Andersen (2016) 
which found that callbacks for White applicants with a record and no CQE were 
significantly better than those with a record and no CQE (Whites with a CQE = 25.6%; 
Whites with a record and no CQE = 9.8%). Potential explanations for this difference 
could be the use of a formal certificate, a different research location, or a different 
criminal record in the current study. Specifically, it is possible that attaching a formal 
CQE certificate to the resume drew more attention to a criminal record condition that 
would be overlooked if only present in a cover letter (see Lareau, 2014 finding that 
approximately 60% of surveyed employers do not read cover letters). Interestingly, this 
would explain why the point estimates for the CQE condition were lower than those with 
a record and no CQE in every comparison. Further, it is again possible that one or more 
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of the control variables used here (i.e., staffing agency or day submitted) were driving the 
higher White CQE callback rates in Leasure and Andersen (2016). However, as the 
between-subjects design was the only one that could include the record and CQE versus 
record and no CQE comparison (because of the risk of detection as noted above), it is 
also possible that particular unobserved resume or employer characteristics were driving 
this result (see Heckman, 1998).   
H3: The probability of a callback for applicants with no record will be greater 
than those with a record. 
 
The above results support hypothesis 3. Applicants with no record received a 
significantly larger number of callbacks than those with a record (probabilities were as 
follows: Whites with a record and no CQE = 15.6%; African Americans with a record 
and no CQE = 8.9%; Whites with no record = 27.4%; African Americans with no record 
= 16.6%). This finding was supported in all racial comparisons and in all robustness 
checks.  
This finding is consistent with the bulk of literature in this area finding that a 
criminal record has a significant negative impact on hiring outcomes. For example, Pager 
(2003) found the following callback probabilities for testers presenting a felony drug 
conviction: White no record = 34%; White record = 17%; African American no record = 
14%; African American record = 5%. Further, Agan and Starr (2017a) found that those 
with a criminal record (drug or property crime) had a callback rate of 8.5% and those 
without a record had a callback rate of 13.6%. As noted above, numerous other studies 
using various designs have found similar results. Because the current study used a unique 
criminal record formulation (multiple convictions for drug and theft crimes) and was 
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conducted in a different geographic setting, the findings of previous research in this area 
are reinforced.  
H4: The probability of a callback for African American applicants will be less 
than White applicants in all criminal record conditions.  
 
The above results support hypothesis 4. African American applicants received 
significantly fewer callbacks than White Applicants in all criminal record categories. This 
finding was supported in both designs and in most robustness checks. A few models in 
the mixed design portion of the study failed to find statistically significant racial effects. 
For example, the African American and White grouping models (with and without 
controls) failed to find statistically significant racial differences. Additionally, the 
individual name models (with and without controls) did not find statistically significant 
differences between Tremayne and Seth and Tremayne and Jake in both criminal record 
conditions. However, the probabilities derived from those models were in the direction 
predicted by the null hypothesis. Further, when both White and African American 
resumes received a callback, African Americans had a probability of being called first 
that was approximately 20 percentage points lower (statistically significant in the control 
model using a one-sided test) than Whites.  
This finding is consistent with the plethora of research showing that African 
Americans were consistently less likely to advance in the hiring process than equally 
situated Whites (see Bendick et al., 1994; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). For example, 
Zschirnt and Ruedin (2016) utilized meta-analysis of 42 separate correspondence studies 
from 1990 to 2015 to examine discrimination in hiring practices and found that 
discrimination against minorities was present across time, jurisdiction, gender, and 
economic contexts (see also the meta-analysis by Quillian et al., 2017). As noted above, 
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Pager (2003) found that Whites with a criminal record received a larger percentage of 
callbacks than African Americans with no criminal record (17% versus 14%). Such a 
finding was nearly replicated in the current study (Whites with a record = 15.6% and 
African Americans with no record = 16.6%). Because the current study used a unique 
criminal record formulation (multiple convictions for drug and theft crimes) and was 
conducted in a different geographic setting, the findings of previous research in this area 
are reinforced.  
5.2 POLICY AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
There are several policy and theoretical implications that can be derived from the 
above findings. The first set of implications is derived from the test of CQE effectiveness. 
The results here indicate that a CQE was not effective in terms of creating statistically 
equal chances of callbacks for ex-offenders (possessing the specific criminal record 
formulation used here) and those with no record when used for general employment 
purposes. In fact, applicants with a record and CQE fared no better in terms of callbacks 
than applicants with a record and no CQE. Given the judicial stamp of good character, 
employer immunity clause, and recent amendment strengthening the CQE, it is difficult 
to identify further amendments which could improve this mechanism. It is possible that 
certificates of relief, or any other mechanism that falls short of sealing criminal history, 
may not be effective at overcoming the negative stigma of the specific criminal record 
used in this study. As far as theoretical implications, the above results indicate that CQEs 
may not be effective signals of productivity (signaling theory) or effective risk reduction 
mechanisms (prospect theory) for ex-offenders who possess criminal history with more 
severe or repeat offenses.  
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Therefore, legislators may need to consider expanding eligibility requirements for 
collateral consequence relief mechanisms that eliminate consideration of one’s criminal 
record in the hiring process. Such mechanisms definitionally eliminate the negative 
signals and perceived risk associated a criminal record. Expungement is one promising 
avenue for collateral consequence relief given recent studies which cited increased 
employment rates and average earning for those who have had their records expunged 
(see Selbin et al., 2016; Prescott & Starr, 2019). However, legislators may be reluctant to 
enact laws which broaden the types of ex-offenders who would be eligible for 
expungement (Love, 2011). Further, Prescott and Starr (2019) found that a large number 
of expungement eligible ex-offenders fail to apply for this mechanism.  
In line with this fact, another possibility is to expand ban-the-box laws to entirely 
exclude criminal history questions in the hiring process. Such a provision could include 
reasonable time-clean requirements (requirements for an ex-offender to stay crime-free 
for a specified period of time) and exceptions for employers in certain industries 
(healthcare, childcare, etc.). For example, states could pass laws which ban consideration 
of criminal history that is older than 3 years. Further, placing the burden on employers to 
remove criminal record questions altogether would eliminate the need for ex-offenders to 
navigate a potentially complicated and expensive expungement process (Love, 2011). 
However, some ban-the-box research has found that removing criminal history questions 
results in increased racial discrimination (Agan & Starr 2017b; see also Sugie et al., 
2017). It is argued that some employers essentially try to guess which employees possess 
a criminal record, which disparately impacts minorities (see Aigner and Cain’s (1977) 
statistical discrimination theory).   
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A final option to reduce the negative impact of a criminal record could be to 
increase employer incentives for hiring ex-offenders. Specifically, programs which 
provide employers direct financial benefits for hiring ex-offenders may reduce the impact 
of a criminal record. Programs such as Federal Bonding do not provide direct financial 
benefits and instead provide insurance policies if ex-offender employees cause damage or 
liability (Ohio Department of Correction, 2017). The best-known direct incentive 
program is the Work Opportunity Tax Credit. This mechanism does so by offering 
employers a tax credit for hiring ex–felons who have a conviction or release from prison 
that is no more than one year old (U.S. Dept of Labor, 2017). The amount of the tax 
credit is determined by the number of hours worked by the disadvantaged employee 
during the first year of employment; however, the maximum credit is $2,400 per 
employee. Increasing the dollar amount of the credit and expanding eligibility 
requirements may be an effective mechanism to reduce the risk (prospect theory) 
associated with hiring an ex-offender. However, jurisdictions would need to take steps to 
inform employers about such a program as research has found that many employers are 
unaware of current incentive programs (see Martin et al., 2019).  
The second set of implications is derived from the tests of racial differences in 
callbacks. The results here showed that African American applicants received 
significantly fewer callbacks than White Applicants in all criminal record categories. This 
finding is consistent with the plethora of research showing that African Americans were 
less likely to advance in the hiring process than equally situated Whites (see Zschirnt & 
Ruedin, 2016; Quillian, Pager, Hexel, & Midtboen, 2017).  
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While it is possible that some of the racial differences found in the current study 
were driven by overt racism, it is more likely the result of implicit bias. Implicit bias “is a 
mental process that stimulates negative attitudes about people who are not members of 
one’s own ‘in group’” (Kirwan Institute, 2012; see also the above discussed concept of 
statistical discrimination). This bias then can lead to discriminatory behavior in a variety 
of contexts (Alexander, 2012). For example, criminal justice research examining implicit 
bias has found that individuals are more likely to support punitive policies for minorities 
(see for example, Hetey & Eberhardt, 2014). Further, research has also demonstrated that 
bias results in racially disproportionate representation in various stages of the criminal 
justice system (see for example Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004; Geller & Fagan, 2010; 
see also Travis et al., 2014). In the current context, numerous studies have linked 
negative views of African Americans to employers’ unwillingness to hire such 
individuals (Neckerman & Kirschenman, 1991; Pager & Karafin, 2009; see also 
Anderson, 2012). 
Therefore, any effective collateral consequence relief mechanism must account 
for racial discrimination and implicit bias. Doing so may require the use of several 
mechanisms in concert with one another. One possibility is to expand the targeted groups 
in the Work Opportunity Tax Credit to include minorities.  
However, some authors have been skeptical about the benefit of anti-
discrimination legislation and case law, pointing to previous attempts that simply shifted 
discrimination from one structure to another (Bell, 1992). The validity of such an 
argument is highlighted in the current context by the research noted above finding that 
minorities with no criminal record are negatively impacted by BTB laws (Agan & Starr 
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2017b; see also Sugie, 2017). Authors of those studies argued that employers who no 
longer have access to criminal history information post BTB essentially try to guess 
which employees have criminal records, and that this guessing process disproportionately 
impacts minorities.  
Guided by these points, a few additional policy recommendations can be offered. 
First, one possibility would be to encourage (through tax or other financial incentives) 
more private affirmative action policies and practices (see United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,1979 allowing the use of affirmative action in private 
employment). Relatedly, another possibility would be to mandate more robust public 
affirmative action policies and practices. Interestingly, one study examined whether 
Executive Order 11246 (an order requiring companies with federal contracts to be 
compliant with affirmative action/fair hiring policies) increased the amount of African 
American employees. That study found that the amount of African American employees 
in affected companies grew by an average of 0.8 percentage points after a five-year 
period of being bound by the executive order.  
Second, Bell (1992) also noted that any legitimate approach to dealing with racial 
discrimination must recognize the current disadvantaged economic position of African 
Americans in the U.S. One direct method to address this point would be reparations. 
Reparation legislation would seek to compensate African Americans for various 
individual and community losses suffered as a result of slavery, segregation, and 
contemporary racism (Feagin, 2004). Such reparations could then lead to further positive 
socioeconomic opportunities and thus upward mobility. Interestingly, the U.S. has 
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supported enforcement of Nazi victim reparations and has paid reparations to Japanese 
and Native Americans (Feagin, 2004).  
 Third, Bell (1992) and others argued that minority defendants are limited in their 
ability challenge discriminatory aspects of various laws and policies (see also Alexander, 
2012). For example, current law imposes a large burden on minority defendants seeking 
to prove discriminatory intent (Alexander, 2012). Relaxing these and other standing and 
immunity rules could provide minorities with an effective mechanism to challenge 
policies and practices as discriminatory (see Alexander; 2012).  
5.3 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The findings in the current study should be considered in light of the following 
limitations. First, this study did not examine the effectiveness of certificates of relief for 
women. While some research has found that that criminal history does not affect women 
as negatively as it does men, the topic needs further study (Galgano, 2009; Ortiz, 2014). 
Future research should continue to explore the impact of a criminal record for women. If 
future research should find a significant impact of a criminal record for women’s 
employment opportunities, then researchers should explore the effectiveness of 
certificates of relief for reducing that impact. 
Second, this study only focused on White and African American applicants. The 
results here may not generalize to other racial or ethnic groups. This is an important 
limitation as research has demonstrated that Hispanic individuals with criminal records 
also face barriers in securing employment (Pager, Western, & Sugie, 2009). Future 
research should also explore the effectiveness of certificates of relief for ex-offender 
Hispanics and other racial/ethnic groups seeking employment as race/ethnicity of these 
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other groups may differentially impact callback rates for those with criminal records or 
CQEs. 
Relatedly, only two racially distinct names were used as measures of race. This is 
an important limitation as some of the above results demonstrate statistically significant 
differences in callbacks between individual names used as a measure of one race (see also 
Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). For example, in the mixed design portion of the study, 
the differences in callbacks between Tremayne and Daquan were marginally significant 
for both criminal record categories (with and without controls).33 
Third, this study used only one criminal record formation (drug and theft) and did 
not note the type of drug. While the criminal record used here was built to best address 
generalizability, including other crime types or specifying particular types of drugs could 
produce different results (see Leasure and Andersen, 2016, 2019). This is an important 
limitation as survey research has shown that an employer’s willingness to hire ex-
offenders depends largely on the seriousness (type) of the crime (see Albright & Denq, 
1996; Kuhn, 2019). Future research should explore the effectiveness of certificates of 
relief on reducing the impact of various crime types (e.g., assault, D.U.I., fraud).   
 Fourth, the ages of the crimes used in this study were not manipulated. This is an 
important limitation giving research has found that employers are more willing to hire ex-
offenders with older criminal histories (see Albright & Denq, 1996; Kuhn, 2019; Leasure 
& Andersen, 2017). Future research should explore the effectiveness of certificates of 
relief on reducing the impact of various criminal history ages. 
                                                 
33 Removal of the influential pairs caused these differences to lose marginal significance.   
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Fifth, this study only utilized job postings that required submission of a resume. A 
search of entry-level positions posted within the last 30 days (as of 9-22-19) on 
Careerbuilder.com showed that 265 out of 728 postings required only a resume. While 
such an approach allowed for more control over the experimental conditions (see Agan & 
Starr, 2017a, 2017b utilizing formal applications and noting that research assistants were 
to rely on their judgement for answering unanticipated questions), the above results may 
not generalize to postings that require formal applications. Future research should explore 
the effectiveness of certificates of relief for ex-offenders using formal applications to 
apply for a position. 
Sixth, the findings here may be specific to Cleveland, Ohio. This is an important 
limitation given the lessons learned from experiments on mandatory domestic violence 
arrests. Early studies in this area influenced policy, but were unsuccessfully replicated in 
other locations (e.g., Berk, Campbell, Klap, & Western, 1992). This study must be 
replicated in other geographic areas before drawing concrete conclusions (see Sherman & 
Strang, 2004). 
Seventh, the current study did not vary the order of the education and work 
history on resumes. This is an important limitation as ordering of these factors could 
impact results. For example, it is possible that those with a criminal history would fare 
better in early employment outcomes if they could present work history and educational 
attainment that occurred after a conviction. Conversely, if a conviction is the most recent 
occurrence, offenders may face more reluctance from employers. Future research should 
manipulate the temporal ordering of the work and education history with criminal record 
treatment conditions.   
139 
 
Eight, several methods could be used to convey that an applicant possesses a CQE 
and only a few combinations were used in this study. The current study attached actual 
certificates to resumes, placed hypothetical applicants’ names on the official CQE list, 
and provided a note about the CQE in a cover letter. A note was included in the cover 
letter to strengthen the signal of the CQE and briefly explain the purpose of a CQE. A 
brief explanation was important to include as previous research showed that employers 
might not be aware of certificates or their exact purpose (Ewald, 2016; Garretson, 2016; 
Sahl, 2016). The brief explanation used in this study was meant to convey the main 
benefits of the CQE; the determination from a court that the individual is not a safety 
risk, the presumption that the person’s criminal record is insufficient evidence to 
disqualify an individual for an employment opportunity, and the negligent hiring 
immunity. While the brief note communicated these facts, several other versions could be 
conveyed which could influence employer response. Future research should construct 
differing versions of certificate explanations and examine differences in employer 
response.  
Finally, the current study only explored the effectiveness of a CQE for improving 
general employment opportunities for ex-offenders. This study did not examine whether a 
CQE is beneficial for those seeking licensures or in obtaining positions that require 
licensures. It is possible that those seeking such positions may fare better in hiring 
outcomes. Future research should explore the effectiveness of these certificates for 





5.4 TECHNICAL NOTES ON CORRESPONDENCE STUDIES   
As a result of the above data collection project, there are several technical notes 
regarding correspondence designs that are worthy of discussion. First, each design 
showed statistically significant differences between CQE holders and those with no 
record. However, the difference in callback probabilities for CQE holders in these two 
designs are worthy of further discussion. The probability of a callback for CQE holders in 
the mixed design was .131 for African Americans and .174 for Whites. The probability of 
a callback for CQE holders in the between-subjects design was .070 for African 
Americans and .125 for Whites. The difference between the African American 
probabilities was statistically significant, p = .04 (using a 2-sample z-test). The difference 
between the White probabilities was not statistically significant, p = .17.  
Regardless of statistical significance, both differences raise questions about the 
impact of the designs used in this study. One explanation is that the mixed design 
suffered from carryover/spillover effects. As noted above, previous research has detected 
the presence of such effects in experimental discrimination research examining callback 
rates (see Phillips, 2016). It is possible that an employer in the between-subjects design 
who received one resume noting a criminal conviction and CQE would be more inclined 
to wait and see if the candidate pool quality increased before deciding on callbacks. 
However, an employer in the mixed design who received both resumes (criminal record 
with CQE and no record) may have been influenced to conduct more interviews given the 
growing pool of lower quality resumes (i.e., criminal record on one resume and 
employment gaps, economically depressed neighborhoods, and GEDs rather than 
diplomas on both resumes). In essence, an employer in the mixed design may feel that 
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they need to conduct several interviews to find a good candidate given the number of 
lower quality resumes.  
Second, a limitation of correspondence designs utilizing electronic submission not 
readily identifiable in the literature is that one cannot guarantee that the correspondence 
was received. For example, email malfunctions (sender or receiver) and online job site 
malfunctions are certainly possible. This is a limitation that future researchers should 
note and potentially address. Researchers could include procedures in their IRB protocol 
that allow them to periodically confirm whether a correspondence was received. 
Relatedly, researchers should perform technology checks on the equipment used to 
receive employer callbacks. Periodic checks such as calling study phones and sending 
emails to study email addresses would help reduce concern in this area.  
Third, researchers conducting online correspondence designs should consider how 
to address the growing use of online job skill assessments which are required to complete 
an application (even those requiring only a resume). For example, indeed.com, the largest 
online job website in the U.S., recently introduced several different assessments which 
employers can require for complete resume submission (indeed blog, 2018). These 
assessments include multiple job specific skill tests, problem solving tests, critical 
thinking tests, computer skill tests, and language tests (indeed assessments, 2019a). 
Further, these assessments can require an applicant to answer pre-recorded questions via 
phone (indeed assessments, 2019b). Therefore, researches will either need to exclude 
applications with such assessments from their population or they will need to develop a 
strategy to deal with each potential assessment. In the current study, applications 
requiring assessments were excluded because most applications did not require an 
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assessment. However, this option may not be feasible in the future if assessments become 
a normal application practice.  
Fourth, and related to the third, researchers need to be weary of automatic 
responses from job websites that could be misconstrued as a callback. Through the course 
of this research, it became apparent that several applications submitted via indeed.com 
would send an email congratulating the applicant on making it to the next step in the 
hiring process and inviting them to complete a further step. However, these emails were 
automatically sent by the job website and were not indicative of an employer’s actual 
decision-making process (deduced from the fact that the congratulations email arrived 
seconds after resume submission). Therefore, researchers need to carefully examine 
callbacks to ensure that they in fact represent an employer’s actual decision-making 
process.   
Fifth, researchers conducting correspondence designs which use callbacks as a 
dependent variable need to enable several avenues for an employer to contact 
hypothetical applicants. This is an important point as recent correspondence studies 
utilized only voicemail and email accounts (see Agan & Starr, 2017a, 2017b). However, 
in the current study, callbacks were received via voicemail, text messages, emails, and 
various combinations thereof. Therefore, future researchers utilizing a correspondence 
study should use all three of these contact avenues to ensure that the callback variable is 
less susceptible to measurement error.   
Finally, researchers and institutional review boards should begin to question the 
ethics of audit and correspondence designs conveying criminal history which do not 
involve contact with the employer post callback or submission. The results of these 
143 
 
designs have been very useful in terms of detailing the level of stigma attached to a 
criminal record. However, it is possible that such designs add to this stigma in certain 
circumstances. For example, it is possible that an employer who invited one with a 
criminal record for an interview will be dissuaded from doing so in the future if the 
invitation was not addressed. In the aggregate, these individual instances could increase 
the level of stigma attached to a criminal record in the employment context. Such an issue 
could potentially be avoided by including an IRB procedure which allows the researcher 








 CONCLUSION  
The number of those with some sort of  a criminal record stands at approximately 
85 million (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). Such numbers are of crucial importance 
when considering the impact of so-called collateral consequences of conviction. Though 
there are many collateral consequences (barriers to housing, loss of public benefits, loss 
of civil rights), ex-offenders and other related parties such as probation and parole 
officers consistently cite that one of the most punitive collateral consequences is the 
barrier to employment created by incarceration and the application of a criminal record 
(Bahr et al., 2010; Garland et al., 2010; O’Brien, 2011; Ray et al., 2016; Western et al., 
2015). These studies demonstrate that ex-offenders have issues seeking employment (i.e., 
lack of ability to travel), being hired, and being promoted to better paying jobs (Bahr et 
al., 2010; Garland et al., 2010; O’Brien, 2011; Pager, 2003; Ray et al., 2016; Western et 
al., 2015).  
Such findings are of crucial importance because employment is a key factor for 
desistance from criminal behavior (Baron, 2008; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Tripodi et al., 
2010; Verbruggen et al, 2012; Wang et al, 2010; Wright & Cullen, 2004; and see 
Lageson & Uggen, 2013; Uggen & Wakefield, 2008 for thorough reviews). Recognizing 
the barriers created from collateral consequences, all jurisdictions have created collateral 
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consequence relief mechanisms meant to provide some sort of relief (Collateral 
Consequence Resource Center, 2017). One of the newest mechanisms, specifically 
created to combat collateral consequences related to employment, is the certificate of 
relief (sometimes called certificate of recovery or certificate of qualification for 
employment) (Love, 2011; Love & Frazier, 2006; O.R.C. 2953.25). Certificates of relief 
are intended to aid ex-offenders in their job search by demonstrating rehabilitation to 
decision-makers, lifting occupational licensing restrictions, and sometimes providing tort 
immunities to employers (Love, 2006; Love & Frazier, 2006; O.R.C. 2953.25). Previous 
research largely focused on access to and perceived effectiveness of certificates of relief. 
Two studies did examine the actual effectiveness of these certificates with a field 
experiment; however, they produced mixed results (see Leasure & Andersen, 2016, 
2019).  
The current study built upon previous research by testing an amended version of 
Ohio’s certificate of relief, using a criminal record condition that contained multiple 
convictions of varying crime types (drug and theft), including multiple control variables 
and robustness checks, using official certificates, and by using a study location that 
comprises the largest number of Ohio ex-offenders.  
The current study produced several important findings. First, results indicated that 
applicants with a CQE received significantly fewer callbacks than those with no record. 
Second, the results also showed that when both applicants received a callback, those with 
a CQE had a probability of being called first that was approximately 22 percentage points 
lower (marginally significant when controls were added to the model) than those with no 
record. Third, applicants with a record and CQE fared no better in terms of callbacks than 
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applicants with a record and no CQE. Fourth, applicants with no record received a 
significantly larger number of callbacks than those with a record. Finally, African 
American applicants received significantly fewer callbacks than White Applicants in all 
criminal record categories and when both White and African American resumes received 
a callback, African Americans had a probability of being called first that was 
approximately 20 percentage points lower (significant using a one-sided test) than 
Whites.  
The findings that show the negative impact of a criminal record and minority 
status on hiring outcomes are consistent with a long line of research. It was this long line 
of research that prompted the specific analyses in this study. The results of Leasure and 
Andersen (2016) provided promising evidence that the certificate of relief may be 
effective at reducing criminal record stigma. However, the results of that analysis were 
not confirmed in this study. Such a result emphasizes the importance of replication in 
experimental research. Despite the findings here, the above limitations show that further 
research is needed to better understand the effectiveness of certificates of relief. Given 
the substantial negative impacts of a criminal record in the hiring process, such research 
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LOGISTIC REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 
 
 Several diagnostics were performed for the logistic regressions. These diagnostics 
were largely guided by a resource distributed by the UCLA Institute for Digital Research 
and Education (UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, 2019a). The first 
diagnostic performed was a check for influential observations.  
A. Influential Observations  
As noted in the Stata manual, “DFBETAs are perhaps the most direct influence 
measure of interest to model builders. DFBETAs focus on one coefficient and measure 
the difference between the regression coefficient when the specified observation is 
included and excluded, the difference being scaled by the estimated standard error of the 
coefficient” (StataCorp, 2019: 15; see also Williams, 2016). Guided by previous 
recommendations, values greater than 1 were further examined for potential influence 
(see Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Schutte & Violette, 1994; Williams, 2016; see also 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980 recommending further investigation of values greater 
than 2). This was meant to identify observations that shifted the regression coefficient 
estimate at least one standard error. Stata’s dbeta and lfdbeta commands were used to 
identify DFBETAs with values greater than 1.  
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i. Mixed Design 
For the mixed portion of the study, this procedure identified two potential 
influential observation pairs. Probabilities and average marginal effects with these pairs 
deleted (with and without controls) were compared to the results above and there were no 
changes in statistical or substantive significance.34 While overall results of other models 
in the mixed portion of the study were unaffected by removal of the influential pairs, a 
few points are worthy of further discussion. For the interaction model without controls, 
removal of the influential observations caused the African American CQE and African 
American no record comparison to become marginally statistically significant (p = 
.189*). For the interaction model with controls added, removal of the influential 
observations caused the African American CQE and African American no record 
comparison to become fully statistically significant (p = .098*). Further, the difference 
between Whites with no record and African Americans with no record was now only 
statistically significant (p = .052*) in the interaction control model.   
 For the individual name models without controls, removal of the influential pairs 
caused the differences (both criminal record categories) between Tremayne and DaQuan 
to lose marginal significance (p = .106 for no record; p = .109 for CQE).  For the 
individual name models with controls, removal of the influential pairs again caused the 
differences (both criminal record categories) between Tremayne and DaQuan to lose 
marginal significance (p = .169 for no record; p = .164 for CQE).    
                                                 
34 Models excluding each individual pair were also examined. R2, AIC, and BIC favored 
the model excluding both pairs.  
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 For the first call model without controls, removal of the influential pairs caused 
the racial differences in both criminal record categories to become marginally significant 
(p = .110* for no record; p = .108* for CQE).   
ii. Between-Subjects Design 
There were no influential observations in the between-subjects portion of the 
study with a DFBETA value over 1.  
B. Multicollinearity 
 Multicollinearity was checked using Stata’s coldiag2 and collin commands which 
present multiple collinearity diagnostics.  
 i. Mixed Design 
 
The results of the coldiag2 command showed that the highest condition index 
value was 21.30 (next highest value was 11.87 and all others under 10). Gujarati (2002) 
notes that condition indexes with values equal to or less than 10 provide weak evidence 
for a collinearity issue (see also Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). Condition index values 
that are greater than 10 and less than 30 provide moderate evidence of a collinearity 
issue. However, a high condition index value must also have two or more associated 
variance-decomposition proportions with a value greater than .5 (see Callaghan & Chen, 
2008). Here, for the condition index value of 21.30, the constant had a value of .99; 
however, no other proportions had a value greater than or equal to .5. For the condition 
index value of 11.87, only one proportion had a value above .5 (.56). Therefore, these 
results indicate that multicollinearity was not an issue. Another multicollinearity 
diagnostic is the variance inflation factor (VIF) (see UCLA Institute for Digital Research 
and Education, 2019a noting that values above 10 are a potential cause for concern).  
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Using Stata’s collin command, results indicated that no variance inflation factor had a 
value greater than 4.84, mean VIF 1.92).  
 ii. Between-Subjects Design  
 
 The results of the coldiag2 command showed that the highest condition index 
value was 20.09 (the next highest value was 9.23). For the variance-decomposition 
proportions, the constant had a value of .96 and three other variance proportions had a 
value greater than or equal to .5 (.59, .66, .57). However, using Stata’s collin command, 
results indicated that no variance inflation factor had a value greater than 5.46, mean VIF 
1.87). Further, Allison (2012) notes that [multicollinearity] is: 
only a problem for the variables that are collinear. It increases the standard errors 
of their coefficients, and it may make those coefficients unstable in several ways. 
But so long as the collinear variables are only used as control variables, and they 
are not collinear with your variables of interest, there’s no problem. The 
coefficients of the variables of interest are not affected, and the performance of 
the control variables as controls is not impaired. 
 
In both of the above designs, none of the potential issues of collinearity are present in the 
key independent variables (racial and criminal record conditions). Allison (2012) also 
notes that multicollinearity can safely be ignored when the issue emanates from 
“indicator (dummy) variables that represent a categorical variable with three or more 
categories. Such was the case with the above high value condition index scores and 
variance-decomposition proportions.   
C. Specification Error and Model Fit  
 
 Model fit was determined with the use of two pseudo R2 measures (McFadden 
and Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke) and both AIC and BIC statistics. These measures are noted 
beneath each logistic regression. Favored BIC values were identified using Raftery 
(1995) and favored AIC values were identified using Hilbe (2009). McFadden values 
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were guided by McFadden (1979). Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke values were guided by 
UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education (2019b). Stata’s linktest command 
was used to check for specification error in the models that included control variables. 
The UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education (2019a) stated as follows 
regarding the linktest: 
The idea behind linktest is that if the model is properly specified, one should not 
be able to find any additional predictors that are statistically significant except by 
chance. After the regression command (in our case, logit or logistic), linktest uses 
the predicted value (_hat) and predicted value squared (_hatsq) as the predictors 
to rebuild the model. The variable _hat should be a statistically significant 
predictor, since it is the predicted value from the model. This will be the case 
unless the model is completely misspecified. On the other hand, if our model is 
properly specified, variable _hatsq shouldn’t have much predictive power except 
by chance. Therefore, if _hatsq is significant, then the linktest is significant. This 
usually means that either we have omitted relevant variable(s) or our link function 
is not correctly specified. 
 
i. Mixed Design 
   
The linktest for the main effect model with controls produced a statistically 
significant _hat value (p = 0.000) and a non-significant _hatsq value (p = 0.629). These 
results suggest that this model was correctly specified. The linktest for the individual 
name model (examining differences for each name used as a measure of race) with 
controls produced a statistically significant _hat value (p = 0.000) and a non-significant 
_hatsq value (p = 0.564). These results suggest that this model was correctly specified. 
The linktest for the interaction effect model with controls produced a statistically 
significant _hat value (p = 0.000) and a non-significant _hatsq value (p = 0.597). These 
results suggest that this model was correctly specified. The linktest for the first call model 
with controls produced a statistically significant _hat value (p = 0.002) and a non-
significant _hatsq value (p = 0.715). These results suggest that this model was correctly 
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specified. The linktest for the African American grouping model with controls produced 
a statistically significant _hat value (p = 0.000) and a non-significant _hatsq value (p = 
0.931). These results suggest that this model was correctly specified. The linktest for the 
White grouping model with controls produced a statistically significant _hat value (p = 
0.001) and a non-significant _hatsq value (p = 0.200). These results suggest that this 
model was correctly specified. The linktest for the African American and White grouping 
model with controls produced a statistically significant _hat value (p = 0.003) and a non-
significant _hatsq value (p = 0.326). These results suggest that this model was correctly 
specified. 
ii. Between-Subjects Design 
 
The linktest for the main effect model with controls produced a statistically 
significant _hat value (p = 0.015) and a non-significant _hatsq value (p = 0.581). These 
results suggest that this model was correctly specified. The linktest for the individual 
name model with controls produced a statistically significant _hat value (p = 0.011) and a 
non-significant _hatsq value (p = 0.638). These results suggest that this model was 
correctly specified. The linktest for the interaction model with controls produced a 
statistically significant _hat value (p = 0.017) and a non-significant _hatsq value (p = 





LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS PRESENTING ODDS RATIOS 
 
A. Mixed Design 
 
 i. Main Model  
 
Table B.1. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback. 
Variable OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race       
     White  1.394 0.257 1.81 0.071 0.972 2.000 
Record Type       
     CQE 0.628 0.070 -4.17 0.000 0.504 0.781 
Constant 0.240 0.039 -8.89 0.000 0.176 0.329 
Note. N = 800. McFadden R2 = 0.013. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.020. AIC = 
768.343. BIC = 782.397. Log pseudolikelihood = -381.172. Wald chi2 (2) = 20.60. Prob 
> chi2 = 0.0000. Standard error adjusted for 400 clusters. Reference category for record 
and CQE is no record. Reference category for White is African American.   
 
 ii. Controls 
 
Table B.2. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback with controls.   
Variable OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper  
Race       
     White 1.430 0.282 1.82 0.069 0.972 2.103 
Record Type      
     Record and CQE 0.584 0.075 -4.18 0.000 0.454 0.752 
City Location      
     Cleveland 1.049 0.328 0.15 0.879 0.568 1.938 
     Not Listed 0.83 0.338 -0.46 0.647 0.374 1.843 
Base Resume      
     2 0.964 0.124 -0.28 0.777 0.750 1.240 
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Submit First      
     Yes 1.013 0.130 0.10 0.919 0.787 1.304 
Full-Time       
     Yes 1.148 0.415 0.38 0.702 0.566 2.330 
     Not Listed 1.205 0.809 0.28 0.782 0.323 4.490 
Job Type       
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.741 0.432 -0.51 0.607 0.236 2.322 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.508 0.215 -1.6 0.109 0.222 1.163 
     Manufacturing  0.404 0.237 -1.55 0.122 0.128 1.273 
     Restaurant Labor 0.459 0.276 -1.30 0.195 0.141 1.491 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.509 0.366 -0.94 0.348 0.124 2.088 
     Driving 0.559 0.328 -0.99 0.322 0.177 1.768 
     Clerical 0.195 0.127 -2.51 0.012 0.054 0.698 
     Sales In-Store 0.706 0.418 -0.59 0.556 0.221 2.251 
     Warehouse 0.556 0.261 -1.25 0.211 0.222 1.395 
     Sales Call Center 3.907 2.584 2.06 0.039 1.069 14.281 
     Multiple  0.305 0.295 -1.23 0.219 0.046 2.029 
Staffing Agency      
     Yes 13.007 6.377 5.23 0.000 4.976 34.002 
Temporary      
     Yes 1.812 0.817 1.32 0.187 0.749 4.387 
Month Submitted      
     January 0.758 0.357 -0.59 0.556 0.301 1.907 
     March 0.687 0.223 -1.16 0.247 0.364 1.297 
     April 0.445 0.211 -1.71 0.087 0.176 1.126 
     May 1.353 0.572 0.72 0.474 0.591 3.099 
Time Submitted      
     PM 0.878 0.234 -0.49 0.625 0.521 1.480 
Posting Age      
     5-14 days 1.235 0.416 0.63 0.530 0.639 2.388 
Day Submitted      
     Friday and Saturday 0.293 0.181 -1.99 0.047 0.087 0.982 
Hourly Pay      
     Above Median 1.010 0.395 0.03 0.979 0.470 2.172 
     Not Listed 1.287 0.445 0.73 0.465 0.654 2.536 
Constant  0.309 0.161 -2.25 0.025 0.111 0.860 
Notes. N = 800. McFadden R2 = 0.135. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.198. AIC = 
729.618. BIC = 874.841. Log pseudolikelihood = -333.809. Wald chi2 (30) = 90.92. Prob 
> chi2 = 0.0000. Standard error adjusted for 400 clusters. Reference Category for record 
type is no record. Reference category for Race is African American. Reference category 
for city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category for base resume is 1. 
Reference category for submitted first is no. Reference category for full-time is part-time. 
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Reference category for job type is general labor. Reference category for staffing agency 
is no. Reference category for temporary is no. Reference category for month submitted is 
February. Reference category for time submitted is AM. Reference category for posting 
age is 1-4 days. Reference category for day submitted is Sunday through Thursday. 
Reference category for hourly pay is median and below.  
 
 iii. Individual Names 
 
Table B.3. Logistic regression of the criminal record and individual name conditions on 
an applicant’s likelihood of a callback.  
Variable   OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Name        
     Jake   1.646 0.372 2.20 0.028 1.057 2.564 
     Seth  1.788 0.476 2.18 0.029 1.061 3.011 
     Tremayne  1.488 0.334 1.77 0.077 0.958 2.312 
Record Type       
     CQE 0.627 0.070 -4.17 0.000 0.504 0.781 
Constant  0.196 0.040 -7.94 0.000 0.131 0.293 
Note. N = 800. McFadden R2 = 0.016. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.024. AIC = 
770.112. BIC = 793.535. Log pseudolikelihood = -380.056. Wald chi2(4) = 23.34. Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0001. Standard error adjusted for 400 clusters. Reference Category for CQE is 
no record. Reference category for Name is DaQuan.  
 
Table B.4. Logistic regression of the criminal record and individual name conditions on 
an applicant’s likelihood of a callback with controls.  
Variable OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Name       
     Jake 1.801 0.435 2.43 0.015 1.121 2.892 
     Seth 1.732 0.501 1.90 0.058 0.982 3.054 
     Tremayne 1.501 0.370 1.65 0.100 0.926 2.433 
Record Type      
     Record and CQE 0.571 0.075 -4.24 0.000 0.440 0.739 
City Location      
     Cleveland 1.052 0.330 0.16 0.872 0.568 1.946 
     Not Listed 0.830 0.337 -0.46 0.646 0.375 1.839 
Base Resume      
     2 0.956 0.123 -0.35 0.728 0.743 1.231 
Submit First      
     Yes 1.014 0.130 0.11 0.916 0.788 1.303 
Full-Time       
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     Yes 1.157 0.422 0.40 0.690 0.566 2.363 
     Not Listed 1.213 0.812 0.29 0.773 0.327 4.502 
Job Type       
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.736 0.428 -0.53 0.598 0.236 2.300 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.507 0.215 -1.60 0.110 0.221 1.166 
     Manufacturing  0.410 0.237 -1.54 0.123 0.132 1.273 
     Restaurant Labor 0.462 0.280 -1.27 0.203 0.140 1.519 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.496 0.358 -0.97 0.331 0.121 2.037 
     Driving 0.541 0.320 -1.04 0.300 0.169 1.727 
     Clerical 0.193 0.126 -2.53 0.012 0.054 0.692 
     Sales In-Store 0.698 0.415 -0.6 0.546 0.218 2.241 
     Warehouse 0.550 0.259 -1.27 0.204 0.218 1.385 
     Sales Call Center 3.788 2.502 2.02 0.044 1.038 13.823 
     Multiple  0.312 0.299 -1.21 0.225 0.047 2.048 
Staffing Agency      
     Yes 12.662 6.144 5.23 0.000 4.892 32.774 
Temporary      
     Yes 1.819 0.826 1.32 0.188 0.747 4.427 
Month Submitted      
     January 0.775 0.365 -0.54 0.589 0.308 1.950 
     March 0.676 0.220 -1.20 0.230 0.357 1.280 
     April 0.430 0.206 -1.76 0.079 0.168 1.102 
     May 1.356 0.573 0.72 0.471 0.592 3.102 
Time Submitted      
     PM 0.877 0.235 -0.49 0.625 0.519 1.482 
Posting Age      
     5-14 days 1.232 0.417 0.62 0.538 0.635 2.390 
Day Submitted      
     Friday and Saturday 0.301 0.185 -1.95 0.051 0.090 1.004 
Hourly Pay      
     Above Median 1.008 0.393 0.02 0.984 0.469 2.163 
     Not Listed 1.280 0.445 0.71 0.478 0.648 2.530 
Constant  0.256 0.138 -2.53 0.011 0.089 0.736 
Notes. N = 800. McFadden R2 = 0.138. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.201. AIC = 
731.749. BIC = 886.341. Log pseudolikelihood = -332.875. Wald chi2 (32) = 89.76. Prob 
> chi2 = 0.0000. Standard error adjusted for 400 clusters. Reference Category for record 
type is no record. Reference category for name is DaQuan. Reference category for city 
location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category for base resume is 1. Reference 
category for submitted first is no. Reference category for full-time is part-time. Reference 
category for job type is general labor. Reference category for staffing agency is no. 
Reference category for temporary is no. Reference category for month submitted is 
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February. Reference category for time submitted is AM. Reference category for posting 
age is 1-4 days. Reference category for day submitted is Sunday through Thursday. 
Reference category for hourly pay is median and below.  
 
 iv. Interactions  
Table B.5. Logistic regression of the criminal record and race interaction on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback.  
Variable OR SE z P>z CI Lower  CI Upper  
Race       
     White  1.642 0.401  2.03 0.042 1.017  2.651 
Record Type       
     CQE 0.773 0.172 -1.16 0.248 0.499 1.197 
Interaction Term       
     White x CQE  0.684 0.252 -1.03 0.302 0.332 1.408 
Constant  0.220 0.040 -8.23 0.000 0.153 0.315 
Note. N = 800. McFadden R2 = 0.014. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.022. AIC = 
769.289. BIC = 788.027. Log pseudolikelihood = -380.645. Wald chi2(3) = 23.16.  Prob 
> chi2 = 0.0000. Standard error adjusted for 400 clusters. Reference category for record 
and CQE is no record. Reference category for White is African American. Reference 
category for White x CQE is African American with no record.  
 
Table B.6. Logistic regression of the criminal record and race interaction on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback with controls.  
Variable OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race       
     White 1.684 0.447 1.96 0.050 1.001 2.834 
Record Type      
     CQE  0.714 0.174 -1.38 0.166 0.443 1.150 
Interaction Term      
     White x CQE 0.692 0.283 -0.90 0.367 0.311 1.540 
City Location      
     Cleveland 1.045 0.327 0.14 0.888 0.566 1.931 
     Not Listed 0.828 0.335 -0.47 0.642 0.375 1.830 
Base Resume      
     2 0.976 0.125 -0.19 0.848 0.759 1.255 
Submit First      
     Yes 1.017 0.131 0.13 0.898 0.789 1.309 
Full-Time       
     Yes 1.157 0.419 0.40 0.687 0.569 2.352 
     Not Listed 1.226 0.827 0.30 0.762 0.327 4.597 
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Job Type       
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.723 0.421 -0.56 0.577 0.231 2.264 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.514 0.217 -1.58 0.115 0.224 1.176 
     Manufacturing  0.411 0.239 -1.53 0.126 0.131 1.283 
     Restaurant Labor 0.456 0.279 -1.28 0.200 0.138 1.514 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.522 0.379 -0.90 0.370 0.126 2.164 
     Driving 0.566 0.334 -0.96 0.335 0.178 1.799 
     Clerical 0.193 0.126 -2.52 0.012 0.054 0.694 
     Sales In-Store 0.730 0.427 -0.54 0.591 0.232 2.295 
     Warehouse 0.553 0.260 -1.26 0.208 0.219 1.392 
     Sales Call Center 3.797 2.538 2.00 0.046 1.024 14.072 
     Multiple  0.312 0.303 -1.20 0.230 0.046 2.093 
Staffing Agency      
     Yes 13.232 6.432 5.31 0.000 5.104 34.308 
Temporary      
     Yes 1.764 0.801 1.25 0.211 0.725 4.296 
Month Submitted      
     January 0.758 0.358 -0.59 0.558 0.300 1.914 
     March 0.676 0.221 -1.20 0.231 0.357 1.283 
     April 0.445 0.211 -1.71 0.088 0.176 1.128 
     May 1.346 0.571 0.70 0.483 0.586 3.090 
Time Submitted      
     PM 0.882 0.236 -0.47 0.639 0.523 1.489 
Posting Age      
     5-14 days 1.256 0.424 0.67 0.500 0.648 2.434 
Day Submitted      
     Friday and Saturday 0.301 0.187 -1.93 0.053 0.089 1.018 
Hourly Pay      
     Above Median 1.031 0.404 0.08 0.938 0.478 2.223 
     Not Listed 1.312 0.461 0.77 0.439 0.659 2.612 
Constant  0.274 0.147 -2.42 0.016 0.096 0.783 
Notes. N = 800. McFadden R2 = 0.136. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.199. AIC = 
730.815. BIC = 880.723.  Log pseudolikelihood = -333.408. Wald chi2 (31) = 92.59. 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. Standard error adjusted for 400 clusters. Reference Category for 
record type is no record. Reference category for race is African American. Reference 
category for interaction term is African American x no record. Reference category for 
city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category for base resume is 1. 
Reference category for submitted first is no. Reference category for full-time is part-time. 
Reference category for job type is general labor. Reference category for staffing agency 
is no. Reference category for temporary is no. Reference category for month submitted is 
February. Reference category for time submitted is AM. Reference category for posting 
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age is 1-4 days. Reference category for day submitted is Sunday through Thursday. 
Reference category for hourly pay is median and below.  
 
 v. Racial Groupings  
 
Table B.7. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback for the African American grouping. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type       
     CQE  0.642 0.125 -2.27 0.023 0.438 0.941 
Constant   0.225 0.063 -5.35 0.000 0.131 0.389 
Note. N = 174. McFadden R2= 0.007. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.011. AIC = 
153.087. BIC = 159.406. Log likelihood = -74.544. LR chi2 (1) = 5.16. Prob > chi2 = 
0.023. Standard errors adjusted for 87 clusters. Reference Category for record type is no 
record.  
 
Table B.8. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback for the African American grouping with controls. 
Variable OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type      
     Record and CQE 0.589 0.130 -2.40 0.017 0.382 0.908 
City Location      
     Cleveland 1.349 1.038 0.39 0.697 0.299 6.095 
     Not Listed 1.470 1.546 0.370 0.714 0.187 11.539 
Base Resume      
     2 1.301 0.317 1.08 0.280 0.807 2.097 
Submit First      
     Yes 1.411 0.362 1.34 0.179 0.854 2.332 
Full-Time       
     Yes 1.401 1.67 0.28 0.777 0.135 14.491 
     Not Listed 0.477 0.758 -0.47 0.642 0.021 10.739 
Staffing Agency      
     Yes 41.800 46.821 3.33 0.001 4.653 375.508 
Temporary      
     Yes 13.159 17.819 1.90 0.057 0.926 187.006 
Month Submitted      
     January 1.295 1.715 0.20 0.845 0.097 17.373 
     March 1.860 2.297 0.50 0.615 0.165 20.926 
     April 0.423 0.684 -0.53 0.595 0.018 10.039 
     May 2.023 2.056 0.69 0.488 0.276 14.827 
Time Submitted      
     PM 0.792 0.742 -0.25 0.803 0.126 4.973 
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Posting Age      
     5-14 days 1.502 1.567 0.39 0.697 0.194 11.613 
Day Submitted      
     Friday and Saturday 0.079 0.100 -2.01 0.044 0.007 0.935 
Hourly Pay      
     Above Median 2.325 2.527 0.78 0.438 0.276 19.568 
     Not Listed 2.136 2.548 0.64 0.524 0.206 22.119 
Constant  0.040 0.072 -1.78 0.074 0.001 1.372 
Notes. N = 174. McFadden R2= 0.251. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.337. AIC = 
150.486. BIC = 210.508. Log pseudolikelihood = -56.243. Wald chi2 (18) = 84.94. Prob 
> chi2 = 0.0000. Standard error adjusted for 87 clusters. Reference Category for record 
type is no record. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. 
Reference category for base resume is 1. Reference category for submitted first is no. 
Reference category for full-time is part-time. Reference category for job type is general 
labor. Reference category for staffing agency is no. Reference category for temporary is 
no. Reference category for month submitted is February. Reference category for time 
submitted is AM. Reference category for posting age is 1-4 days. Reference category for 
day submitted is Sunday through Thursday. Reference category for hourly pay is median 
and below.  
 
Table B.9. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback for the White grouping. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type       
     CQE  0.602 0.130 -2.34 0.019 0.394 0.920 
Constant   0.403 0.096 -3.81 0.000 0.253 0.643 
Note. N = 174. McFadden R2= 0.010. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.017. AIC = 
194.309. BIC = 200.627. Log likelihood = -95.154. LR chi2 (1) = 5.50. Prob > chi2 = 
0.019. Standard errors adjusted for 87 clusters. Reference Category for record type is no 
record.  
 
Table B.10. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback for the White grouping with controls. 
Variable OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type      
     Record and CQE 0.525 0.139 -2.43 0.015 0.312 0.883 
City Location      
     Cleveland 1.196 0.934 0.23 0.819 0.259 5.522 
     Not Listed 0.743 0.679 -0.33 0.745 0.124 4.451 
Base Resume      
     2 1.075 0.274 0.28 0.778 0.652 1.772 
Submit First      
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     Yes 1.219 0.329 0.73 0.462 0.719 2.068 
Full-Time       
     Yes 1.55 0.977 0.7 0.487 0.451 5.331 
     Not Listed 1.087 1.575 0.06 0.954 0.064 18.595 
Staffing Agency      
     Yes 38.68 65.539 2.16 0.031 1.397 1070.893 
Temporary      
     Yes 2.347 1.972 1.02 0.31 0.452 12.184 
Month Submitted      
     January 1.127 1.451 0.09 0.926 0.09 14.072 
     March 0.929 0.751 -0.09 0.928 0.191 4.532 
     April 1.462 1.545 0.36 0.719 0.184 11.595 
     May 2.866 2.654 1.14 0.255 0.467 17.596 
Time Submitted      
     PM 0.248 0.168 -2.06 0.04 0.065 0.937 
Posting Age      
     5-14 days 1.263 0.942 0.31 0.754 0.293 5.45 
Day Submitted      
     Friday and Saturday 0.344 0.374 -0.98 0.326 0.041 2.901 
Hourly Pay      
     Above Median 1.847 1.477 0.77 0.443 0.386 8.852 
     Not Listed 4.152 2.612 2.26 0.024 1.21 14.25 
Constant  0.094 0.077 -2.86 0.004 0.018 0.474 
Notes. N = 174. McFadden R2= 0.182. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.273. AIC = 
195.231. BIC = 255.253. Log pseudolikelihood = -78.615. Wald chi2 (18) = 32.75. Prob 
> chi2 = 0.018. Standard error adjusted for 87 clusters. Reference Category for record 
type is no record. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. 
Reference category for base resume is 1. Reference category for submitted first is no. 
Reference category for full-time is part-time. Reference category for job type is general 
labor. Reference category for staffing agency is no. Reference category for temporary is 
no. Reference category for month submitted is February. Reference category for time 
submitted is AM. Reference category for posting age is 1-4 days. Reference category for 
day submitted is Sunday through Thursday. Reference category for hourly pay is median 
and below.  
 
Table B.11. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback for the African American and White grouping. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race        
     White  1.164 0.187 0.94 0.346 0.849 1.595 
Record Type       
     CQE  0.634 0.103 -2.81 0.005 0.461 0.871 
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Constant   0.250 0.047 -7.37 0.000 0.173 0.361 
Note. N = 452. McFadden R2= 0.009. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.014. AIC = 
427.266. BIC = 439.607. Log likelihood = -210.633. LR chi2 (2) = 9.08. Prob > chi2 = 
0.011. Standard errors adjusted for 226 clusters. Reference category for race is African 
American. Reference Category for record type is no record.  
 
Table B.12. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback for the African American and White grouping with 
controls. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race        
     White  1.170 0.198 0.93 0.351 0.841 1.629 
Record Type       
     Record and CQE 0.621 0.108 -2.73 0.006 0.441 0.875 
City Location       
     Cleveland 1.099 0.463 0.22 0.823 0.481 2.510 
     Not Listed 0.923 0.447 -0.16 0.869 0.357 2.387 
Base Resume       
     2  0.870 0.149 -0.81 0.417 0.621 1.218 
Submit First       
     Yes  0.860 0.148 -0.88 0.381 0.614 1.205 
Full-Time        
     Yes  1.098 0.443 0.23 0.817 0.498 2.422 
     Not Listed 0.674 0.67 -0.4 0.691 0.096 4.725 
Staffing Agency       
     Yes  5.881 3.238 3.22 0.001 1.998 17.304 
Temporary       
     Yes  1.227 0.749 0.34 0.737 0.371 4.061 
Month Submitted       
     January 0.917 0.539 -0.15 0.883 0.29 2.902 
     March  0.702 0.286 -0.87 0.385 0.316 1.561 
     April  0.458 0.268 -1.34 0.181 0.145 1.44 
     May  0.717 0.472 -0.51 0.613 0.197 2.607 
Time Submitted       
     PM  1.217 0.399 0.60 0.549 0.640 2.316 
Posting Age       
     5-14 days 1.041 0.413 0.10 0.919 0.479 2.265 
Day Submitted       
     Friday and Saturday 0.569 0.464 -0.69 0.489 0.115 2.811 
Hourly Pay       
     Above Median 0.645 0.318 -0.89 0.375 0.245 1.697 
     Not Listed 1.061 0.409 0.15 0.878 0.498 2.260 
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Constant   0.315 0.177 -2.06 0.04 0.105 0.948 
Notes. N = 452. McFadden R2= 0.062. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.093. AIC = 
438.715. BIC = 520.988. Log pseudolikelihood = -199.357. Wald chi2 (19) = 32.94. Prob 
> chi2 = 0.024. Standard error adjusted for 226 clusters. Reference category for race is 
African American. Reference Category for record type is no record. Reference category 
for city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category for base resume is 1. 
Reference category for submitted first is no. Reference category for full-time is part-time. 
Reference category for job type is general labor. Reference category for staffing agency 
is no. Reference category for temporary is no. Reference category for month submitted is 
February. Reference category for time submitted is AM. Reference category for posting 
age is 1-4 days. Reference category for day submitted is Sunday through Thursday. 
Reference category for hourly pay is median and below.  
 
 vi. First Call   
 
Table B.13. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of being called first. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race        
     White  2.128 0.951 1.69 0.091 0.887 5.109 
Record Type       
     CQE  0.471 0.292 -1.21 0.225 0.139 1.588 
Constant   0.982 0.385 -0.05 0.963 0.456 2.117 
Note. N = 90. McFadden R2= 0.053. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.095. AIC = 
124.133. BIC = 131.632. Log likelihood = -59.066. LR chi2 (2) = 4.40. Prob > chi2 = 
0.111. Standard errors adjusted for 45 clusters. Reference category for race is African 
American. Reference Category for record type is no record.   
 
Table B.14. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of being called first with controls. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race        
     White  2.423 1.169 1.83 0.067 0.941 6.240 
Record Type       
     CQE  0.370 0.252 -1.46 0.144 0.097 1.405 
Base Resume       
     2  1.212 0.772 0.30 0.763 0.347 4.225 
Submitted First       
     Yes  2.684 1.879 1.41 0.159 0.680 10.589 
Constant   0.571 0.309 -1.03 0.301 0.198 1.651 
Note. N = 90. McFadden R2= 0.092. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.160. AIC = 
123.259. BIC = 135.758. Log likelihood = -56.629. LR chi2 (4) = 5.14. Prob > chi2 = 
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0.274. Standard errors adjusted for 45 clusters. Reference category for race is African 
American. Reference Category for record type is no record.  Reference category for base 
resume is 1. Reference category for submitted first is no.  
 
B. Between-Subjects Design 
 
 i. Main Model   
 
Table B.15. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Record Type        
     No Record  2.643 0.551 4.66 0.000 1.756 3.978 
     Record   1.295 0.296 1.13 0.257 0.828 2.027 
Race        
     White  1.895 0.323 3.76 0.000 1.358 2.646 
Constant   0.075 0.015 -12.92 0.000 0.051 0.112 
Note. N = 1200. McFadden R2= 0.040. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.059. AIC = 
968.115. BIC = 988.475. Log likelihood = -480.058. LR chi2 (3) = 40.40. Prob > chi2 = 
0.0000. Reference Category for record type is record and CQE. Reference category for 
race is African American.  
 
 ii. Controls  
 
Table B.16. Logistic regression of the criminal record and racial conditions on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback with controls. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race        
     White  1.949 0.347 3.75 0.000 1.375 2.762 
Record Type       
     No Record 2.779 0.604 4.70 0.000 1.815 4.255 
     Record 1.365 0.322 1.32 0.187 0.860 2.168 
City Location       
     Cleveland City 0.716 0.155 -1.54 0.124 0.468 1.096 
     No Address 1.269 0.343 0.88 0.377 0.748 2.155 
Full-Time        
     Yes  1.393 0.312 1.48 0.139 0.898 2.160 
     Not Listed 2.428 0.885 2.44 0.015 1.189 4.959 
Job Type        
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.466 0.235 -1.51 0.131 0.173 1.254 
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     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.771 0.217 -0.92 0.356 0.444 1.339 
     Manufacturing  0.519 0.227 -1.50 0.134 0.220 1.225 
     Restaurant Labor 0.736 0.227 -0.99 0.320 0.403 1.346 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.458 0.213 -1.68 0.093 0.184 1.139 
     Driving 1.854 0.730 1.57 0.117 0.857 4.010 
     Clerical 0.232 0.117 -2.89 0.004 0.086 0.625 
     Sales In-Store 0.657 0.380 -0.73 0.468 0.211 2.042 
     Warehouse 0.606 0.229 -1.33 0.184 0.289 1.269 
     Sales Call Center 2.347 1.003 2.00 0.046 1.015 5.423 
     Multiple  1.176 0.694 0.27 0.784 0.370 3.741 
Staffing Agency       
     Yes  3.419 1.553 2.71 0.007 1.403 8.328 
Temporary       
     Yes  1.593 0.521 1.42 0.155 0.839 3.024 
Month Submitted       
     January 0.975 0.328 -0.07 0.940 0.504 1.885 
     March 0.954 0.21 -0.21 0.830 0.619 1.469 
     April  1.189 0.389 0.53 0.597 0.626 2.259 
     May  0.717 0.206 -1.16 0.247 0.408 1.259 
Time Submitted       
     PM  1.108 0.204 0.56 0.575 0.773 1.589 
Posting Age       
     5-14 Days 0.822 0.192 -0.84 0.402 0.521 1.299 
Day Submitted       
     Friday - Saturday 0.480 0.224 -1.57 0.116 0.192 1.200 
Hourly Pay       
     Above Median 1.365 0.379 1.12 0.263 0.792 2.352 
     Not Listed 0.942 0.196 -0.29 0.774 0.626 1.417 
Constant  0.069 0.025 -7.28 0.000 0.034 0.142 
Note. N = 1200. McFadden R2= 0.099. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.140. AIC = 
961.890. BIC = 1114.592. Log likelihood = -450.945. LR chi2 (29) = 98.63. Prob > chi2 
= 0.0000. Reference Category for record type is record and CQE. Reference category for 
Race is African American. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. 
Reference category for full-time is part-time. Reference category for job type is general 
labor. Reference category for staffing agency is no. Reference category for temporary is 
no. Reference category for month submitted is February. Reference category for time 
submitted is AM. Reference category for posting age is 1-4 days. Reference category for 






 iii. Individual Names  
 
Table B.17. Logistic regression of the criminal record and individual name conditions on 
an applicant’s likelihood of a callback. 
Variable   OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Name        
     Jake   2.131 0.510 3.16 0.002 1.333 3.406 
     Seth  1.582 0.388 1.87 0.061 0.978 2.557 
     Tremayne  0.943 0.251 -0.22 0.825 0.560 1.587 
Record Type       
     No Record 2.701 0.566 4.74 0.000 1.791 4.074 
     Record 1.294 0.296 1.13 0.260 0.827 2.026 
Constant  0.077 0.018 -10.7 0.000 0.048 0.123 
Note. N = 1200. McFadden R2= 0.042. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.061. AIC = 
970.134. BIC = 1000.675. Log likelihood = -479.067. LR chi2(5) = 42.39. Prob > chi2 = 
0.0000. Reference Category for record type is record and CQE. Reference category for 
Name is DaQuan.  
 
Table B.18. Logistic regression of the criminal record and individual name conditions on 
an applicant’s likelihood of a callback with controls. 
Variable  OR SE z P>z CI Upper CI Lower 
Name        
     Jake  2.078 0.541 2.81 0.005 1.247 3.462 
     Seth  1.766 0.449 2.23 0.026 1.072 2.908 
     Tremayne 0.975 0.281 -0.09 0.930 0.554 1.715 
Record Type       
     No Record 2.801 0.611 4.72 0.000 1.827 4.295 
     Record 1.363 0.322 1.31 0.191 0.857 2.165 
City Location       
     Cleveland City 0.719 0.156 -1.52 0.129 0.470 1.101 
     No Address 1.281 0.347 0.91 0.361 0.753 2.177 
Full-Time        
     Yes  1.385 0.311 1.45 0.146 0.892 2.150 
     Not Listed 2.382 0.87 2.38 0.017 1.164 4.874 
Job Type        
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.474 0.239 -1.48 0.14 0.176 1.276 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.78 0.220 -0.88 0.377 0.449 1.355 
     Manufacturing  0.528 0.231 -1.46 0.144 0.223 1.245 
     Restaurant Labor 0.739 0.228 -0.98 0.327 0.404 1.352 
196 
 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.457 0.212 -1.68 0.092 0.184 1.137 
     Driving 1.844 0.727 1.55 0.121 0.851 3.992 
     Clerical 0.234 0.118 -2.87 0.004 0.087 0.631 
     Sales In-Store 0.668 0.387 -0.70 0.487 0.215 2.08 
     Warehouse 0.616 0.233 -1.28 0.199 0.294 1.291 
     Sales Call Center 2.323 0.995 1.97 0.049 1.003 5.378 
     Multiple  1.192 0.705 0.30 0.767 0.374 3.798 
Staffing Agency       
     Yes  3.398 1.545 2.69 0.007 1.394 8.284 
Temporary       
     Yes  1.622 0.533 1.47 0.141 0.852 3.088 
Month Submitted       
     January 0.985 0.332 -0.04 0.965 0.509 1.906 
     March 0.928 0.215 -0.32 0.747 0.589 1.462 
     April  1.153 0.387 0.43 0.67 0.598 2.226 
     May  0.731 0.211 -1.09 0.277 0.415 1.287 
Time Submitted       
     PM  1.112 0.205 0.58 0.564 0.775 1.595 
Posting Age       
     5-14 Days 0.819 0.191 -0.85 0.393 0.518 1.295 
Day Submitted       
     Friday - Saturday 0.485 0.227 -1.55 0.121 0.194 1.211 
Hourly Pay       
     Above Median 1.359 0.378 1.10 0.270 0.788 2.343 
     Not Listed 0.945 0.197 -0.27 0.787 0.628 1.422 
Constant  0.070 0.027 -6.88 0.000 0.033 0.150 
Note. N = 1200. McFadden R2= 0.099. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.140. AIC = 
965.403. BIC = 1128.286. Log likelihood = -450.702. LR chi2 (31) = 99.12. Prob > chi2 
= 0.0000. Reference Category for record type is record and CQE. Reference category for 
name is DaQuan. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. 
Reference category for full-time is part-time. Reference category for job type is general 
labor. Reference category for staffing agency is no. Reference category for temporary is 
no. Reference category for month submitted is February. Reference category for time 
submitted is AM. Reference category for posting age is 1-4 days. Reference category for 
day submitted is Sunday through Thursday. Reference category for hourly pay is median 
and below. 
 
 iv. Interactions  
 
Table B.19. Logistic regression of the criminal record and race interaction on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback. 
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Variable   OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race        
     White  2.149 0.764 2.15 0.031 1.071 4.316 
Record Type        
     No Record  2.946 1.011 3.15 0.002 1.504 5.772 
     Record   1.423 0.539 0.93 0.352 0.677 2.988 
Interaction Term        
     White x No Record  0.840 0.364 -0.40 0.687 0.360 1.962 
     White x Record   0.863 0.410 -0.31 0.756 0.340 2.189 
Constant   0.070 0.020 -9.30 0.000 0.040 0.122 
Note. N = 1200. McFadden R2= 0.041. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.059. AIC = 
971.945. BIC = 1002.486. Log likelihood = -479.973. LR chi2 (5) = 40.57. Prob > chi2 = 
0.0000. Reference category for record type is record and CQE. Reference category for 
race is African American. Reference category for interaction term is African American 
with record and CQE.  
 
Table B.20. Logistic regression of the criminal record and race interaction on an 
applicant’s likelihood of a callback with controls. 
Variable   OR SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
Race        
     White  2.245 0.820 2.21 0.027 1.097 4.594 
Record Type       
     No Record 3.149 1.109 3.26 0.001 1.579 6.279 
     Record  1.509 0.587 1.06 0.291 0.703 3.235 
Interaction Term       
     White x No Record 0.816 0.365 -0.46 0.648 0.340 1.959 
     White x Record 0.853 0.420 -0.32 0.747 0.325 2.238 
City Location       
     Cleveland City 0.715 0.155 -1.54 0.122 0.468 1.094 
     No Address 1.271 0.343 0.89 0.375 0.748 2.158 
Full-Time        
     Yes  1.396 0.313 1.49 0.137 0.900 2.165 
     Not Listed 2.444 0.895 2.44 0.015 1.193 5.009 
Job Type        
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.467 0.236 -1.51 0.132 0.174 1.257 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.771 0.217 -0.93 0.354 0.444 1.337 
     Manufacturing  0.520 0.227 -1.50 0.135 0.22 1.225 
     Restaurant Labor 0.735 0.226 -1.00 0.317 0.402 1.344 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.459 0.214 -1.67 0.094 0.185 1.143 
     Driving 1.864 0.735 1.58 0.114 0.861 4.037 
     Clerical 0.231 0.117 -2.90 0.004 0.086 0.623 
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     Sales In-Store 0.657 0.380 -0.72 0.469 0.211 2.044 
     Warehouse 0.610 0.23 -1.31 0.190 0.291 1.277 
     Sales Call Center 2.314 0.993 1.95 0.051 0.998 5.366 
     Multiple  1.173 0.693 0.27 0.787 0.369 3.734 
Staffing Agency       
     Yes        
Temporary 3.421 1.559 2.70 0.007 1.401 8.355 
     Yes  1.591 0.521 1.42 0.156 0.838 3.023 
Month Submitted       
     January 0.974 0.328 -0.08 0.937 0.503 1.884 
     March 0.952 0.21 -0.22 0.825 0.618 1.467 
     April  1.187 0.391 0.52 0.602 0.622 2.266 
     May  0.717 0.206 -1.16 0.247 0.408 1.259 
Time Submitted       
     PM  1.106 0.203 0.55 0.584 0.771 1.586 
Posting Age       
     5-14 Days 0.822 0.192 -0.84 0.400 0.520 1.298 
Day Submitted       
     Friday - Saturday 0.476 0.223 -1.59 0.112 0.190 1.190 
Hourly Pay       
     Above Median 1.361 0.378 1.11 0.267 0.790 2.346 
     Not Listed 0.942 0.196 -0.29 0.773 0.626 1.416 
Constant  0.063 0.027 -6.58 0.000 0.028 0.144 
Note. N = 1200. McFadden R2= 0.099. Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke R2 = 0.140. AIC = 
965.676. BIC = 1128.559. Log likelihood = -450.838. LR chi2 (31) = 98.84. Prob > chi2 
= 0.0000. Reference Category for record type is record and CQE. Reference category for 
race is African American. Reference category for interaction term is African American x 
CQE.  Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category 
for full-time is part-time. Reference category for job type is general labor. Reference 
category for staffing agency is no. Reference category for temporary is no. Reference 
category for month submitted is February. Reference category for time submitted is AM. 
Reference category for posting age is 1-4 days. Reference category for day submitted is 





PROBABILITIES AND AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
A. Mixed Design 
 
Table C.1. Probability of a callback for controls.   
Variable  Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
City Location     
     Outside Cleveland City 0.189 0.021 0.149 0.229 
     Cleveland City 0.195 0.035 0.127 0.264 
     Not Listed 0.166 0.044 0.080 0.252 
Base Resume    
     1 0.190 0.019 0.154 0.226 
     2 0.185 0.018 0.151 0.220 
Submitted First    
     No  0.187 0.018 0.152 0.221 
     Yes 0.188 0.019 0.152 0.225 
Full-Time     
     No 0.173 0.039 0.096 0.249 
     Yes 0.190 0.019 0.153 0.228 
     Not Listed 0.197 0.078 0.044 0.349 
Job Type     
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.202 0.077 0.051 0.353 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.153 0.042 0.072 0.235 
     Manufacturing  0.129 0.055 0.020 0.237 
     General Labor 0.249 0.036 0.179 0.318 
     Restaurant Labor 0.142 0.061 0.022 0.262 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.154 0.079 -0.002 0.309 
     Driving 0.165 0.068 0.032 0.297 
     Clerical 0.071 0.038 -0.003 0.145 
     Sales In-Store 0.195 0.076 0.047 0.344 
     Warehouse 0.164 0.051 0.064 0.264 
     Sales Call Center 0.528 0.137 0.261 0.796 
     Multiple  0.103 0.079 -0.051 0.257 
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Staffing Agency    
     No 0.167 0.016 0.135 0.199 
     Yes 0.660 0.093 0.477 0.843 
Temporary    
     No 0.181 0.017 0.148 0.213 
     Yes 0.268 0.071 0.129 0.408 
Month Submitted    
     January 0.175 0.051 0.075 0.275 
     February 0.212 0.033 0.147 0.276 
     March 0.163 0.027 0.110 0.215 
     April 0.118 0.037 0.045 0.190 
     May 0.258 0.055 0.151 0.365 
Time Submitted    
     AM 0.194 0.022 0.151 0.238 
     PM 0.177 0.024 0.129 0.225 
Posting Age    
     1-4 Days 0.183 0.017 0.149 0.217 
     5-14 Days 0.211 0.043 0.126 0.296 
Day Submitted    
     Sunday - Thursday 0.201 0.018 0.166 0.237 
     Friday - Saturday 0.079 0.039 0.004 0.155 
Hourly Pay    
     Median and Below 0.170 0.034 0.103 0.237 
     Above Median 0.171 0.034 0.105 0.237 
     No Pay Listed 0.203 0.024 0.156 0.25 
 
Table C.2. Average marginal effects for controls.    
Variable Difference SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
City Location      
     Cleveland City 0.006 0.041 0.15 0.880 -0.075 0.088 
     No Address -0.023 0.049 -0.48 0.634 -0.118 0.072 
Base Resume      
     2 -0.005 0.017 -0.28 0.777 -0.037 0.028 
Submitted First      
     Yes 0.002 0.017 0.10 0.919 -0.031 0.034 
Full-Time       
     Yes 0.018 0.045 0.39 0.696 -0.070 0.106 
     Not Listed 0.024 0.089 0.27 0.787 -0.150 0.197 
Job Type        
     Cust. Serv. Call Center -0.047 0.085 -0.54 0.586 -0.214 0.121 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store -0.095 0.056 -1.72 0.086 -0.204 0.014 
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     Manufacturing  -0.120 0.064 -1.87 0.062 -0.246 0.006 
     Restaurant Labor -0.107 0.071 -1.51 0.132 -0.246 0.032 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. -0.095 0.088 -1.09 0.277 -0.267 0.077 
     Driving -0.084 0.076 -1.11 0.268 -0.233 0.065 
     Clerical -0.178 0.051 -3.47 0.001 -0.278 -0.077 
     Sales In-Store -0.053 0.085 -0.63 0.531 -0.220 0.114 
     Warehouse -0.085 0.062 -1.36 0.173 -0.206 0.037 
     Sales Call Center 0.280 0.144 1.94 0.052 -0.002 0.562 
     Multiple  -0.146 0.084 -1.74 0.082 -0.310 0.019 
Staffing Agency      
     Yes 0.493 0.095 5.19 0.000 0.307 0.679 
Temporary      
     Yes 0.087 0.074 1.19 0.236 -0.057 0.232 
Month Submitted      
     January -0.037 0.061 -0.61 0.542 -0.156 0.082 
     March -0.049 0.043 -1.14 0.252 -0.133 0.035 
     April -0.094 0.051 -1.84 0.065 -0.194 0.006 
     May 0.046 0.066 0.70 0.483 -0.083 0.176 
Time Submitted      
     PM -0.017 0.034 -0.49 0.622 -0.083 0.050 
Posting Age      
     5-14 Days 0.028 0.047 0.61 0.544 -0.063 0.120 
Day Submitted      
     Friday - Saturday -0.122 0.044 -2.77 0.006 -0.209 -0.036 
Hourly Pay      
     Above Median 0.001 0.047 0.03 0.979 -0.092 0.094 
     Not Listed 0.033 0.044 0.75 0.454 -0.053 0.118 
Note. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category 
for base resume is 1. Reference category for submitted first is no. Reference category for 
full-time is part-time. Reference category for job type is general labor. Reference 
category for staffing agency is no. Reference category for temporary is no. Reference 
category for month submitted is February. Reference category for time submitted is AM. 
Reference category for posting age is 1-4 days. Reference category for day submitted is 
Sunday through Thursday. Reference category for hourly pay is median and below.  
 
Table C.3. Probability of a callback for alternate coding of Full-Time and City Location.    
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
Full-Time     
     No 0.173 0.039 0.096 0.250 
     Yes 0.189 0.021 0.148 0.230 
     Not Listed  0.197 0.078 0.044 0.350 
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     Both 0.199 0.054 0.092 0.305 
City Location    
     Outside Cleveland City 0.189 0.021 0.149 0.230 
     Cleveland City 0.195 0.035 0.127 0.263 
     No City Listed 0.161 0.084 -0.004 0.325 
     Multiple Cities 0.198 0.082 0.0370 0.359 
     Out of State 0.158 0.057 0.046 0.270 
 
Table C.4. Average marginal effects of alternate coding of Full-Time and City Location.  
Variable Difference SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
City Location      
     Cleveland City 0.006 0.041 0.14 0.887 -0.075 0.087 
     No Address -0.029 0.086 -0.33 0.738 -0.198 0.140 
     Multiple Cities 0.008 0.085 0.10 0.922 -0.159 0.176 
     Out of State -0.031 0.061 -0.52 0.605 -0.151 0.088 
Full-Time      
     Yes 0.016 0.047 0.34 0.732 -0.075 0.107 
     Not Listed 0.024 0.088 0.27 0.785 -0.149 0.198 
     Both 0.026 0.065 0.39 0.695 -0.103 0.154 
Note. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category 
for full-time is part-time. 
 
B. Between-Subjects Design  
 
Table C.5. Probability of a callback for controls.   
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
City Location     
     Outside Cleveland City 0.153 0.013 0.128 0.177 
     Cleveland City 0.117 0.018 0.082 0.152 
     Not Listed 0.183 0.033 0.118 0.248 
Full-Time     
     No 0.115 0.019 0.078 0.151 
     Yes 0.150 0.012 0.126 0.173 
     Not Listed 0.226 0.047 0.134 0.318 
Job Type     
     Cust. Serv. Call Center 0.094 0.039 0.018 0.170 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store 0.142 0.027 0.090 0.195 
     Manufacturing  0.103 0.036 0.032 0.173 
     General Labor 0.174 0.019 0.137 0.212 
     Restaurant Labor 0.137 0.030 0.079 0.196 
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     Restaurant Cust. Serv. 0.092 0.035 0.024 0.161 
     Driving 0.271 0.066 0.142 0.400 
     Clerical 0.050 0.022 0.007 0.094 
     Sales In-Store 0.125 0.057 0.013 0.237 
     Warehouse 0.117 0.034 0.051 0.183 
     Sales Call Center 0.315 0.077 0.164 0.466 
     Multiple  0.197 0.083 0.034 0.360 
Staffing Agency    
     No 0.142 0.010 0.123 0.161 
     Yes 0.332 0.086 0.163 0.501 
Temporary    
     No 0.143 0.010 0.123 0.162 
     Yes 0.202 0.045 0.114 0.290 
Month Submitted    
     January 0.150 0.035 0.081 0.219 
     February 0.153 0.018 0.118 0.188 
     March 0.147 0.018 0.112 0.182 
     April 0.174 0.037 0.103 0.246 
     May 0.117 0.023 0.073 0.162 
Time Submitted    
     AM 0.142 0.012 0.118 0.167 
     PM 0.154 0.017 0.121 0.187 
Posting Age    
     1-4 Days 0.151 0.011 0.129 0.174 
     5-14 Days 0.13 0.021 0.088 0.172 
Day Submitted    
     Sunday - Thursday 0.151 0.010 0.131 0.171 
     Friday - Saturday 0.083 0.033 0.019 0.146 
Hourly Pay    
     Median and Below 0.146 0.019 0.109 0.182 
     Above Median 0.184 0.031 0.123 0.245 
     No Pay Listed 0.139 0.013 0.114 0.164 
 
Table C.6. Average marginal effects for controls. 
Variable Difference SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
City Location       
     Cleveland City -0.036 0.022 -1.62 0.106 -0.079 0.008 
     No Address 0.030 0.036 0.84 0.399 -0.04 0.100 
Full-Time       
     Yes 0.035 0.022 1.56 0.118 -0.009 0.079 
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     Not Listed 0.111 0.051 2.17 0.030 0.011 0.211 
Job Type       
     Cust. Serv. Call Center -0.081 0.043 -1.86 0.063 -0.166 0.004 
     Cust. Serv. In-Store -0.032 0.034 -0.95 0.340 -0.098 0.034 
     Manufacturing  -0.072 0.041 -1.76 0.078 -0.151 0.008 
     Restaurant Labor -0.037 0.036 -1.04 0.298 -0.107 0.033 
     Restaurant Cust. Serv. -0.082 0.040 -2.04 0.041 -0.161 -0.003 
     Driving 0.097 0.068 1.41 0.158 -0.038 0.231 
     Clerical -0.124 0.029 -4.22 0.000 -0.182 -0.066 
     Sales In-Store -0.049 0.061 -0.81 0.416 -0.168 0.069 
     Warehouse -0.057 0.039 -1.48 0.139 -0.133 0.019 
     Sales Call Center 0.141 0.080 1.76 0.079 -0.016 0.298 
     Multiple  0.023 0.085 0.26 0.792 -0.145 0.190 
Staffing Agency      
     Yes 0.190 0.087 2.19 0.029 0.020 0.360 
Temporary      
     Yes 0.060 0.047 1.28 0.200 -0.032 0.151 
Month Submitted      
     January -0.003 0.039 -0.08 0.940 -0.080 0.074 
     March -0.005 0.026 -0.21 0.830 -0.056 0.045 
     April 0.021 0.042 0.52 0.606 -0.060 0.103 
     May -0.035 0.030 -1.2 0.230 -0.093 0.022 
Time Submitted      
     PM 0.012 0.021 0.56 0.578 -0.030 0.053 
Posting Age      
     5-14 Days -0.022 0.025 -0.87 0.386 -0.070 0.027 
Day Submitted      
     Friday - Saturday -0.068 0.034 -1.99 0.047 -0.136 -0.001 
Hourly Pay      
     Above Median 0.039 0.036 1.08 0.278 -0.031 0.109 
     Not Listed -0.007 0.023 -0.28 0.776 -0.052 0.039 
Note. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category 
for full-time is part-time. Reference category for job type is general labor. Reference 
category for staffing agency is no. Reference category for temporary is no. Reference 
category for month submitted is February. Reference category for time submitted is AM. 
Reference category for posting age is 1-4 days. Reference category for day submitted is 
Sunday through Thursday. Reference category for hourly pay is median and below. 
 
Table C.7. Probability of a callback for alternate coding of Full-Time and City Location.    
Variable Margin SE CI Lower CI Upper 
Full-Time     
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     No 0.116 0.019 0.080 0.153 
     Yes 0.149 0.013 0.124 0.174 
     Not Listed  0.222 0.047 0.131 0.314 
     Both 0.154 0.039 0.078 0.230 
City Location    
     Outside Cleveland City 0.152 0.013 0.128 0.177 
     Cleveland City 0.117 0.018 0.083 0.152 
     No City Listed 0.142 0.040 0.063 0.221 
     Multiple Cities 0.220 0.070 0.082 0.357 
     Out of State 0.265 0.095 0.079 0.451 
 
Table C.8. Average marginal effects of alternate coding of Full-Time and City Location.    
Variable Difference SE z P>z CI Lower CI Upper 
City Location      
     Cleveland City -0.035 0.022 -1.58 0.114 -0.078 0.008 
     No Address -0.010 0.042 -0.24 0.808 -0.093 0.072 
     Multiple Cities 0.067 0.071 0.94 0.346 -0.073 0.207 
     Out of State 0.112 0.096 1.17 0.243 -0.076 0.301 
Full-Time      
     Yes 0.033 0.023 1.43 0.153 -0.012 0.078 
     Not Listed 0.106 0.051 2.09 0.037 0.007 0.206 
     Both 0.038 0.043 0.88 0.379 -0.046 0.122 
Note. Reference category for city location is outside Cleveland City. Reference category 
for full-time is part-time. 
 
 
 
 
